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ABSTRACT 
Courtney A. Short: “The Most Vital Question”: Race and Identity in Occupation Policy 
Construction and Practice, Okinawa, 1945-1946. 
(Under the direction of Joseph Glatthaar) 
This study explores the planning considerations of the United States military in 
formulating and implementing policy for the occupation of Okinawa from April 1945 to July 
1946.  American soldiers, Marines, and sailors on Okinawa encountered not only a Japanese 
enemy but a large local population.  The Okinawans were ethnically different from the Japanese 
yet Okinawa shared politics with Japan as a legal prefecture.  When devising occupation policies, 
the United States military analyzed practical military considerations such as resources, weapons 
capability, and terrain as well as attempted to ascertain a conclusive definition of Okinawa’s 
relation to Japan through conscious, open, rational analysis of racial and ethnic identity.  Unable 
to definitively determine the depth of Okinawan loyalty to Japan, American planners opted for 
caution and advised military forces to expect the people to act like enemy.  While the Marines 
held steadfast to the image of the enemy civilian, soldiers’ ideas about the race, ethnicity, and 
identity of the Okinawans evolved through interactions with the civilians throughout the battle.  
Seen as obedient, docile, and cooperative, the Army expressed feelings of kinship towards the 
civilians and reshaped its military government policies towards leniency.  The Navy, upon taking 
control of the military government program following the war, likewise adapted its view of the 
ethnicity of the Okinawans and recognized them as competent and civilized: a group that formed 
a distinct, separate, unique ethnic community that was neither American nor Japanese in its 
likeness.  For all services, assignments of identity influenced the parameters of occupation policy
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- whether by retaining tight restrictions like the Marines or by allowing the Okinawans 
ownership in the design of their community like the Navy.  Okinawans themselves also actively 
chose and promoted a self-identity that gained them the advantage of good treatment by the 
American victors.  Considerations of race, ethnicity, and identity by the Americans deeply 
influenced the conduct of the occupation beyond practical concerns of resources and battlefield 
conditions.  The mercurial nature of the identity of the Okinawans displays both the malleability 
of race and ethnicity and its centrality in occupation planning.
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INTRODUCTION 
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 catapulted America into a world war 
with battlefields across an ocean.  Despite poor diplomatic relations between the United States 
and Japan over the previous twenty years, the raid on the Hawaiian base shocked Americans and 
dislodged any hopes they had of remaining isolated from the international war that brewed in 
Europe.  Japan stood as a formidable foe that had both tactical skill and intelligent military 
leaders.  In quick secession, Japan followed the Pearl Harbor strike with attacks on Allied 
possessions in Singapore, the Philippines, Borneo, and Java.  By 1942, the Japanese fought at sea 
and on land as they aimed for Port Moresby, New Guinea, and the American fleet at Midway.1  
 American military strategy focused on the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese 
home islands.  Japan, however, established a defensive perimeter around its mainland by 
occupying numerous islands throughout the Pacific.  Confronted by Japanese aggression at the 
edge of this boundary, the United States military embarked on a multiservice island campaign in 
1943 that featured two simultaneous approaches – one along the South Pacific led by the Army 
under General Douglas MacArthur and one in the Central Pacific led by the Navy under Admiral 
Chester Nimitz.  American forces progressed north towards Japan by selectively assaulting 
islands that had the greatest strategic value and bypassing those that lacked Japanese troops or 
could offer the advantage of cutting off Japanese forces from supplies.  Captured islands served 
                                                          
1Christopher J. Anderson The Marines in World War II: from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (London: Stackpole 
Books, 2006; Michael J. Lyons, World War II: A Short History (Cambridge: Pearson Publishing, 2009), 142-150; 
Max Hastings, Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945 (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 198-263. 
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as refit outposts and staging bases for further operations.  The campaign demonstrated immense 
American industrial and military power.  Supported by the strength of its production and 
mobilization, the United States fought in the air, on land, and at sea with a large and capable 
military; operations highlighted the innovative use of aircraft and sea vessels in amphibious 
campaigns, naval battles, and jungle land warfare.  Naval bombardments coupled with 
amphibious landings secured islands such as Tarawa, Eniwetok, and Saipan and allowed U.S. air 
forces to move within bombing distance of the home islands.  Under MacArthur in the South 
Pacific, the Army secured Biak and Wakde, both of which provided completed airfields.2 
Okinawa sat at the culmination point of the two drives; MacArthur and Nimitz’s separate 
campaigns merged into one joint mission to invade the island located only 360 nautical miles 
from Kyushu, the southernmost home island.  Okinawa would serve as a staging area for the 
planned invasion of mainland Japan and also support operations as a supply depot; possession of 
the island finally gave the Americans the necessary proximity to their intended target, for 
invasion as well as bombing.   
Okinawa, however, differed from all other islands that the Americans had landed on; it 
was a prefecture of Japan and housed half a million residents that held status as subjects of the 
Emperor.3  Okinawa’s relationship with Japan over the centuries had developed a unique 
trajectory unlike other Asian countries in the region.  Once ruled by royalty, the Ryukyuan 
Kingdom prided itself on a commitment to peaceful international relations that ultimately led to 
the end of the Kingdom with the quiet usurpation of King Sho Tai in 1879 by the Japanese and 
the establishment of Okinawa Prefecture.  Ethnically, Okinawans were Ryukyuan and not 
                                                          
2Ibid; Hastings, Inferno, 419-426. 
 
3Ibid; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, November 15, 1944, RG 407, Box 2502, NARA, 5. 
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Yamato Japanese, a difference that led to the relegation of Okinawa to a less desirable and 
secondary prefecture in politics and social constructs.  The ease of dismantling the Ryukyuan 
Kingdom, however, meant that Japan never treated Okinawa as a colony nor its people as the 
conquered.  The key distinction meant that Okinawans considered themselves subjects of the 
Emperor and a part of the nation of Japan despite the prejudices and disadvantages that the 
Japanese government waged against them.  At the same time, however, Okinawans also 
remained very aware of their second class status and harbored a certain amount of bitterness 
towards Japan because of the inequality.4 
When Brigadier General William E. Crist, the Tenth Army Deputy Commander for 
Military Government, identified the problem of discerning the loyalty of the Okinawan 
population as “the most vital question” in planning military government and operations on 
Okinawa, he had witnessed almost forty-five days of armed conflict on the island.  Throughout 
the Pacific, wartime occupation received little attention from operational military planners.  U.S. 
occupation policy generally focused on removing civilians from the battlefield by corralling 
them into encampments.  While the use of military government camps still provided the 
foundation for occupation policies on Okinawa, the ethnicity and massive population posed a 
brand new challenge for the American military in the Pacific.  At a size of approximately 
463,000, the people of Okinawa, intermingled with Japan’s military, made a significant impact 
on operations and forced the Americans to deal with the pervasive integration on the battlefield 
of children, families, and the elderly.  Crist recognized the complications posed by the 
population and correctly assessed that a complete analysis of the potential effects of the people 
on combat and military government operations stood as a crucial step in the planning of 
                                                          
4George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing, 2000), 156-166, 381-383. 
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Operation ICEBERG (the Battle of Okinawa) – one that if miscalculated could result in the 
failure of the invasion.5 
Race and ethnicity sat at the center of such a study.  Crist correctly looked at the large 
size of the population and the close yet strained association between the people and Japan and 
assessed how fundamental an educated understanding of the ethnic and racial dynamics was to 
conducting military operations of all types on the island of Okinawa.  Gauging the reaction of the 
population to a foreign invasion held paramount importance to the success of the mission.  As 
Japanese subjects, the Okinawans could significantly increase the size of the enemy force by 
fighting.  The people’s bitterness towards Japan, however, could inspire them to see the 
Americans as a liberating force.  The safety and security of the American troops depended on a 
sophisticated attempt at determining the allegiance and identity of the Okinawans.6  Only 
through comprehension of the complex ethnic, racial, and historical background of the 
Okinawans in relation to Japan could American planners make informed decisions about military 
government practices and the proper employment of troops.  Crist’s comment reflects the open, 
analytical role of race and identity in military decision-making.  Neither practical military 
considerations nor deliberations on race could accurately inform military policy alone.   
Within the greater context of the war with Japan, Crist’s comment about the importance 
of decoding the Okinawan’s sense of identity when conducting military planning points to an 
                                                          
5History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, 1 April-30 April 1945 [L Day to L+29] by BG William E. 
Crist, May 10, 1945, RG 407, Box 2487, file 110-5.0, NARA; Robert B. Sheeks, Lieutenant, USMCR, “Civilians on 
Saipan,” Far Eastern Survey, May 9, 1945, 109; Military Government, General Order No.2-44, Tinian, September 
2, 1944, RG 389, Box 844, NARA, Training Syllabus, Charlottesville, VA, October 21, 1944, RG 496, Box 351, 
NARA, 1; Military Government, General Order No. 1-44, Tinian, August 26, 1944, RG 389, Box 844, NARA; Plan 
for the Naval Military Government of the Marianas, RG 398, Box 844, NARA; Political Directive for the Military 
Government of the Caroline Islands in the Central Pacific, Appendix D, March 1944, RG 389, Box 844, NARA; 
Plan for the Naval Military Government of the East Caroline Islands, RG 389, Box 844, NARA. 
 
6 History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 17; Okinawa Diary, 
March 21, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns. 
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issue of intellectual discourse among scholars of the Pacific War.  Noting the brutal nature of 
combat between Japan and the United States, historians have dissected the relations between the 
two nations and the possible role of racism in shaping the nature of the fighting.  Most notably, 
John Dower’s War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War argued that negative 
racial feelings drove policy makers and individual actors within the military to interact with the 
Japanese in a darker, more vicious manner that pushed the boundaries of acceptable violence in 
war.  Craig Cameron followed Dower’s influential work by examining the details of one unit’s 
actions on Okinawa in American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the 
First Marine Division, 1941-1951.  Cameron reinforced Dower’s thesis that racism defined 
action by depicting gruesome deeds the American military committed against their enemy and 
arguing that negative racial stereotypes served as the primary motivator.  John Lynn, however, 
has countered both Cameron and Dower in his work Battle: A History of Combat and Culture.  
Lynn asserts that military organizations shape policy and strategy around practical military 
considerations such as troop strength, resource allocation, and enemy disposition.  Military 
leaders make balanced tactical and strategic decisions based on mission needs, not fueled by 
irrational, emotionally charged racism.7 
Military planners for the invasion of Okinawa, both Army and Marine, defied the 
arguments of Dower, Cameron, and Lynn.  While not disregarding the importance of calculating 
the strength of supply lines that stretched from the Pacific back to the United States or the 
dynamics of terrain on the tactics employed, military leaders embraced what Crist promoted –
                                                          
7John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); 
Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in First Marine Division, 
1941-1951 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).    
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complex, educated, sophisticated, mindful consideration of identity, race, and ethnicity during 
planning and execution of the mission.   
Chapter one examines the Army.  Under the direction of Crist, the Army developed a 
document, called the GOPER, that provided a general plan for military government.  The 
GOPER offered little guidance on how to treat the civilians and instead gave the subordinate 
commanders authority to run military government within the perimeters of how they perceived 
the situation.  Planners acknowledged that they could not accurately predict the reaction of the 
Okinawans to the invasion and therefore urged the soldiers to approach the civilians with 
caution.  Through training, the soldiers understood the ambiguity of the Okinawan identity.  Full 
awareness of the uncertainty of Okinawan loyalty allowed the soldiers to reassess the intentions 
of the people based on what they encountered on the island.  As a result, the Army loosened 
restrictions within military government camps as the Okinawans acted obedient and cooperative. 
In Chapter two, the Marines also examined the complex historical and political 
relationship between Japan and Okinawa through intelligence studies and reached the same 
conclusion as the Army in regards to the uncertainty of the Okinawans’ loyalty.  Like the Army, 
the Marine planners could not determine with confidence whether or not the population would 
fight in support of the Japanese Emperor or feel liberated by the American forces.  Unlike the 
Army, however, the Marines gave little priority to such studies.  Lacking a high-ranking officer 
like Crist to oversee the development of military government plans, the Marines assigned the 
duty as an ancillary task to a logistics Colonel.  Officers trained at the Civil Affairs schools did 
not receive permission to attend planning meetings.  While the military government plan 
produced by the Marines, called Annex “Able,” copied the GOPER in many ways, Marine 
leaders added unambiguous statements that identified the Okinawans as Japanese and therefore 
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as enemy.  As the Marines landed, they considered the population unwaveringly hostile and 
constructed military government policy that handled the civilians harshly. 
Chapter three deals with the assumption of military government by the Navy following 
the surrender of Japan.  The Navy inherited a dislocated population suffering from the impact of 
war with urgent needs for medical assistance, food, clothing, shelter, and reunification with their 
families.  Unprepared partly because of the immediacy of the situation and partly because of the 
exodus of qualified seaman whose war commitment expired, the Navy spent the first months 
issuing ad hoc orders that reached the field officers at the camps too slowly.  Innovative and 
motivated young officers worked hard to convince unimaginative superiors that the solution to 
the ineffectiveness of Naval military government lay with granting the Okinawans greater 
leadership in the development of their community.  The transition towards peace improved the 
relationship between the sailors and the Okinawans and higher leadership published directives 
that reinforced the ideas of the young officers.  Okinawan leadership not only eased the burden 
of running military government from the dwindling American forces but also allowed the 
creation of a government structure that sat on a foundation of culturally familiar practices.  The 
Navy now saw the Okinawans as a civilized and competent people, unique in their own ethnicity.  
Chapter four examines the Okinawans and their own awareness of identity.  Japanese 
indoctrination sought to align the Okinawans with Japan despite relegating them to a secondary 
status.  Before the battle, most Okinawans did associate themselves with Japan.  The horrific 
conditions of war, however, combined with cruel acts inflicted upon the population by the 
Japanese Army shocked the people and made them reevaluate their loyalties.  Realigning their 
identity with Okinawa rather than Japan served a practical purpose of providing them protection 
and improved conditions under U.S. military government programs by disassociating themselves 
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with the enemy.  Okinawan identity also allowed the people to grapple with the mental anguish 
caused by the betrayal of the Japanese.  The ability of the people to consciously determine their 
own identity demonstrates the malleability of race and ethnicity and places the perceptions of the 
American military government within context.  
This study examines the wartime occupation of Okinawa from the planning stages in late 
1944/early 1945 through the end of the Navy’s responsibility for occupation duties in July 1946.  
In entering the historical discourse about the role of race in the Pacific War, two analytical 
choices drive the structure of this work.  First, civilians that ethnically bear more resemblance 
with the enemy than the American invading forces serve as the focal point of American racial 
interaction.  By examining the contact between a population and the U.S. military rather than 
between two militaries, the study eliminates the confusion of the misleading argument that issues 
of race in the Pacific War stemmed only from dehumanizing an enemy.  A large, mostly docile 
civilian population complicates the term “enemy” and allows for the exploration of American 
racism in the Pacific outside of the confines of force-on-force conventional war.  Second, the 
environment of combat, central to the historical debate, also features predominantly in this work.  
The confusion, energy, heightened emotions, drastic situations, and trauma of combat pushed the 
actors into dramatic decision-making.  During the battle, soldiers, sailors, and Marines made 
quick, weighty decisions that carried grave consequences.  Within the intensity of hostilities, the 
complexity and magnitude of determining the identity of the civilians increased.  This study 
purposefully ends at the termination of the Navy led occupation in July 1946 when the 
Americans stored their weapons and armed the Okinawans as local police - the point at which the 
occupiers finally created enough space between themselves and the end of the war that they no 
longer had to contemplate the possibility of the population acting as enemy. 
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The Battle of Okinawa marked the beginning of a long United States presence on the 
island that continues to this day.  Throughout the decades, treatment of the population by both 
the Americans and Japanese varied from congenial to cruel.  In reaction, Okinawan allegiance 
adjusted as the residents continually sought out the best situation.  This study does not seek to 
explain the entire Okinawan experience under U.S. occupation, which continued until 1972, or 
the period of sustained American troop presence following the reversion of Okinawa back to 
Japan.  Okinawan occupation lacks both linear logic and simplicity.  The fluctuations in the 
interactions between the Americans, the Okinawans, and the Japanese prevent the entirety of the 
occupation (1945-1972) or the years following from falling into a broad category.  This study 
limits itself to examining race and identity as it influenced policy making during the Pacific War.  
A sweeping overview of American and Okinawan relations throughout the years reaches beyond 
the scope of this work. 
In addition to historical relevance, studying the impact of race and identity on military 
planning carries great significance for future military operations and occupations in particular.  
As the United States continues long term commitments in regions with populations of varying 
ethnicities, a closer look at historical examples of wartime occupations provides insights into the 
potential of American policy to positively handle complex ethnic interactions.  Much like in 
Okinawa in 1945, troops working today in volatile areas in Iraq and Afghanistan must 
differentiate between enemy and civilian in order to fulfill their duties.  As the wartime 
occupation of Okinawa reveals, a deliberate, contemplative, analytical approach to ethnicity and 
identity opens up the possibility for positive and therefore productive interactions between 
soldiers and populations that allow for a greater chance of accomplishing military objectives. 
10 
 
On the island of Okinawa in 1945, American soldiers, sailors, and Marines encountered a 
large population that lived as subjects of the Emperor but suffered under discriminatory Japanese 
policies that relegated them to second class status.  Through deliberate, conscious consideration 
of Okinawan ethnic heritage and the island’s political relationship with Japan, American military 
planners made determinations about Okinawan allegiance that shaped occupation policies that 
the soldiers, sailors, and Marines then executed.  Assessments of identity informed interactions 
between the troops and the people in an open-minded manner that allowed for the promotion of 
the military government’s goals.  In the few instances where contact with the population carried 
negative consequences, the troops disregarded the malleability of race and clung to preconceived 
definitions of identity that did not reflect the circumstances.  Alongside the analysis of race and 
ethnicity, the American military did not discount the importance of practical military 
considerations such as supply lines, enemy disposition, and the security of troops and 
information.  Military leaders ensured the success of operations on Okinawa by not only 
evaluating the pragmatic military aspects of the mission but having the acumen to assess the 
ethnic dynamics as well. 
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IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY: ARMY WARTIME OCCUPATION POLICY 
On May 31, 1945, two American soldiers sat cross-legged on the floor of a small hut in 
the gutted village of Nodake on the island of Okinawa.  Their hostess, a middle-aged Okinawan 
woman, stooped down over them as she poured hot tea into small round clay cups.  Many 
different families shared the hut with the woman and some of them crowded into the main room 
to join in the tea ceremony with the Americans.1  The bombings, begun in October, 1944 
preparatory to the America invasion, had destroyed numerous homes in the village.  Under the 
direction of the United States Army, several families now lived together in the homes that 
survived.   
Military Government Detachment B-5 had operated Camp Nodake for two months.  
Outside its perimeter, the Battle of Okinawa (Operation ICEBERG) that began with the invasion 
of the Kerama Islands on March 26, 1945 still raged as the Japanese prepared to fall back to their 
second line of defense and the Americans seized Shuri Castle, the headquarters of the Japanese 
32nd Imperial Army.2 
Okinawa, because of its proximity to mainland Japan and the political position of its 
people as subjects of the Emperor, provided a unique battleground in a brutal war.  The graphic 
nature of the fighting in the Pacific War combined with racist epithets proffered by both the 
                                                          
1United States Military Government, Detachment B-5, Diary, April 30, 1945, Western Manuscript Collection, 
CO445, Folders 1-4, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 33. 
 
2Benis M. Frank, Okinawa: Touchstone to Victory (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970); Masahide Ota, The Battle 
of Okinawa: The Typhoon of Steel and Bombs (Tokyo: Kume Publishing Company, 1984); E.B. Sledge, With the 
Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996); Bill Sloan,  The Ultimate Battle: 
Okinawa 1945 – The Last Epic Struggle of World War II  (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007). 
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Americans and the Japanese has caused some scholars, like John W. Dower, to believe that race 
dominated wartime conduct.  Dower’s seminal work War without Mercy: Race and Power in the 
Pacific War correctly details the intense racial hatred that both Americans and Japanese felt 
towards each other.  His conclusion, however, that such hatred drove tactical decisions has 
sparked a debate among historians.  Craig Cameron in American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, 
and the Conduct of Battle continues Dower’s thesis and asserts that American racism towards the 
Japanese significantly influenced the tactical decisions of the First Marine Division.  In response 
to Cameron, John Lynn’s Battle: A History of Combat and Culture argues that military 
considerations overrode cultural bias and racism.  American forces planned their battles by 
assessing terrain, determining resources, and calculating weapons capability, not by planning 
brutal missions to avenge Pearl Harbor.3 
The Battle of Okinawa complicates Dower, Cameron, and Lynn’s arguments.  As a 
prefecture of Japan, Okinawa was not a colony; yet, its people were not ethnically Japanese.  In 
rebuttal to Lynn’s argument, the complexities of race could not be ignored in favor of practical 
military evaluation because of the overwhelming number of unpredictable civilians on the 
battlefield.  Dower’s and Cameron’s arguments about racism, however, also are insufficient 
because the Okinawans were not Japanese.  Their ethnicity confused Americans and forced 
American planners to confront race and ethnicity in their policy making in a contemplative way 
that was more sophisticated, calculated, and conscious than blind racism.  Rather than devising 
                                                          
3John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); 
Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in First Marine Division, 
1941-1951 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).   
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plans from intense feelings of racial hatred, planners considered race logically while constructing 
their policy and retained the paramount importance of practical military considerations as well. 
In the quiet hut, over a steaming cup of traditional tea, the mood was welcoming and 
congenial; the Okinawans and Americans exchanged peaceful gestures and expressed kinship.4  
Months before, during the planning of Operation ICEBERG, the Americans did not foresee such 
a friendly exchange. They viewed the Okinawan population as potentially hostile.  The American 
commanders and planners who devised the military government plan, concerned with 
successfully completing the mission of securing the island of Okinawa with the smallest amount 
of American casualties possible, focused on issues of supply and security.  The planners, 
however, also had to gauge the reaction of the Okinawan population to a foreign force invading 
their land.  Related to the practical military planning considerations of supply and security, 
assessing the temperament of a civilian population of a prefecture of Japan required the planners 
to attempt to define the level of allegiance that the Okinawans felt towards Japan.  The 
Americans, therefore, made determinations about the Okinawans’ identity that influenced the 
construction of military government policy. 
Exercising caution in order to minimize unnecessary risks to operational secrets and 
American lives, military government units worked under guidance that resulted in intense 
security measures that firmly controlled civilian movement.  As the soldiers continually dealt 
with the civilians, however, they encountered a population that was cooperative, obedient, and 
perceived as more akin to the Americans than to the Japanese.  Gradually, the separate military 
government units relaxed their strict measures.  First hand experience with the Okinawans 
                                                          
4Diary, April 3, 1945, Detachment B-5, 25. 
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caused the Americans to reevaluate the Okinawans’ potential loyalty to Japan and their identity 
as a group.  The conclusions reached by the military government units about Okinawan identity 
caused the modification of military government policy. 
The American planners who devised military government policy and the commanders 
and soldiers who executed that policy carefully considered practical military matters in their 
decision making; however, contemplating the complex ethnic and political situation of Okinawa 
as a prefecture of Japan also contributed to the construction of policy.       
     ***** 
On January 6, 1945, Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. sat at a desk in 
Washington D.C. reviewing the final version of his “Operational Directive #7 from the 
Commanding General of Tenth Army” (GOPER).5  For the past three years, the United States 
had been engaged in world war.  American troops invaded North Africa and Sicily, fought in 
Tunisia and Italy, destroyed German submarines in the Atlantic Ocean, liberated France, 
combated subversion in Latin America, sent supplies to the Soviets through the Middle East, and 
provided mortars and artillery to the Chinese.  In the Pacific, American forces proved victorious 
in battles fought from aircraft carriers at sea and amphibious landings at various islands and 
                                                          
5The GOPER was the primary document for military government operations on Okinawa; it was the document 
briefed to all military government units.  Its contents were repeated in Annex 15 to Operations Plan 1-45.  Two 
military government appendices were completed two months after the GOPER and covered command responsibility 
issues following the battle.  Appendix E, Annex 1 to Operation Plan No.1., called “Tentative Military Government 
Plan for Phase II” mentioned without details how military government would fall under Island Command (IsCom) 
after the completion of the battle.  Appendix A, Annex X, “Civil Censorship Plan” was completed by IsCom.  
(Annex 15, Tentative Operations Plan No. 1-45, January 6, 1945, RG 407, Box 2487, file 110-5.5, NARA; 
Appendix E, Annex 1 to Operation Plan No.1, “Tentative Military Government Plan for Phase II,” RG 389, Box 
704, NARA; Appendix A, Annex X, “Civil Censorship Plan,” March 11, 1945, RG 389, Box 704, NARA; History 
of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, 1 April-30 April 1945 [L Day to L+29] by BG William E. Crist, 
May 10, 1945, RG 407, Box 2487, file 110-5.0, NARA.)  The short title “GOPER” is not an acronym and its origin 
is not known. (Arnold Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988). 
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increasingly drew closer to Japan for the inevitable invasion seizing islands like Guadalcanal, 
Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan, Leyte and part of New Guinea.   
In June 1944, Buckner traveled to Washington to take command of Tenth Army and 
participate in the planning for the unit’s first mission. Originally identified as the seizure of 
Taiwan, the objective shifted to the island of Okinawa in October.  As American military 
progress in the Pacific moved closer to mainland Japan, military planners viewed Operation 
ICEBERG as a crucial preliminary step in the plan to invade mainland Japan. Admiral Chester 
W. Nimitz, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, and Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner believed 
the successful capture of Okinawa would prevent the war from lasting another year.6  Located 
360 nautical miles from Kyushu and equally as close to Formosa and China, Okinawa was 
situated in a militarily advantageous position to Japan, its occupied lands and its deployed troops.  
Capture of Okinawa would jeopardize Japan’s ability to send supplies to Southeast Asia and 
allow the Allies to launch missions against multiple Japanese possessions.7  As a staging ground 
for the proposed attack on mainland Japan, Okinawa offered airstrips, harbors, and troop-staging 
areas.  The island could also operate as a supply depot and help alleviate the increasingly 
difficult task of transporting resources from the United States to the Western Pacific.    
Buckner spent months in Washington planning the details of the upcoming Okinawa 
mission with top military leaders from both the Army and the Navy while Brigadier General 
William E. Crist, his Deputy Commander for Military Government, worked from Schofield 
Barracks in Oahu, Hawaii with the rest of Buckner’s staff.8  Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Spruance, 
                                                          
6Nicolas Evan Sarantakes, ed, Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph 
Stilwell (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 17.  Buckner received official orders assigning him 
as the Commanding General of Tenth Army on September 4, 1944. 
 
7CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, November 15, 1944, RG 407, Box 2502, NARA, 5. 
 
8Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars, 17-21; Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 18. 
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General of the Army George C. Marshall, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, and Rear 
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman all participated in the planning of Operation ICEBERG.  The 
planners, from the beginning, recognized that this would be a joint operation of the Army, Navy, 
and Marines to include amphibious landings, heavy shelling from ground based artillery, 
warships, and carriers and an aggressive infantry landing force.  Buckner offered his combat 
plans for Admiral Spruance’s review on the morning of November 1, 1944.  Buckner had only 
one voice in the joint planning.  On January 8, 1945 he submitted alternative combat plans to 
Vice Admiral Turner that were then accepted.  Separated from his staff in Hawaii, all his plans – 
combat plans, military government plans, operational annexes – were written at separate 
intervals, submitted, revised, and approved at different times. 
The GOPER, approved on January 6, was the plan for handling the large civilian 
population on Okinawa through the use of military government units attached to Marine and 
Army combat divisions.  Based on training manuals used in the Army’s Civil Affairs schools and 
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44 produced from intelligence summaries, the plan 
provided a general outline of the initial tasks of the military government units.9  It began with the 
mission of military government: to “assist military operations by maintaining order, promoting 
security, preventing interference, reducing active and passive sabotage, relieving combat troops 
                                                          
 
9The GOPER was not directly based on previous military government policies created for other theaters of battles; 
the GOPER did not arise from a template.  The planners considered the Okinawan population to be unique because 
they considered them to be possibly similar to the Japanese in culture and allegiance.  The GOPER followed the 
Army standard operations order format and covered typical topics taught in the Civil Affairs schools – local 
government, medical care, supply, finance etc. – but the contents of the GOPER varied from previous military 
government policies created for areas like the Philippines, Guadalcanal, Saipan, and the Marianas. (Military 
Government, General Order No.2-44, Tinian, September 2, 1944, RG 389, Box 844, NARA, Training Syllabus, 
Charlottesville, VA, October 21, 1944, RG 496, Box 351, NARA, 1; Military Government, General Order No. 1-44, 
Tinian, August 26, 1944, RG 389, Box 844, NARA; Plan for the Naval Military Government of the Marianas, RG 
398, Box 844, NARA; Political Directive for the Military Government of the Caroline Islands in the Central Pacific, 
Appendix D, March 1944, RG 389, Box 844, NARA; Plan for the Naval Military Government of the East Caroline 
Islands, RG 389, Box 844, NARA.) 
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of local administration, and mobilizing local resources in the aid of military objective.”10  The 
GOPER explained how military government units would be structured and how they would 
function.  It also gave general directions on the proper conduct of the units under the immediate 
conditions of battle.  Primarily, the document established short term policies aimed to provide 
the units with just enough information to establish rudimentary camps immediately upon 
landing. 
In the appendices, Buckner and his staff detailed the structure and composition, to 
include personnel and equipment, of the military government units.  During the combat phase, he 
specified that the units would fall under the combat commander and unit to which they were 
attached.11  The Headquarters element for all military government activities on the island lay at 
Tenth Army level.  The separate military government units attached to the combat divisions each 
consisted of four detachments with different individual missions.  “A” detachments were to 
move forward with the combat units and seek out dislocated civilians for evacuation.  The 
civilians would then move away from the frontlines towards the “B” detachments which were to 
follow closely behind the “A” detachments and establish temporary camps that processed 
civilians.  Further back, the “C” detachments were to build more stable camp environments that 
                                                          
10Operational Directive #7 from the Commanding General of Tenth Army, January 6, 1945, RG 290, Box 2196, 
NARA, 1. 
 
11Upon completion of the assault, the military government teams were to be reassigned to Island Command (IsCom) 
under Major General Fred C. Wallace, USMC.  This transition was originally planned to begin once camps were set 
up in the rear areas.  By the end of the battle (the garrison phase), all military government units were to be under 
IsCom.  In actuality, however, the transition to IsCom took much longer and was not completed until July 2, 1945.  
The military government units remained under the control of the combat divisions, XXIV Corps and Tenth Army 
military government staffs.  IsCom existed as primarily a staff section for the majority of the battle. (Fisch, Military 
Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 18, 27; Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, p.2; 
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, November 15, 1944; XXIV Corps Military Government Daily Operations 
Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; Military Government Operations in the Ryukyu Area, Appendix V, Part I-IV, 
August 2, 1945, RG 407, Box 2487, File 110-5, NARA; LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns, Okinawa 
Diary, April 30, 1945, RG 407, Box 2441, NARA). 
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had the capacity to sustain a large civilian population for an extended period of time.  Lastly, the 
“D” detachments would process even larger populations – 60,000-100,000 – and had the 
potential for permanency.12  The basic concept funneled civilians gradually from the dangerous 
battlefront to the relatively safe rear areas through a series of detachments and camps that 
increasingly became more established and larger in size. 
Buckner gave little guidance about the personal conduct of his troops towards civilians.13  
He only addressed their relationship in one statement.  Under the title of “Degree of Control,” he 
ordered the commanders to “demand and enforce obedience,” and thus directed that civilians 
could earn back their freedom only by following the instructions of the occupiers.  He delegated 
to his subordinate commanders the “powers of government as international law and military 
necessity may require.”14 The GOPER was a flexible document that allowed for interpretation by 
subordinate commanders as conditions warranted.15  As the battle changed, commanders on all 
levels had the freedom to decide based on their own judgment.  With language like “to the extent 
required” and “take necessary action,” Buckner made the GOPER as useable a document as 
subordinate commanders could desire.  It clearly stated, however, that “rigid control of civilians 
will be exercised.”16   
                                                          
12Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 2-4. 
 
13Details about specific treatment of and interaction between civilians and American forces were not included in 
most literature about military government, civil affairs, and occupation.  Only training materials used at the Civil 
Affairs training schools for officers briefly instructed that all cultural and religious customs be maintained and 
civilians be treated with respect.  All other information distributed to the soldiers eliminated the topic, stating only 
that it would addressed as required. (Training Syllabus, Charlottesville, VA, October 21, 1944, RG 496, Box 351, 
NARA, 1; Tenth Army Pamphlet – Information on Military Government, February 13, 1945, RG 389, Box 704, 
NARA, 7). 
 
14Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 1. 
 
15Interview with LTG Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., Okinawa Diary, March 21, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG 
James M. Burns. 
 
16Ibid.; Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 2, 9. 
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Policies for the immediate occupation outlined in the GOPER addressed supply, medical 
needs, and civilian labor forces for use both within camps and with tactical units.  An initial 
supply of food for the civilian population was planned to arrive with the assault divisions.  
Amounts of foods typical of an Okinawan diet, such as rice, beans, and fish, were calculated per 
individual and per 1,000 civilians.  After the initial supplies brought ashore by the Americans 
were depleted, the policy called for soldiers to shift to captured local island resources.  Policies 
for clothing and transportation were similar – an initial stock would land with the assault and 
resupply became the responsibility of military government by means of reconnaissance and 
capture of local items.  The policy forbade the issuing of United States military rations except in 
cases of undefined emergency.  The GOPER emphasized the ingenuity of the soldiers to procure 
the necessary supplies while at the same time planning for an adequate initial stock.  The policy 
designated the   requirements of food and clothing as those “minim[ally] essential.”17  
Medical policy involved treating casualties, containing contagious disease, and creating a 
sanitary environment.  The guidance directed American military medical personnel to dispense 
care only “to the extent required to prevent interference with military operations and meet 
humanitarian needs.”18  Guidance dictated that medical personnel transport the urgently sick or 
wounded patients to hospitals, quarantine those with contagious ailments, and maintain strict 
supervision over conditions to ensure proper cleanliness.  The order also stated that Okinawan 
medical doctors and nurses, local facilities, and local equipment should be used only for civilian 
patients.19  
                                                          
17Ibid., 5. 
 
18Ibid., 9. 
 
19Ibid., 10. 
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Buckner and his staff viewed the Okinawans as a potential source of labor that the 
combat units could use if provided food, water, and transportation.  Civilians would not be paid.  
The policy also directed the combat units to guard civilians while they worked.  The 
responsibility of organizing the labor fell to the military government commander of each camp 
whose duty it was to coordinate the labor assignments.20  Civilians would not have a choice 
about participating in the labor program.   
The GOPER included a section that briefly mentioned locally-run government as an 
eventual goal but an impractical reality in the initial occupation.  The majority of the government 
section dealt with censorship and Okinawan cultural institutions.  Civilians residing in camps 
were prohibited communication with those outside the camp.  The policy denied the use and/or 
creation of a postal service and empowered military government personnel to “take necessary 
action to prevent communication with enemy civilians.”21  Policies regarding cultural arts and 
monuments ordered their protection and suggested the option of instituting educational programs 
for civilians.22  
Buckner thus laid a base for military government operations.  Naturally, his policy 
emphasized the primacy of the tactical military mission over the comfort of the civilians, 
establishing the standard for the needs of the civilians at the lowest level possible to meet the 
minimal essential requirements for sustaining life.  Buckner and his staff included few details in 
the GOPER and neglected any discussion of interaction between soldiers and civilians.  What 
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details were included contributed unrelated, ancillary information that did not address the 
conduct of American soldiers. 
As the Commanding General of Tenth Army, General Buckner wanted first to secure the 
island in order to sever Japanese supply lines and organize and launch the final attack on the 
mainland.  In the GOPER, the mission of the military government included a statement about 
“preventing interference with military operations.”23 He ordered the military government to 
remove the civilians from the battlefield because their presence could jeopardize the tactical 
mission; he did not order their evacuation out of a concern for their safety.  “As for the civilians, 
the main idea is to keep them out of the way,” he told an interviewer on March 21, 1945, “and to 
minimize difficulties for our own forces.”24  While he and his staff worked on the GOPER, he 
worked simultaneously with his staff on the invasion plans.  They focused on balance of fires 
through the combined use of artillery and infantry, decided where to land, and analyzed 
intelligence reports and maps in an attempt to identify the location of the Japanese forces.  
Buckner based his choices on an assessment of the potential combat situation and how that 
situation could produce American victory.  The GOPER did not in actuality focus on the conduct 
of military government.  Instead, it focused on how to minimize the impact of civilians on the 
battle.    
Buckner’s command emphasis on the battle shaped military government policy 
completely.  He directed the “A” detachments to conduct reconnaissance and locate civilians in 
forward areas where they might be hiding out of fear.  Tactically, however, Buckner’s battle 
plans did not take into account stray civilians mixed in with Japanese troops.  He required the 
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24Interview with LTG Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr.; Okinawa Diary, March 21, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG 
James M. Burns. 
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military government detachments to support the battle by removing civilians as quickly as 
possible.  Buckner’s tactics included using flamethrowers to kill Japanese troops in caves; 
Okinawans hiding in those caves would also die.  His priorities lay with the safety of his soldiers 
in combat.  He aimed to obtain his objective with the smallest amount of American casualties as 
possible. 
Supply also concerned Buckner deeply.  The distance between Okinawa, the Philippines, 
where the invasion force assembled, and the United States, coupled with the complication of the 
continuation of a two-front war challenged supply operations.25  Buckner and his staff actively 
manipulated loading doctrine and managed initial supply and resupply in order to stretch Tenth 
Army’s assets.  His emphasis on supply carried over to his guidance for military government.  
The detailed supply section in the GOPER, which included extensive appendices about specific 
food ration amounts and equipment allocation, demonstrated his preoccupation with resources.  
The document repeatedly ordered soldiers to salvage local property for additional food, clothing, 
and transportation, and assigned a non-commissioned officer to handle the salvage effort.26  The 
directive banned giving United States military rations to civilians because Buckner lacked the 
provisions beyond those needed for American troops.  Proper control and rationing of all types of 
supply occupied a central component of mission success.  Buckner emphasized supply 
conservation in the mission statement to military government: the “mobilizing [of] local 
resources [is] in the aid of military objective.”27     
                                                          
25Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars, 5.  The Americans landed 548,000 troops and docked 1,300 ships. (Frank, Okinawa, 
50; Ota, The Battle of Okinawa, x; Sledge, With the Old Breed, 192; Sloan, The Ultimate Battle, 96).   
 
26Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 7. 
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Buckner’s strict, yet sparse procedural guidance on medical aid also demonstrated his 
fear of a supply shortage.  He approved the limitation of medical care to the bare necessities and 
assumed the cooperation of Okinawan medical doctors and nurses.28  His staff included medical 
supplies on a list of salvage items and the GOPER proclaimed that “maximum utilization of local 
resources and salvaged equipment [was] essential.”29 
In addition to legitimate command concerns about mission success, minimizing casualties 
and adequate resources, Buckner, Crist, and his staff faced a unique demographic on Okinawa.  
Unlike previous campaigns in the Pacific Theater, Okinawa’s status as a prefecture of Japan 
meant that Allied forces would confront civilians who were subjects of the Emperor and who the 
American planners categorized as “essentially Japanese people, of partly Japanese stock.”30  
With an Okinawan population estimated at 463,000, military planners had to consider possible 
reactions of the inhabitants to the invasion.  Crist regarded the issue of the mind-set of the 
Okinawans as “the most vital question in connection with military government.”31  In devising 
policy, Buckner, Crist and his staff assessed the temperament and loyalty of the Okinawans to 
the Japanese in an effort to determine the civilian response to the American presence.   
All commanders, planners, and most soldiers had access to a number of resources that 
addressed the cultural background of the Okinawans and their historic ties to Japan.  Intelligence 
produced the CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, and the Civil Affairs schools distributed 
the Ryukyu Handbook.  Popular magazines and books about Japan, its prefectures, and its 
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30Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, 1.  In reality, the Okinawans were of a different 
ethnicity completely – Ryukyuan - from the mainland Yamato Japanese.   
 
31History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist. 
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colonies also were available.  Fortune magazine, for example, devoted their entire April issue in 
1944 to the population, politics, economics, and militarism of Japan. 
Each publication had a different intended audience.  The wide readership of Fortune 
included everyone from Buckner, Crist and other staff members to ordinary soldiers waiting for 
transport ships to families back in the United States.32  Fairfield Osborn wrote his book, The 
Pacific World: its vast distances, its lands and the life upon them and its people, specifically for 
American service members and their families with duty in the Pacific.33  Osborn called Okinawa 
a “province” of Japan and Fortune magazine emphasized that “Japan coveted not only pieces of 
the continent but islands, and from China she wrung Formosa and the Ryukyus.” 34  Fortune also 
asserted that the people of Japan had different ethnicities, stating that “the Japanese people are 
not a homogeneous race.  They are a mixture of half a dozen distinct Asiatic and South Sea 
peoples of different physical and cultural characteristics.”35   
The Army’s Civil Affairs schools issued the Ryukyu Handbook to its officers slated for 
assignment in the Pacific.  In three hundred pages, the handbook, covered geography, 
agriculture, economics, culture, and history.  Like the popular publications, the handbook 
attempted to understand the complicated political situation of Okinawa and the ethnic 
background of its people.  It acknowledged the Japanese invasion and conquest of the island by 
the Satsuma clan in 1609 and described the current position of Okinawa “as an integral part of 
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33Osborn’s book was not sponsored by the United States War Department and its readership can only be assumed. 
 
34“The Geography of Conquest,” Fortune (April 1944): 161; Fairfield Osborn, The Pacific World: Its vast distances, 
its lands and the life upon them, and its people (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1944), 184.  These 
publications portrayed Okinawa as a colony which it was not.   
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the [Japanese] state.”36  It depicted the Okinawans as a racially mixed subordinate group who 
spoke both Japanese and the local dialect Luchuan.  Japan, according to the handbook, had 
successfully integrated Okinawa into its own government as a prefecture.37  Okinawa housed 
four branch prefectural offices and its men voted for representatives who served both locally and 
in the Imperial Diet in Tokyo.38   
Along with the Ryukyu Handbook, Tenth Army staff studied the CINCPAC-CINCPOA 
Bulletin #161-44, which served as the “enemy situation” supplement to intelligence summaries.39  
Like the handbook, the publication acknowledged the ethnic difference between the Okinawans 
and the Japanese while simultaneously linking the two groups based on “similar 
characteristics.”40  It also recognized the fact that Okinawans spoke the Luchuan dialect in rural 
areas and schools instructed the Japanese language.  Politically, the bulletin explained the 
historical relationship of Okinawa and Japan and addressed Japan’s invasion of the island and 
Okinawa’s current status as a legitimate prefecture of the Empire.  Unlike the handbook, 
however, the bulletin alluded to a tension between the Okinawans and the Japanese.  Despite the 
current incorporation of Okinawa into the Japanese government, the differences between the two 
groups in practiced customs and religion as well as their shared history of Okinawa’s invasion 
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37This assessment was slightly incorrect and misleading.  While Okinawa was legally a prefecture of Japan, Japan 
maintained a higher level of control over Okinawa than its other prefectures.  For example, all high prefectural 
positions in Okinawa were held by the Japanese rather than locals.  The government structure in Okinawa was the 
same as other prefectures but it was dominated by the Japanese. (Yenob –PW-188, POW interrogation, May 16, 
1945, RG 389, Box 844, NARA;  Masamichi S. Inoue, Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of 
Globalization  [New York: Columbia University Press, 2007] 55-62). 
38The Ryukyus Handbook, 1944, Department of the Army, VIII. 
 
39History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 17. 
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complicated the political relationship.  The bulletin fully concluded that the Japanese considered 
the Okinawans more like the Chinese than themselves and mentioned the Japanese indoctrination 
program created to integrate Okinawa into the Empire culturally.41  The document also more 
accurately explained how much influence Okinawa prefecture truly had in the Imperial Diet.  
Okinawa’s government did fall within the Japanese system and had representatives and voting 
districts as the Ryukyu Handbook explained.  Japanese subjects from mainland, however, served 
in the most important government positions in Okinawa and thereby prevented the Okinawans 
from participating fully in their own governance, creating resentment towards the Japanese 
among the Okinawans and contributing to oppressive feelings of inferiority.42 
Intelligence summaries of Okinawan culture, geography, politics, and history made the 
task of predicting the disposition of the civilians complicated.  The Okinawans had lost their 
independent kingdom to an invading force that viewed them as ethnically different and inferior; 
yet, the incorporation of Okinawa as a prefecture and integral part of the Empire meant the island 
was not a colony.  An invading foreign country could either inspire the Okinawans to support 
Japan or ignite long repressed feelings of resentment towards the Japanese.  Crist lamented that 
the intelligence studies of Okinawa yielded “no satisfactory answer [about] the attitude of the 
Okinawans.”43 
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44 offered a recommendation.  “It would be 
dangerous,” stated the bulletin, “to conclude that anything less than active resistance to invasion 
can be expected from the population.”  With time and an extensive propaganda campaign, the 
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bulletin suggested, the Okinawans would succumb peacefully to American authority.44  The 
recommendation made sense to Buckner, Crist and the subordinate commanders.  “At worst,” 
Crist thought, “military government expected to find a fanatical population, typically Japanese in 
attitude, which would resist to the death and commit mass suicide rather than surrender.”45  Soon 
to confront a population that politically may have allegiance to Japan but ethnically was 
alienated, Buckner acted responsibly as a commander and approved a military government 
policy that best supported the combat mission.  Despite his Southern upbringing and racist 
tendencies, he planned for the worst case scenario in order to best prepare his troops for 
unpredictable situations on the battlefield and to minimize American casualties.46  Throughout 
the GOPER, he instructed the military government units to proceed carefully with the civilians 
and safeguard not only themselves but also secret information.  His order for the “rigid control of 
civilians” served the dual purpose of eliminating them as battlefield obstacles and preventing 
them from acting as enemies once inside the camps.  His orders prohibiting a postal system, 
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46Buckner was the son of a Confederate General and shared similar beliefs with his father on race and the South.  He 
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American citizenship because their Asian heritage would taint American demography. (Sarantakes, ed, Seven Stars, 
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Okinawa Diary, March 21, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns; Nicolas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: 
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to view the Okinawan civilian population as enemy was widely accepted and shared by his fellow commanders and 
staff planners.  In the interest of successfully securing Okinawa and safeguarding the lives of the troops, all 
American commanders approached the unpredictable Okinawans with caution.          
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ordering censorship and forbidding the communication of civilians with any person outside the 
camps were designed to prevent access to and distribution of information to Japanese troops.47   
Buckner’s combatant commanders, who had access to the same intelligence summaries, 
also concluded that preparing for the possibility of hostile civilians was the best course of action.  
Major General John Hodge, XXIV Corps Commander, who considered the Okinawans to be 
similar to the Japanese in perceived cunning, “anticipated great trouble with civilians and 
soldiers dressed as civilians on target.”  He wanted the Okinawans kept behind barriers away 
from the American soldiers.  He warned that fraternization could put valuable information, and 
subsequently soldiers’ lives, at risk.48  
In line with the recommendations in the bulletin and staff intelligence estimates, Tenth 
Army launched an intensive propaganda campaign.  In hopes of exploiting the ethnic differences 
between the Okinawans and the Japanese, propaganda aimed at Okinawans emphasized the 
inequalities that the Japanese imposed on them.  Leaflet 527 asked the civilians: “What 
obligations have you to the Japanese?  Is this your war? Or is it really the war of Japanese 
leaders who have dominated you for many decades?”49  American forces, therefore, attempted to 
capitalize on the ethnic tension between the Okinawans and the Japanese and to turn the 
Okinawans into amicable friends. 
American planners, therefore, used cultural information about the Okinawans to shape 
military government policies.  They actively assessed the complicated relationship between 
Japan and Okinawa and thus attempted to predict the civilian reaction to the Americans.  The 
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policies took seriously Okinawa’s status as a prefecture but also sought to exploit Okinawan 
feelings of disadvantage and inferiority. The Americans’ understanding of the identity of the 
Okinawans, whether as Japanese subjects or as conquered people with a separate ethnicity, 
contributed greatly to how they devised military government policy and how they envisioned the 
conduct of the military government units.   
***** 
While Buckner attended meetings and developed plans in Washington, his forces were 
spread across the globe in various states of preparation.  Crist and his staff continued to produce 
materials from Hawaii.  His Army combat divisions waited on Leyte after successfully securing 
the island under the leadership of General MacArthur.  His military government officers arrived 
at Fort Ord, California from the Civil Affairs training schools at Princeton and Columbia 
University on December 28, 1944 and, once there, received their assignments to specific military 
government units with an undisclosed overseas mission.  Enlisted soldiers for the military 
government units also arrived at Fort Ord between late December and early January from various 
other units and as draftees.  They had not received training at the military schools in New Jersey 
and New York because those institutions existed for officer education only.  Their arrival in 
California marked the first time that the enlisted men learned that they would work in civil 
affairs and thus, they began their first classes on what their jobs would entail.50  
Within four days of their arrival, the soldiers boarded their transport ships and headed 
across the Pacific.  Over the two month voyage, the units received their mission, instructed the 
soldiers in the basics of their duties, and conducted preparations ranging from equipment issue 
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and task training to tracking soldier’s pay.  The absence of any previous civil affairs training for 
the enlisted soldiers challenged the unprepared officers.    
Officers drafted the onboard training plan at Fort Ord.  In addition to generic Army topics 
such as rifle familiarization and disease prevention, they taught the basics of civil affairs using 
the Ryukyu Handbook, CINCPAC-CINCPOA bulletin #161-44, the Tenth Army Pamphlet – 
Information on Military Government, and the Tenth Army Technical Bulletin on Military 
Government approved by Crist.51  Officers with experience in Japanese language and culture, 
like Captain E.H. Horn of Detachment B-5, Company A, who had spent nineteen years in Japan, 
instructed all soldiers in Japanese language and “characteristics.”52    
 The enlisted soldiers, therefore, received the same information about Okinawa as the 
officers who planned the operation.  The Tenth Army Pamphlet, written specifically for the 
troops and approved on February 13, 1945, further enforced the idea that the Okinawans could 
act in dangerous ways towards American forces.  The pamphlet emphasized the threat of 
civilians, calling them “weapons of war” and “enemy civilians.”  It warned that Japanese soldiers 
might insert themselves into the population in order to spy.53  The document also advised against 
soldiers interacting with civilians for fear of catching diseases that infected people “regardless of 
color or race.”54  In its conclusion, it instructed soldiers to report suspicious civilians to their 
superiors.55  Training onboard the ships described the population as “proper prisoners of war [or] 
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war criminals, or they can be civilians, depending on how they act . . . [but they] cannot pose as 
civilians and still try to help the enemy, either acting as spies, blowing up stuff, or anything like 
that.”56  
Soldiers, therefore, were taught to be cautious of the civilians and to view them as 
enemies and, in an effort to clearly communicate this directive, the pamphlet purposefully 
avoided calling the civilians Okinawans.  Despite receiving the CINCPAC-CINCPOA bulletin 
and the Ryukyu Handbook, the training consistently referred to the Okinawans as Japanese 
civilians or enemy civilians.57  As a result, soldiers did not always feel as if they received 
training that clearly differentiated between the two groups and each soldier interpreted the 
ethnicity of the Okinawans in his own way.  One explained that while he realized that the 
civilians were of Ryukyuan descent, he viewed Okinawa as Japanese land peopled by Japanese.  
“You have so many walking on two different cultures that, gosh, it’s hard to explain,” he 
remembered, “And that’s what we were all taught, you know, in the military that, hey, they’re all 
Japanese so there’s no need to separate them.”58  Another soldier stated that “no one had heard of 
Okinawa . . . [only] that the island was infected with poisonous snakes . . . [and that] the natives 
were not Japanese but a more primitive people called Hairy Anus.”59  The complicated situation 
of Okinawa’s relationship with Japan perplexed the soldiers just as it did the planners.  The 
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training did, however, communicate one thing clearly; regardless of whether the soldiers fully 
understood Okinawan culture and ethnicity, they did not trust the civilians and remained fully 
aware of their potential for sabotage.60    
On January 13, 1945, the troop ships stopped at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to allow the 
detachment commanders to confer with the military government staff of Tenth Army.  Only 
commanders attended the four day meeting; all other soldiers – officer and enlisted – remained 
onboard.  Crist distributed the finalized GOPER during the meeting.  Additionally, he defined 
the mission of the “A” and “B” detachments as “confined almost entirely to providing suitable 
concentration and assembly areas.”61  Crist’s verbal guidance contradicted the GOPER.  The 
document specified that “A” detachments collect civilians and “B” detachments construct 
temporary camps as assembly points for evacuating civilians.  Crist’s input narrowly defined the 
duty of the “A” and “B” detachments to reconnoitering space for and establishing more 
permanent camps.  The contradiction caused major confusion for the military government 
commanders, particularly because Crist delivered both conflicting missions at the same meeting.  
The distribution of the GOPER should have clarified duties for the commanders and their men 
and provided much desired insight into their overseas mission and new civil affairs duties.  
Crist’s brief instead raised more questions.  The soldiers – commanders, officers, and enlisted - 
all arrived at their new units with no previous experience in conducting the actual duties of 
military government.  Now they faced their mission with limited time to train and only a vague 
notion as to how the different detachments should function and connect with the combat units. 
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Four days later, on January 17, the troop transport ships left Honolulu for the Philippines 
with liaison officers from the Tenth Army Military Government Staff aboard.  These men led 
and supervised instruction on the mission and military government duties using the GOPER.  In 
accordance with the GOPER and Buckner’s intent, “anticipation of more complex and elaborate 
civil administration was discouraged.”62  While the addition of these officers aboard the ships 
made the document accessible to the soldiers, the officers also further modified the duties of the 
“A” and “B” detachments.  The officers decided to consolidate “the effort of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
teams toward taking care of displaced persons and paving the way for camp teams.”63  Although 
slight, the varied descriptions of the detachments’ duties made the conduct of the operation 
unclear to the soldiers and commanders.   
The arrival of the liaison officers also marked a shift in the command structure for the 
training program; instruction was now consolidated under a single commander on each ship.  
Previously each detachment team had conducted its own training which meant that the soldiers 
received the instruction in small groups from their own superiors.  The new plan combined all 
the enlisted soldiers on the ship into one large training group.  The focus of the training also 
shifted; Japanese culture and language were replaced by rudimentary subjects such as Army 
organization and map reading.  The officers who had previously taught the material were now 
assigned to duties specified in the GOPER. Captain Horn, for example, no longer conducted 
language training because he served on the censorship board.  As L-Day neared, all soldiers 
found themselves busy with important preparatory tasks and the training program dwindled.64 
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On February 19, when the transport ships reached Leyte and the military government 
units joined up with their combat divisions, Japanese language training resumed.  Only five 
enlisted men per detachment, however, participated in the training.  Throughout their time in the 
Philippines, the debate about the mission and purpose of the detachments continued in addition 
to new talk of how the combat divisions would function with the military government units.  
Officers discussed issues of supply support and the scope of the units’ responsibilities on the 
actual battlefield.  Out of these discussions developed a new directive addressing the interaction 
of the soldiers with the civilian populace, a subject that the GOPER did not address.  The 
detachment commanders ordered the separation of civilians and soldiers into fenced enclosures 
constructed by Army engineer units to prevent fraternization and to restrict civilian access to 
military information.65  These regulations were based on the governing view of Okinawans as the 
enemy.      
By the time Buckner joined his troops in the Philippines, the training program for the 
treatment of civilians had been going for a month.  Supported by testimony that Japanese 
paratroopers in civilian clothing had been used in the fighting on Leyte, the training program 
enforced the notion that Okinawans must be treated as enemy.  The instruction informed soldiers 
that civilians on Okinawa were not from the Japanese islands but “will be regarded as enemies 
and as likely to do us harm whenever opportunity offers, and would treat accordingly.”66  The 
soldiers continued to acknowledge the cultural differences of the Okinawans but identified them 
with the Japanese.  
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By February 28, the mission of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ detachments had diverged so far from the 
original instructions in the GOPER that the detachment commanders began to speak of their task 
in loose, assumptive terms.  E.R. Mosman, commander of B-5 attached to 96th division, wrote 
that “it appeared that the function of the ‘B’ teams in this operation would be concerned almost 
entirely with internal administration of civilian collection stockades and providing labor.  No 
other duties outside the collection areas were contemplated.”67  The “B” detachments received 
formal and informal instruction describing a wide range of duties as varied as locating camps, 
establishing both temporary and permanent camps, and searching for misplaced civilians in an 
effort to prepare them for any task that may ultimately be assigned.  
On March 31, the eve of the landings on Okinawa, Mosman expressed exasperation about 
the uncertainty of his unit’s mission and recorded yet a different version of their possible duties 
in his command notes: “experiencing considerable difficulty in appraising position in the coming 
operation as related to Division plans regarding civilians but it appears this unit will serve as an 
‘Advanced Team.’”68  With those words, Mosman went to bed, only to wake the next day and 
send his men into combat with no clarity on the particulars of their duties.  
    ***** 
The main assault began on April 1, with the landing of combat units and the “A” 
detachments, followed by the landing of the “B” and “C” Detachments.  The teams began setting 
up processing centers and registering retreating civilians in areas like Sunabe, Chatan, and 
Nugun.69  Army Engineers attached to the military government units quickly constructed barb 
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wire fences and Military Police acted as guards in order to separate the civilians from the 
prisoners of war and the American soldiers.70 
American bombs and naval gunfire carpeted Okinawa prior to troops landing in order to 
minimize Japanese resistance, destroying seventy-five percent of the homes and forcing the 
civilian population to retreat to lime rock caves.  In shock, starving, lice ridden, disease stricken, 
and suffering injuries from bullets and shelling, civilians needed the temporary camps for 
preliminary medical care, and food.  In letters to family members that had evacuated the island 
under Japanese direction in 1944, the civilians cried out that “everything is so totally different 
from how it was before the war.  We think about nothing other than finding enough food to stay 
alive.”71   
The battle flattened most of Okinawa’s structures and cities.  Private E.B. Sledge 
described the landscape as “shell blasted . . . treeless and increasingly low and flat.” Buckner 
described large cities such as Naha as “deserted ruins . . . most of it burned out . . . of no value 
except as a port.”  As the fighting continued and rain fell steadily, the destruction grew 
exponentially.  Okinawa, once considered “picturesquely beautiful,” now sat bogged down in 
mud so thick that vehicles couldn’t move through it.  The mud and knee-deep water hindered 
soldiers’ efforts to distribute ammunition and evacuate the wounded.  Eventually, Naha’s last 
purpose as a port diminished as sunken ships blocked the harbor. Total shells expended by the 
Americans on Okinawa equaled nearly two and three quarters million.  These shells flattened 
homes, burned out fields and crops, and killed civilians and Japanese soldiers alike.  The loss of 
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their homes emotionally crushed the Okinawans.  “As I walk among what are literally the ruins 
of our hometown, I am overcome with emotion,” one Okinawan man cried, “but if there was 
even a single wall left of that house we all loved, I saw no sign of it.”  Over a million shells lay 
unexploded on the roadways and throughout the countryside; civilians retreating from the 
frontlines risked detonating these charges as they walked.  An estimated 200,000 people – 
Okinawan, Japanese, and American – died, most of their bodies rotting in the humid air.  A 
young Okinawan girl observed, “Here and there were rotten parts of bodies, and the mud-
covered corpses were so grotesque you couldn’t tell the men from the women.  Somehow they 
reminded me of sweet potato tempura covered with kneaded flour.”  As part of the clean up 
effort following the hostilities, American troops dug mass graves in the once productive fields 
and thus limited farming possibilities.72 
In the few areas that did not suffer much bomb damage, sturdy homes and healthy crops 
lay abandoned.  With limited American supplies at the camps, such wasted resources contributed 
to tight rationing of food and a communal living environment.  Close accommodations combined 
with the Okinawan custom of saving human feces for use as pig feed increased the likelihood of 
disease and the presence of rodents, flies, and mosquitoes.73  The abundance of casualties 
overwhelmed the early temporary camps and caused the “relative absence of public health and 
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sanitation measures.”74  Staff Sergeant A.G. Karpen wrote a poem titled Japanese Garden 
describing the desecration of Okinawa.  It in, he juxtaposed beautiful imagery of Okinawa as an 
exotic Asian island next to the brutality and carnage of the war.  “Come walk with me in gardens 
of the dead,” he wrote, “What lily-beds, the skulls, and yellow gentians the old unburied bones, 
what sacred odor of disintegrated flesh, what ample altars for glad offering to kind divinity are 
tanks shattered midst the garden’s carnage.  Naha’s rubble, all so delicate; and Itoman, 
sequestered, proudest bed of roses, red with blood and piles of roof slate.”75  Seizen Nakasone, a 
Professor at the University of the Ryuykus, lamented, “I thought that this land, soaked with the 
blood of countless people would never be fit for human habitation again.”76 
Within the desolation and total decimation, the military government units had to create 
living conditions that would preserve and protect life.  Camp conditions varied depending upon 
what each location had available for salvage and how much time the Americans spent on each 
site to work continually on improvement.  The camp at Sunabe, for example, lasted for only five 
days.  Described as “rigorous,” the camp held 2,039 civilians but only had two tarpaulins for 
shelter and no blankets for cooler night temperatures.  Given the size of the population, the 
tarpaulins covered only the elderly.77  In contrast, the camp at Nodake, set up within a village, 
had the advantage of one-hundred-sixty-seven houses available for use (only twenty-two houses 
had burned down).78  With Nodake’s population at 6,000, civilians lived crowded together in the 
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remaining structures.  The “C” detachment camp at Shimabuku created ten districts fifteen days 
into the battle while at the same time struggling to secure an adequate water supply.79 
Despite the variation in the conditions, all camps operated under the basic principles 
outlined in the GOPER as further modified by detachment commanders.  Every camp kept 
meticulous headcounts and filled out daily reports signed by the detachment commander who 
sent them through the division and XXIV Corps to the Tenth Army Military Government Staff.80  
The staff then combined the data into a memo addressed to Crist, the Deputy Commander for 
Military Government.  By requesting specific data, the reports laid out Tenth Army’s priorities 
for the detachment – maintain an accurate headcount, control disease, provide basic needs 
through local salvage and organize the civilians into an Army wide beneficial labor force.  The 
reports included a demographic tally of the civilians by gender, location, and medical status and 
also a brief citation on sanitation and an extended paragraph on communicable diseases.81  
Instances of typhus, meningitis, and skin conditions appeared most frequently but only as 
isolated cases.82  Two reported cases of leprosy at the field hospital in Koza prompted 
discussions of evacuation and command involvement from Tenth Army.83 
The reports also dealt with supply and the status of salvage.  Buckner’s concerns about 
supply were warranted; the military government units saved their initial stock of food and 
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construction material for use as emergency rations and focused on local salvage immediately.84  
As the war continued and local resources were slowly consumed, the failure of the promised 
resupply to arrive worried Americans and Okinawans alike.85  Tenth Army recognized the effect 
the availability of local materials had on the living conditions of the camps and tracked salvage 
efforts closely.86 
The reports provided information on the labor projects of the civilians as well.  The 
GOPER directed that civilian labor be available to any unit, including combat units, and the 
military government designed its program around the intent of the GOPER.  Most combat units, 
however, did not request the additional labor; civilians worked almost exclusively within the 
camps doing cooking, laundry, nursing, construction and, if available, farming.87 
American soldiers interacted with both the Japanese and the Okinawan civilians 
immediately upon landing.  Information received during training combined with hasty 
observations caused most soldiers to be able to differentiate between the Okinawans and the 
Japanese through simplistic, inaccurate methods.88  The ability of the soldiers to distinguish 
between the two ethnic groups was not based on an acute awareness of the intricacies of culture 
and race.  Instead, the soldiers separated the groups based on elemental visual differences.  The 
Okinawans, rendered homeless by the intense shelling and fighting, walked in the muddy roads 
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looking for shelter and carrying all their possessions.  They were filthy, scared, and unarmed.  
Japanese soldiers wore military uniforms, carried weapons, and organized attacks against the 
Americans. As American soldiers encountered tired, weary, weak, scared, grimy local people not 
wearing the Japanese uniform or carrying weapons, they assumed they were Okinawan and 
categorized the Okinawans as “pathetic . . . pitiful . . .totally bewildered by the shock of [the] 
invasion . . . and scared to death of [the Americans].”89  Soldiers noted the “debilitated condition 
physically and mentally” of the local civilians. 90  Wrote one soldier from Camp Sunabe: “The 
attitude of the natives toward the American forces at this early stage can be described as one of 
passivity resulting from great shock and fright . . . completely docile.”91   
The American soldiers thus differentiated the Okinawans based on superficial, general, 
imprecise, and not always accurate assumptions.92  Okinawans did wear soiled, threadbare, 
dishelved clothing and were fearful, sick and injured, but these attributes were products of a 
destructive battle.  To the soldiers, however, the destitute state of the Okinawans invoked a 
paternalistic feeling of superiority.  The soldiers saw them as uncivilized, primitive and 
unintelligent rather than as war victims.93  Soldiers denigrated the condition of the locals by 
describing their belongings as “pitifully few and pathetically poor.”94  The training they received 
                                                          
89Sledge, With the Old Breed, 192. 
 
90Diary, April 3- April 8, 1945, Detachment B-5, 27. 
 
91Ibid., 23;  History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 17; 
Okinawa Diary, April 11, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns. 
 
92The Americans were aware that separating the Okinawans from the Japanese by visual cues such as demeanor and 
clothing had its flaws.  Propaganda leaflets distributed to the Okinawans warned them against wearing Japanese 
military clothing for warmth because the Americans would classify them as enemy soldiers.  The content of the 
leaflets demonstrated that the Americans felt apprehension towards all non-Americans and could not identify 
cultural differences between the two groups; their reliance on superficial means of separation, therefore, was heavy. 
(Leaflet 531, 563, Active 7(7-2-C) archive P, Kadena Air Base, KAB Archives). 
 
93History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG William E. Crist, 19-20. 
 
42 
 
about Okinawa supported their paternalistic views. The Ryukyu Handbook, for example, 
described the Okinawans as “mild-mannered, courteous, and subservient” people who “do not 
value orderliness and cleanliness.”95  Despite the devastation of war causing the grimy look of 
the civilians, such training instilled a belief in the Americans that filth was intrinsic to Okinawan 
culture.  “They violate sanitary regulations,” explained Crist, “Because they have no real 
knowledge of sanitation.”96  Local practices, such as using human excrement as fertilizer, 
contributed to the Americans’ false assumptions about Okinawans as unclean.  Military 
government soldiers said the civilians “carefully hoarded” the excrement; soldiers worried that 
the sanitation situation, “including the odor, would probably deteriorate.”97  Adherence to their 
own Western notions made the military government units emphasize a few unfamiliar farming 
practices as exemplary of the nature of the Okinawans as a group. 
While the American observation of the distressed Okinawans as docile and weak 
translated into paternalistic feelings, the majority of the Okinawans did, in fact, conduct 
themselves in a friendly manner.  To the surprise of the Americans, few civilians under the 
custody of the United States troops in the camps carried out subversive acts or committed 
suicide.  Frightened at such close interaction with the American enemy, Okinawans complied 
with the directions of the military government officers.  Obediently transferring between 
locations by truck or by foot, the civilians calculated their chance of survival in the camps by 
observing the number of people the Americans processed.  “I thought that we were probably 
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going to be killed because there were too many POWs for them to handle,” a middle school boy 
at Sunabe thought.  When the Americans handed him shorts, a shirt and eating utensils, he 
relaxed.98  A XXIV Corps report stated that “the processing of civs [sic] posed no problems 
during the first months of the operation.”99  Captain R.W. Appleman, XXIV Corps historian, 
recorded that “the civilians presented no difficult problem and took care of themselves by and 
large, no serious difficulty developed.”100  Military government units observed no aggressive 
actions against Americans by civilians during the first eight days.101   
Yet, even while noting the harmless nature of the Okinawans, the soldiers did not 
disregard the potential of the civilians to incite violent chaos or spy.102  Corporal Robert L. 
Hostetler, Statistical Section Task Force, observed many years later that “every culture has their 
good people and their bad people.”103  Heeding the horror stories told on the transport ships 
about Japanese soldiers disguised as civilians, the Americans still viewed the Okinawans with 
suspicion, despite their helpless appearance.104  New rumors and stories about the covert actions 
of civilians against American forces circulated once the soldiers landed and, while these reports 
were not verified, they did fuel distrust.105  Consistent with the soldiers’ training and orders, a 
                                                          
98Ibid, 23, XXIV Corps After Action Review, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 
407, File 224-12, NARA.   
 
99XXIV Corps After Action Review #125, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; Mark Ealey and Alastair McLauchlan, 
translators, Descent into Hell: Civilian Memories of the Battle of Okinawa, originally published in Ryukyu Shimpo 
(Portland, Merwin Asia, 2014), 151. 
 
100Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA, 3. 
 
101Diary, April 3-8, 1945, Detachment B-5, 27. 
 
102Leaflet X-7, RG 407, Box 2502, NARA. 
 
103Hostetler, interview. 
 
104Tenth Army Pamphlet – Information on Military Government, February 13, 1945; Okinawa Diary, April 11, 
1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin #161-44, November 15, 1944, 
10. 
 
44 
 
generally wary attitude towards the locals worked in harmony with the soldiers’ vigilant efforts 
at self-preservation in a wartime environment.  Soldiers worried that “intelligence was getting to 
the enemy forces via itinerant civilians” who had run away from the military government camps.  
When Americans saw civilians wearing United States military uniforms given to them out of 
charity, the image heightened fear of espionage because it blurred the informally established 
visual identification lines.106  In both official and unofficial written correspondence, the term 
“enemy civilian” continued to appear as a reference to the Okinawans.107  Displaying the unease 
with which military government units approached civilians, XXIV Corps identified the “doubtful 
attitude” of “240,000 Ok[inawans]” to be “one of the major problems” that military government 
personnel sections had to contend with.108 
In the initial confrontation of Americans and Okinawans, the Americans found a 
destitute, poor civilian population that might do violence to the foreigners whose bombs and 
shells had rendered them homeless.  American soldiers used the same simplistic method to 
identify hostile Okinawans that they used to distinguish the Okinawans from the Japanese – how 
they looked.  As one soldier explained, “you could tell by their eyes.”109  Ultimately, they 
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recognized that there existed no way to accurately sort out who was enemy and who was not.  In 
the first month of battle, sheer survival suggested that caution be the ruling principle.110 
The majority of the Okinawans living in the military government camps complied with 
American authority and posed no threat, but not all Okinawans on the island were non-
combatants.  In addition to the few civilians that did spy from within the camps, a large portion 
of the Okinawan population served in military units on the side of the Japanese.111  American 
forces keenly noticed that “the middle aged group of men were missing” from the evacuation 
camps.112  Out of a population of several thousands at Camp Tobaru, military government 
officials reported only 50 men aged 17-45 years.113     
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In anticipation of the attack, the 32nd Imperial Army had arrived on Okinawa in March 
1944.  Under the National Mobilization Act of 1944, the Japanese Army launched a campaign to 
prepare the island for the impending invasion.  The plan included construction projects, like 
building air strips and defenses, and mobilization programs to rally every Okinawan to the 
Japanese national cause.114  Okinawans participated in the war effort through farming, 
conscription, and nursing.  Young female students aged fourteen and older joined student nursing 
corps while young boys joined military fighting units.115  Organized by schools like the Okinawa 
Normal School and the Prefectual First Middle School, The Blood and Iron Corps (Tekketsu 
Kinnotai) - under the supervision of the Japanese Imperial Forces - employed young boys as 
“suicidal attack corps.”116  Okinawan adult men also fought for Japan as soldiers, either as 
augmentees to Japanese units or in Okinawan units called the Okinawan Home Guard (Boei 
Tai).117  Conscription often times pulled the men from their occupations.  Teruya Eihan left his 
job as a math teacher at the Shuri Girls’ School in March 1945 to fight with the Boei Tai.  His 
duties included food and message delivery to the Japanese troops.  As Senior Operations Officer 
of the 32nd Imperial Army Hiromachi Yahara explained, “All people young and old, men and 
women, along with military forces devoted themselves to protecting the imperial motherland.  
This was the guiding principle that our military leaders had been emphasizing.”118  In preparation 
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for the invasion, most civilians felt pride in their duties for the Emperor.  Eihan told his school 
principal that he intended to “do [his] bit for the country.”119   
  Okinawan mobilization contributed significantly to Japanese fighting strength.  Between 
December 1944 and March 1945, Japanese troop strength increased by 16,000 because of the 
incorporation of the Okinawan Home Guard.120  While accommodating the possibility that 
Okinawans as individuals might act as spies, American forces underestimated their participation 
in actual combat units.  Only when realizing the inconsistency between their calculations of the 
number of enemy casualties and the number of enemy troops did the Americans notice the active 
combatant role of the Okinawans.  Earlier instruction emphasizing the rural background and 
cultural differences of the Okinawans from the Yamato Japanese of the mainland contributed to 
this miscalculation.  Stated one officer, “[The] advanced propaganda [campaign] about an 
enchained race seeking liberation has perhaps clouded appreciation of the full extent of Ok [sic] 
contribution to the defense of their native land.”121  The consideration of the Okinawans’ 
relationship with Japan influenced American thinking when contemplating the enemy’s fighting 
ability and strength.  Of 1,113 prisoners of war tallied over a three-week period, 424 were Boei 
Tai and 121 were military civilian employees.122  
Identifying the Okinawans from the Japanese was not a scientific process with foolproof 
results.  American soldiers tried their best to separate the innocuous civilians from those civilians 
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who intended to harm them.  Forming assumptions based off of training material and 
observation, the Americans recognized not only passivity and compliance but the potential for 
infiltration and deceit among the Okinawans.  For soldiers fighting in combat units, the intricate 
process of separating the Okinawans from the Japanese was less important; as combatants 
themselves, their concern was only with those who actively fought against them, regardless of 
ethnicity.123  Crowds of dislocated civilians along the roads were ignored or swiftly transferred to 
the military government units attached to the divisions.  For the military government soldiers 
administrating the camps, however, identifying Okinawans and Japanese as separate groups 
required extensive care and carried real consequences if done incorrectly.  Military government 
personnel slept in the same camps, mere yards away from the local residents.  To them, 
separating Japanese soldiers and Okinawans loyal to Japan from the majority of Okinawan 
refugees seeking relief was of paramount importance.  Their personal security depended upon it.     
The detachment commanders’ orders, issued on the transport ships, for rigid security 
measures were “for their protection and ours.”  Each civilian arriving to the camp underwent a 
screening process in order to discover any dangerous intentions and to find and remove any 
threatening weapon-like object.  Civilian men aged 17-45 were kept in stockades overnight.  
Perimeter fences encased the camps and internal fencing separated American and Okinawan 
living areas.  No civilians could leave the camp without an American soldier escort.  Labor 
parties worked under guard.  Military police, when available, augmented some camps, conducted 
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patrols, and enforced anti-fraternization rules.  Dog patrols consisting of 12 men and 13 dogs 
guarded the camps while the military police rested in the evenings.124   
XXIV Corps ordered strict security measures and each camp implemented them with as 
much rigor as their resources allowed.  Nodake, for example, did not have a perimeter fence 
because both military and local materials necessary for construction were not present in adequate 
amounts in the area.125  Personnel shortages posed the greatest difficulties; B-5, for example, 
consisted of only 23 soldiers and yet processed thousands of civilians, reaching a resident 
population of 6,999 by mid-April.126  Units short on people sent requests for Military Police 
augmentees to XXIV Corps regularly.127   
In order to ensure that the civilians followed the directives of the Americans, military 
government units devised a set of punishments for rule breakers.  In the first few days of the 
battle, the soldiers only issued warnings to those civilians who disregarded the camp 
regulations.128  Before a week had passed, however, they realized that penalties needed to be 
increased.  Punishments included placing offenders in the stockades or denying the daily rice 
ration.129   
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Civilians committed infractions out of their own need for survival, not a desire for 
deviance.  Still anxious and uneasy from fleeing throughout the battlefield, the civilians were 
accustomed to tending to themselves and scavenged for food remnants found in garbage, like 
empty fish cans discarded by the Japanese army.  They left the camps searching for family 
members or some salvageable food in abandoned fields. American forces knew why the civilians 
escaped and organized salvage parties to procure food and supplies for all camp residents.  They 
lacked the manpower, however, to escort every forlorn Okinawan and denied most requests.  The 
urgency of the civilians to leave the camps combined with shortages of material and personnel 
resulted in “numerous problems [with] civilian control.”130 
XXIV Corps issued an order in response to this lack of control.  By April 11, eleven days 
after the initial landings, any resident found leaving the camps or stealing food was to be shot.131  
The order unambiguously directed perimeter guards to “stop all civilians leaving the village for 
crops or any reason, and upon failure to stop when ordered back, to fire at such civilians.”132  
Each individual camp displayed standardized warning signs issued from XXIV Corps to alert the 
residents about the punishment of death.133  The public notices were written in Japanese, 
however, and thus disregarded the fact that older Okinawans only spoke and read Luchuan.134  
American forces not only knew that the Okinawans spoke a different language than Japanese but 
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also acknowledged that “sentences may be translated [between the two languages] word for word 
without comprehension” and that the two languages were “mutually unintelligible.”135  Lack of 
training in Luchuan and its five dialects limited the language options for the bulletins but the 
Americans knew that “standard [Tokyo] Japanese [was] understood by many in the cities and 
towns.”136  The posted bulletins, while still unintelligible to some of the camp population, 
signified an honest effort by military government officials to communicate with the population 
and, while not always able to accommodate it, an awareness of the distinction between 
Okinawans and Japanese.   
Unfortunately, the threats in the postings coupled with the limits of language meant that 
some camp residents understood the penalty only by witnessing firsthand the consequences.  In 
Nodake, seven civilians were shot.  One civilian was shot at Chatan, Maebaru, and Tobaru.  Two 
were shot at Shimabuku.137  When guards fired at fleeing civilians, they rarely, if ever, delivered 
less than a death blow, proving that the intent of the order was to kill rather than maim.  Though 
the number of civilians killed remained low in comparison with the thousands residing in the 
camps, military government units followed the XXIV Corps order universally.138      
The civilians shot had not threatened American soldiers or disclosed American secrets to 
the Japanese.  They had attempted to leave camp unaccompanied, had stolen food, or lingered 
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around the ration dump.139  While the Americans had a real fear that Okinawans could 
potentially retreat back towards Japanese lines after they had lived in close proximity with 
American military information, such fears only partially explained the extreme punishment of 
death.  Notably, the American forces knew that most fleeing Okinawans intended to locate lost 
family members and left over food.  While death stood as a drastic consequence against crimes 
unrelated to enemy acts, civilian freedom of movement threatened security within the camps by 
diminishing the control of the undermanned military government units.  Severely outnumbered, 
the soldiers needed to enforce discipline to reduce the possibility of organized civilian treachery.  
XXIV Corps issued the order in response to the military government units’ loosening grip on 
control of their camps.  The American knowledge of the Okinawans’ motivations for escaping 
meant that they did not shoot civilians because they considered them enemy combatants yet 
neither did they considered them harmless. 
The last shooting of a fleeing civilian occurred on April 26 at the Shimabaru camp when 
a civilian attempted to leave after sunset.140  For the remainder of the wartime occupation, ending 
with the surrender of the Ryukyus on September 7, Army military government units did not 
shoot any more civilians.141  Throughout the last four months of intense fighting, the military 
government units no longer saw a need for strict, deadly control over their camp populations.  As 
soldiers recognized the Okinawans’ quick obedience to the regulations and close living increased 
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familiarity between foreigner and local, individual military government units began to loosen the 
rigid restrictions.    
Punishment programs -whether stockades, food denial, or death- alerted the Okinawan 
camp populations to the seriousness with which the Americans dealt with violations.  While the 
Okinawans discovered to their relief and surprise that the Americans did not intend to harm 
them, Japanese horror stories about American torture made the Okinawans mindful of the 
structure imposed on them.142  As soon as they witnessed the consequences of disobedience, they 
complied. 
Military government soldiers quickly noticed the effectiveness of their punishment 
policies in restoring order and maintaining control over thousands.  With the inclusion of death 
as a punishment, they observed the “virtually complete solution of the problem” of civilians 
leaving the camps on their own.  A stockade constructed at Nodake for escapees who turned 
back before the military police could fire “was seldom required after the first few days.”  Within 
a month, “the penalty of cancelling the rice ration was threatened but not found necessary to be 
used.”143  
Not only did the Okinawans choose cooperation over rebellion but they readily 
participated in the daily operations of the camps and assisted the Americans in camp 
administration.  One Okinawan man made additional leaflets about the consequence of death and 
posted them on paths that led away from Nodake.  Regardless of the likelihood that the 
motivation of the man linked primarily to protecting his fellow Okinawans than working with the 
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Americans, the soldiers viewed such actions as signs of not only compliance but team work 
towards a common goal.144 
During the month of April, American soldiers began to link Okinawan obedience and 
cooperation in camp life to Okinawan culture and identity.  Soldiers compared Okinawans to 
other cultural groups like Filipinos and Japanese and used these comparisons in their favorable 
assessments of Okinawan behavior.  They viewed the Okinawans as “a lot more amenable to 
discipline than Filipinos and [with a] better standard of living.”145  They observed that “the rigid 
and arbitrary Japanese authoritarian disposition appeared strangely absent” in the work demeanor 
of the Okinawans.146  In observing the civilians’ compliant attitude during his visits to the camps, 
Buckner also compared their behavior to that of the Japanese.  He called Okinawan women meek 
and claimed that Japanese women attempted to destroy American equipment with explosives 
during night attacks.  Buckner’s replacement, General Joseph Stilwell, similarly described the 
Japanese as ferocious, brutal, and animal-like and the Okinawans as beautiful people.147  The 
Americans even compared the Okinawans to themselves and found that the way they took 
initiative in camp life resembled an American leadership style characterized by compromise and 
rationality.148    
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The military government units made special note of Okinawans that had spent time in the 
United States and, rather than inspiring sentiments of fear, close ties to America emphasized 
commonalities between the soldiers and civilians.  In contrast to the apprehension felt towards 
Japanese American citizens back home, connections that the Okinawans had with America 
encouraged understanding between the interned civilians and the American camp administrators.  
Okinawans’ personal associations with America also further estranged the Okinawans from the 
Japanese in the minds of the Americans.  More than just visitors to places like Hawaii and Los 
Angeles, California, some Okinawans had children stationed in Hawaii serving in the United 
States Army.  In comparison with the large camp populations, very few Okinawans had 
associations with America.149  The soldiers, however, gravitated towards the shared experience, 
giving the commonality great import in the formation of their opinions.  Soldiers began to view 
the Okinawans as on the American side and described civilians that aided camp activities as 
“responsible.”150   
With such familial ties to America, the soldiers interpreted Okinawan efforts towards 
cooperation as larger gestures in support of the American viewpoint of the war.  “Indeed,” wrote 
one soldier, “the fact that some of them had lived in the United States undoubted ameliorated 
there [sic] attitudes.”151  By April 30, soldiers recognized a trend in the attitude of the civilians; 
most expressed a preference for the influence of the United States government on Okinawa over 
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the Japanese government.152  In Nodake, questioning exposed that “civilians generally refrained 
from expressing views hostile to Japan, but did state they would prefer the rule of the United 
States.”153  Though the military government soldiers who queried the civilians at Nodake 
considered the pro-American response to be linked to Okinawan concerns about economic 
distress, the sentiment nonetheless contributed to an increasing comfort felt by the Americans 
towards the Okinawans.  The local people, initially viewed with suspicion and dismissed with 
insulting assumptions about their child-like nature, gradually represented a cooperative populace 
that might share principles with their foreigner invaders.  
By the end of April, obedience, cooperation and a feeling of kinship resulted in 
adjustment in policy at the individual camps.154  The loosened restrictions did not originate from 
XXIV Corps or Tenth Army.  Instead, they grew gradually as each camp commander assessed 
the situation through careful consideration of the improvement in overall control, the positive 
contributions of the civilians and the perceived growing rift between the Okinawans and the 
Japanese.155  The situations each commander encountered by late April and early May were the 
same as they had dealt with in early April at the outbreak of the battle.  How they chose to 
                                                          
152Okinawa Diary, April 30, 1945, LTC John Stevens and MSG James M. Burns; Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars, 34; 
Diary, 1944-1945, Detachment B-5, 48; XXIV Corps Military Government Daily Operations Log, RG 407, File 
224-12, NARA. 
 
153Diary, May 1-31,1945, Detachment B-5, 47. 
 
154Every military government camp, in varying degrees, relaxed their strict guidelines around the end of April/early 
May.  (Diary, April 1 – May 31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 40-55; XXIV Corps Military Government Daily Operations 
Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA; History of Military Government Operations on Okinawa, May 10, 1945, BG 
William E. Crist, 17-20). 
 
155This exercise of authority was consistent with the guidance in the GOPER.  General Buckner encouraged his 
subordinate leaders to make decisions at their level based on the circumstances they encountered.  The GOPER also 
stated that the civilians could earn back their freedom by behaving favorable.  Even though the camp commanders 
lacked an explicit order from XXIV Corps or Tenth Army directing the shift in policy, their adjustment of policy 
based on perceived changes in the Okinawans’ behavior fell within the general parameters laid out in the GOPER. 
(Operational Directive #7, January 6, 1945, Commanding General, Tenth Army, 2). 
57 
 
handle the incidents, however, was quite different.  When confronted with possible espionage 
more than a month into the battle, camp commanders displayed more trust towards the 
Okinawans and favored their innocence.   
American suspicion and paternalism towards the Okinawans, however, did not disappear. 
The battle still waged fiercely and the possibility of treachery was still present.  The military 
government units, for example, continued to record the names of civilians who had relatives in 
the Japanese Army.156  The Americans, however, trusted the Okinawans to collect this 
information themselves and the list did not inspire additional vigilance by the military 
government.  Despite being still cognizant of their vulnerability living closely with the 
Okinawans, the Americans trusted the camp residents on a level unseen earlier in the battle.  
Compared to decisions made soon after the landing when suspicion quickly turned into 
accusation, the leniency signified a change in the Americans’ view of the Okinawans and their 
identity as a people. 
In Nodake, for example, precise shelling of a nearby American gun position alerted the 
military government soldiers of B-5 of a possible breach of security.  After the 96th Division 
Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachment finished interviews with the civilian camp 
population and submitted them for review, the camp commander decided that no evidence 
existed against any Okinawans and no disciplinary action of any type was appropriate.  He cited 
as reasons for his decision the cooperation and usefulness of the Okinawans in camp productivity 
and their identity as Okinawans, not as Japanese.  “It may be noted,” he wrote, “that while a 
number of Japanese flags were taken from arriving civilians, the inhabitants on questions as to 
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being ‘Japanese’ asserted themselves to be ‘Okinawan,’ not Japanese.”157  A similar situation 
during the first month of battle would probably have caused the suspected offenders to spend at 
least one night in the stockade.  By April 30, the military government soldiers disassociated the 
Okinawans from the Japanese; the Okinawans were no longer viewed as enemy civilians.   
This realignment of identity altered military government policy within the individual 
camps.158  In addition to ending the use of death as a consequence after April 26, military-aged 
men no longer spent their evenings in guarded barbed wire enclosures in the center of the 
camps.159  At Shimabaru, the value of the Okinawans as workers outweighed any fears of 
organized rebellion.  Military government soldiers found it important to send the civilians to 
work some of the few surviving crops and increase the food supply.  While a few soldiers still 
guarded work parties that grew food outside of the camp, civilians conducted their work within 
camp under little to no supervision.  From the beginning of the battle, civilians had received job 
tasks from the military government; by late in the month, civilians completed those daily tasks 
with a greatly increased level of independence.160    
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159The barbed wire stockades still existed as punishment but their use was far less frequent.  One camp, for example, 
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May 1-31, 1945, Detachment B-5, 45-47; XXIV Corps Military Government Daily Operations Log, RG 407, File 
224-12, NARA).  
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 Okinawans held camp leadership positions by April 30.  The Americans divided up the 
living sectors and assigned locals to oversee them.  They interviewed each candidate about their 
previous experience with government, their social and economic status within their village, and 
their attitude towards the United States.161  Chosen leaders had some English language skills, ties 
to America, and credibility within their community. One man chosen as the Civilian Public 
Safety Headman in Nodake had served as the Mayor of Ginowan for 15 years.  Another named 
Kamajo had lived in California for 27 years.162  
The selected local leaders underwent a three-week trial period and, upon assuming their 
positions, possessed only limited authority.  Local leaders oversaw food ration distribution and 
assisted in rule enforcement by communicating the regulations to the population.163  They also 
served on firefighting teams and recommended other civilians who they believed deserved 
positions of responsibility.  The soldiers retained the right to dismiss locals from management 
roles who they believed had failed in their duties; however, the use of civilians as organizers 
increased the stability and control of camp life.164  The decision by Americans to identify civilian 
leaders demonstrated confidence, reliance, and some degree of trust in the Okinawans.  The rapid 
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emergence of local leadership in the midst of battle, although rudimentary, signified progress on 
the part of the Americans towards reevaluating the Okinawans and their identity.165 
Military government units now diverted the low supply of salvaged construction 
materials to projects unrelated to security.166  Camps became more permanent communities; 
Americans constructed playgrounds, schools, orphanages, and nursing homes with materials that 
had once built stockades.167  Soldiers also began to share their military rations and old uniforms 
with cold and hungry civilians despite previous regulations forbidding such actions.168  By May 
31, military government supply officers sought out discarded American uniforms from salvage 
dumps and issued them to civilians.  To dispel any apprehension when viewed by tactical units, 
the military government supply sections painted the word “civilian” in white on each shirt.169  
The relaxed restrictions fostered an environment of friendship and encouraged the soldiers to 
interact with the civilians in casual, social settings; the people had access to more intimate views 
of the soldiers.  A young Okinawan boy observed soldiers shaving and drinking coffee.  “I 
couldn’t believe it,” he exclaimed, “It was a completely different world from what I was used to.  
They even had toilet paper.”   Two soldiers enjoyed tea with a family and several local nurses 
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had to be moved away from Nodake to the camp in Koza after beginning romantic relationships 
with American soldiers.170 
    ***** 
The mission of military government to remove the civilians from the battlefield and 
support the main combat mission of securing the island never changed throughout the battle.  
Likewise, the priorities of safeguarding American lives and maximizing resources also continued 
to drive policy.  American perceptions of Okinawan identity, however, changed as the battle 
progressed.  Continual interaction with the Okinawans showed the population to be obedient and 
cooperative.  American military government soldiers found similarities between themselves and 
the Okinawans that promoted a degree of trust.  Contrasting sharply with pre-battle assumptions 
of the Okinawan disposition, Okinawan behavior caused American military government 
personnel to reassess their perception of Okinawan identity which in turn modified policy.  
American planners, commanders, and soldiers continually evaluated the culture and ethnicity of 
Okinawa as well as its political connections to Japan when making decisions about how the 
American forces would conduct the occupation. 
Inside the military government camps on the Okinawan battlefield the soldiers 
encountered the complexities of race when faced with two ethnic groups – Okinawans and 
Japanese - that appeared to them to be racially alike.  As military government soldiers, their job 
required them to not only safeguard their fellow American soldiers but to sustain the lives of 
thousands of civilians who appeared more similar to the enemy than themselves.  Broad 
generalizations of the racial and ethnic character of the enemy promoted by combat planners to 
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protect American soldiers’ lives conflicted with the war experience of the military government 
soldier.  Within the camps, the military government soldiers had to make a sophisticated 
distinction between two ethnic groups from the same country.   
The initial Okinawa experience weakens Dower’s thesis of crude racial stereotyping.  
Racial hostility between the Japanese and the Americans did not translate into unorthodox and 
unnecessarily cruel policies or behavior.  American planners for the occupation of Okinawa 
instituted policy that lacked bitter race hate.  Despite following such violent engagements as 
Peleileu and Iwo Jima, occupation policy for Okinawa did not contain overtly harsh procedures.  
American planners’ consideration of race and ethnicity produced logically reasoned policies 
instituted to ensure the success of the combat mission. 
Dower correctly argues for strong racism expressed by both sides, yet the planning and 
conduct of military government in Okinawa demonstrates that racial confrontation did not 
always dissolve into ill-informed generalizations and assumptions.  American soldiers 
challenged the negative images of the Japanese by embracing the Okinawans; they responded to 
people of a different ethnicity through conscious evaluation based on interactions with them.  
Dower’s thesis limits such an open analysis and, instead, determines that race carried an 
overriding negativity.  While Dower is correct that the confrontation of the Americans and the 
Japanese on the battlefields of the Pacific was brutal and that Americans expressed an awareness 
of race, the diverse ethnicities encountered on Okinawa and how the American military 
government dealt with those ethnicities dispels the idea that racial confrontation dominated 
American behavior.  Military government planners, commanders, and soldiers’ contemplation of 
race in policy making in the early occupation of Okinawa resulted in the implementation of 
policy that was characterized by constant and open evaluation of ethnically different people. 
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MARINE COWBOYS: STRICT DIRECTIVES IN WARTIME MARINE MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT 
 
A large crowd, visibly old men, children, and women, walked casually down the road 
running lengthwise in front of Marine Private Joe Drago.  It was late May 1945, around one in 
the morning, near Sugar Loaf Hill.  Drago, a combat novice from Boston, and his squad had 
prepared an attack position overlooking the road with hopes of trapping Japanese soldiers.  
Despite the dark, Drago could see the approaching group clearly; these were civilians. 
Drago and his squad leader, Corporal Ed Yahara, jumped into the middle of the road and, 
facing the oncoming crowd, drew their .45 caliber pistols, and fired continuously until they 
depleted all their ammunition.  In the melee, the rest of the squad, observing from along the side 
of the road, reactively opened fire.  As the crowd fled, Yahara and Drago ran back to their 
positions, grabbed the machine gun, and sprayed the civilians with bullets, slowly sweeping from 
left to right and back again.1 
The Battle of Okinawa had been ravaging the island for forty-six days.  Destruction had 
forced hundreds of thousands of Okinawans seeking shelter, food, and relative safety into 
American military government camps and thus stabilized the movement of civilians on the 
battlefield.  Within the camps, the Okinawans were obedient and cooperative, traits 
acknowledged by all American troops.  To the Marines, however, any Okinawan compliance 
with American military directives was seen as responsible behavior for prisoners of war, not as 
characteristic of innocent refugees.  To Drago, Yahara, and the rest of their squad, the people that 
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lay dying on the road were no different than the Japanese soldiers they had been waiting for; 
those old men, children, and women were enemy. 
III Amphibious Corps, like XXIV Corps, agonized over the depth of their supply and 
prioritized the lives of their Marines and the successful execution of the mission above all else.  
Okinawa, however, housed not only a large civilian population but also a population that had a 
strained, complicated, unpredictable relationship with its own country.  Unlike other Japanese 
holdings, Okinawa had never been a colony.  In 1879, Okinawa transitioned from a quasi-
independent country into a political prefecture of Japan.  As ethnic Ryukyuans, however, 
Okinawans suffered prejudice from the mainland Yamato Japanese and did not enjoy full 
benefits as subjects of the Emperor.  American military planners needed to deduce the allegiance 
of the Okinawan population and attempt to predict their reaction to an American assault in order 
to safeguard their own troops and ensure the success of the mission. 
The Marines conducted intensive intelligence investigations into the cultural background 
and disposition of the Okinawans.2  Despite collecting the same data and falling under the same 
Tenth Army guidance from Buckner, the Marines reached a different conclusion about the 
identity of the Okinawans and unequivocally stated in their military government plans that 
Okinawans, despite a cultural background that differed from the Japanese, devoted themselves to 
the Japanese empire as loyal citizens.  While recognizing the complicated relationship the 
Okinawans had with Japan, the Marines erased any ambiguity for its troops by authoritatively 
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assigning an identity to the Okinawans that predicted a hostile response.  Unlike the Army’s 
preparations that considered the possibility of a dangerous population, the Marines did not leave 
any analytical room for its troops to reassess the actions of the civilians upon landing.  Marines 
and those assigned to Marine units were unquestioningly to process the local population as 
enemy civilians, thereby eliminating the danger of miscalculating civilian intent on the 
battlefield.  Marine leadership, therefore, prohibited the practice of any activities they considered 
linked to nationalistic spirit, such as religious gatherings, and prepared to execute an aggressive 
and intimidating occupation.3  The Marines deliberately closed any further interpretation of the 
civilian reaction to an American military presence; as vehement nationalists, the Okinawans 
would greet the landing American troops with antagonism. 
III Amphibious Corps briefed its troops with definitive clarity: all troops were to regard 
the Okinawans suspiciously; as loyal Japanese, they posed a real threat that overrode their 
civilian status.4   Stating that the population would resolutely defend themselves and their 
country, the orders rallied the men and encouraged them to approach the civilians aggressively.  
Instruction for the troops devalued the culture of Okinawa and its communities by calling it an 
insignificant, useless island.5 
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In the confusion and tension of combat, the Marines concentrated on the mission 
objectives: the cohesion of their teams, the effectiveness of their weapons, and the strength of 
their resupply.  As the unarmed Okinawans cluttered the beaches, the assaulting Marines 
haphazardly grouped them into clusters and pushed inland.  In the first days after landing, 
Marine military government retained the unstructured clusters so as to speed the attack.  
Undermanned and short on resources, the military government units ignored the nourishment 
needs of the growing number of relatively free roaming civilians.  Additionally, the Marines 
categorized the Okinawans as vile, inhuman, and inadequate.  Troops found the sight of the war 
ravaged people offensive.6  Based on the composition of the groups of Okinawans they 
encountered on the beaches (children, old men, and women), they assessed the initial threat as 
low.  Never wavering in their belief that the Okinawans were definitive enemy, disgusted by the 
population that they encountered, and naively disregarding the strength of the too young and too 
old, the Marines were reluctant to devote the massive effort necessary to establish functioning 
refugee camps.  Negative attitudes combined with a lack of adequate personnel and supplies, and 
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therefore ability, contributed to the lack of formal military government procedures.  Civilians, 
therefore, traveled unfettered throughout the battlefield obstructing both the operational and 
military government missions.7 
Unstructured, disorganized military government hampered aid distribution and increased 
accidental civilian casualties.  The ability of the Okinawans to wander anywhere within 
American lines also increased the likelihood of exposing military secrets and compromising 
security.  By mid-April, attacks against American troops occurred from within the local 
populations of the Marine military government areas. The Marines, however, did not take the 
time to identify the ethnicity of the attackers.  Reports about the incidents only briefly mentioned 
the cultural origins of the aggressors and dismissively stated that the offenders could have been 
either Japanese or Okinawan. 8  The shock of the attacks caused the Marines to reassess the level 
of control they exercised over the population; established camps with restrictive regulations, as 
originally planned, would minimize the threat of hostile acts against American troops.  While the 
absence of a military government structure at the onset of the invasion resulted from the apathy 
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and inability of an overstressed, undermanned work force, the transition toward firmer controls 
stemmed from concerns about troop safety and extreme misgivings about the Okinawans that 
reinforced the original assessment of the population as “nationals of unquestionable loyalty.”9  
The Marines, despite neglecting to ascertain the ethnicity of the attackers, believed that the 
incidents proved the Okinawans to be combative and unquestionably allied with the Japanese.  
With the attacks considered evidence of hostility and resolute cooperation with the Japanese, the 
Marines’ adverse feelings towards the Okinawans increased.  Identifying the Okinawans as 
Japanese combined with agitation caused by the attacks translated into occasional aggressive 
action from the Marines towards the civilian population.10 
By mid-April, operations in Marine military government camps resembled the Army 
camps far more than they had earlier during the landing.  The Marines had learned from their 
own experiences that loose policies and absent systems made their mission of controlling the 
population and providing for basic humanitarian needs much more difficult.  Despite maintaining 
their distrust of the Okinawans, the Marines had exposed themselves unnecessarily to danger by 
executing their duties with minimal effort.  Now hardened in their conviction of the malicious 
nature of the Okinawans despite never verifying the veracity of the claim, the Marines began 
establishing a camp system that promoted security.  The barbed wire, guards, accountability, 
rations, and movement restrictions looked similar to those used by the Army detachments.  By 
basing those similar measures on an unwavering belief in the aggressive intentions of the 
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Okinawans, however, the Marines carried out their military government duties with an element 
of harshness that was absent from the Army camps from their very inception.11 
The disparity between the Marines and the Army in expectations and conduct of military 
government displays the contested nature of the American definition of Okinawan identity and 
the malleable nature of race and ethnicity.  It also demonstrates the great extent to which the 
assignment of identity shaped the actions of the troops.  Regardless of what specific conclusions 
were reached through cultural examination, scrutiny along lines of ethnicity proved pivotal in 
mission planning and execution.  The American military acknowledged the complexities of each 
cultural group, assigned a well-researched, purposeful identity, and molded policy around this 
assignment. The emphasis on cultural analysis did not undermine the centrality of military 
concerns such as security and supply demands.  Considerations based on military factors and 
battlefield analysis continued to drive the planning and executing of military government 
operations.  Together, military and cultural factors combined to provide the Americans with a 
robust picture of the battlefield and allowed them to make decisions that evaluated all aspects of 
the enemy and environment. 
***** 
On Dec. 7, 1944, at Admiral Nimitz’s Headquarters in Hawaii, Major General Roy S. 
Geiger, Commanding General of III Amphibious Corps, listened intently to preliminary briefings 
about upcoming operations in the Pacific.  General Buckner’s staff officers briefed developing 
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plans for future operations in Iwo Jima and Okinawa to the senior commanding officers of all 
services that would execute the missions.  Geiger, a combat veteran who had already 
commanded at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Guam, and Peleilu, realized the importance of a 
mission conducted so close to the home islands of Japan.  A man who spent his combat time far 
forward with his troops, Geiger fully immersed himself in every aspect of war fighting.  From 
December 7 to December 20, Geiger and his staff of Marines worked closely with the Army and 
the Navy as they began planning Operation ICEBERG.12 
On December 21, armed with preliminary plans and prepared to translate corps priorities 
down to division missions, Geiger and his staff flew from Hawaii to Guadalcanal and Guam to 
meet with the commanders of the assault divisions.  As L-day drew nearer, refinement and 
distribution of the plans became paramount.  By March 16, 1945, his staff conferred in his office 
aboard the U.S.S. Panamint at 0830 every day.  Geiger believed in open discussions among his 
staff members and each major staff section attended the meetings and presented their work on 
designated days.  In the months prior, Geiger’s staff and subordinate commanders had worked 
tirelessly to intricately plan the mission and prepare their Marines.  They trained on amphibious 
operations, street fighting techniques and mock-ups of Japanese-style fortifications. Geiger heard 
plans from the Corps Surgeon, Engineers, Signal, Artillery, and Ordnance elements.  His staff 
considered the complications and benefits of air support, naval gunfire, and debarkation.  They 
carefully thought out the actions of the Shore Party.  Geiger, a persistent, determined, decisive 
yet fair-minded man, insisted his staff and commanders address every component of the 
mission.13 
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Marine Colonel F. B. Loomis, Assistant Chief of Staff of the logistics section, wrote a 
small annex to Administrative Plan 1-45 on January 16, 1945.  Annex “Able,” based off of Tenth 
Army’s GOPER, covered the procedures and the responsibilities of military government for III 
Amphibious Corps.  Loomis, with the assistance of two additional field grade officers and a team 
of enlisted men, handled all aspects of the Marine logistical plan.  The section focused on supply, 
transport, and debarkation for a mission that demanded detailed logistical coordination in order 
to support fighting forces out on Pacific islands.14  Geiger, similar to Buckner, wanted to ensure 
that his troops had enough food, clothing, and ammunition to sustain a fight at such a great 
distance from the United States.  Although the troops would use the Philippines as a logistical 
base, goods still needed to travel across the ocean.  Under Geiger’s watchful eye, Loomis and his 
staff focused intently on the movement of supplies.  Military government procedures, normally 
tasked under a civil affairs section, held little interest for Loomis among his many 
responsibilities.  At the morning meetings in Geiger’s office, Loomis briefed the major 
components of the supply plan; he did not brief military government.  In fact, when Brigadier 
General M.H. Silverthorn, Geiger’s Chief of Staff, set the agenda for the meetings, he did not 
allot a time for issues with military government nor did he invite school trained military 
government Marine officers to attend.15  While Geiger did pay attention to the fact that a large 
civilian population resided on Okinawa, he saw only how that population would complicate 
combat operations.  He did not overly concern himself with the survival needs of the civilians or 
the further issues of rehabilitating a war torn community. 
                                                          
 
14Annex “Able,” January 16, 1945; Memorandum, March 10, 1945, BG Silverthorn.   
 
15Memorandum, March 10, 1945, BG Silverthorn.  
 
72 
 
On December 13, 1944, three Marine officers, specially trained in military government, 
were assigned to III Amphibious Corps to serve as advisors and liaisons.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Donald Winder, Captain Wynne L. Van Schiak and Captain Hector C. Prud’homme Jr., along 
with three Privates First Class, transferred from Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific.  Each of them had 
extensive experience in civil affairs.  Winder and Van Schiak had already served in Saipan and 
Prud’homme had worked with V Amphibious Corps.  None of these officers, however, attended 
any planning meetings for Operation ICEBERG with either the Army or the Marines.  Army 
Brigadier General William E. Crist, Deputy Commander for Military Government, invited the 
Marines Civil Affairs section to participate in Tenth Army planning in Hawaii before their 
departure to the staging area at Guadalcanal.  Civil Affairs policy required Marine officers to 
attend interservice planning meetings prior to operations.16  Despite the policy, however, III 
Amphibious Corps had no military government officers available to Crist in December 1944 and 
early January 1945.  Prud’homme returned to the United States on emergency leave from 
October to early December 1944 and only worked three days in November at the Department of 
the Pacific in San Francisco.17  Van Schiak and Winder did not arrive to III Amphibious Corps 
until February 2, 1945.  Winder’s experience and rank awarded him the position of Officer-in-
Charge.  Since no military government section was formed until after February 2, however, 
Winder worked as a Special Staff Officer, as a lawyer in the Disciplinary Section of the 
                                                          
16Comments on Military Government Operation, July 6, 1945, 1st Marine Division, 2; Operational Report on 
Military Government, OKINAWA, Phase I and II, May 1, 1945; U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs Officers, 
Memorandum, April 13, 1944, RG 127, Box 13, NARA, 3; Major Garnelle G. Wheeler, Activities of the Marine 
Corps In Civil Affairs in World War II, critical study of, March 1946, Montgomery papers. 
 
17Major Hector Charles Prud’homme Jr, Record (Personnel Files), January 1946, 000019042, NPRC, 3. 
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Headquarters of the Marine Corps and as the Acting Director of the Army JAG War Crimes 
desk, Navy division.18 
The Marines created military government liaison positions because joint military 
government teams consisted of only Army and Navy officers and enlisted men.19  Despite its 
close organizational relationship to the Navy, the United States Marine Corps retained an 
independent identity.  Since 1942, rivalry between all services complicated planning and 
execution of campaigns in the Pacific Theater.  By 1945, jurisdictional disputes continued to 
hinder true cooperation.  Buckner, in naming Geiger as his successor, sparked controversy with 
key commanders, such as Admiral Nimitz, who “mortally fear[ed] and distrust[ed] the Marines.”  
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC), felt 
irritated that Admiral Nimitz had any opinion over what an Army commander decided yet also 
was dismayed at Buckner’s choice of Geiger and believed that Buckner had “sold out to one of 
our sister services.”  On an inspection visit of Tenth Army, General Joseph Stilwell found the 
genial way in which the Army handled interservice relations “nauseating.”20  Brigadier General 
Oliver P. Smith, Marine deputy chief of staff for Tenth Army, commented that “if you are going 
to conduct joint operations successfully you have to tread softly.”  Smith ensured that planning 
                                                          
18Temporary duty, case of Lieutenant Colonel Donald T. Winder, July 13, 1945, Floor 3, Module 5, Row 44, NPRC; 
Legal Qualifications, First Endorsement on LtCol. Donald T. Winder, December 11, 1950, Floor 3, Module 5, Row 
44; Performance of Temporary Duty, report on, case of Captain Wynne L.Van Schiak, July 2, 1945, 000014812; 
Operational Report on Military Government, OKINAWA, Phase I and II, May 1, 1945. 
 
19U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs Officers, Memorandum, April 13, 1944; Annex “Able,” January 16, 1945, 4; 6th 
Marine Division Special Action Report, Section 11-Military Government, 50. 
 
20Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars: The Okinawan Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., and Joseph Stilwell, 17, 
19, 57, 75.  Buckner served as the head of the Army commission that investigated the relief of MG Ralph Smith, 
27th Infantry Division by LTG Holland Smith, V Amphibious Corps, for actions on Saipan.  Buckner’s experience 
with the case made him cognizant of how unproductive the interservice rivalry could be.  As commander of Tenth 
Army, Buckner tried to negate the rivalry the best that he could.  Naming Geiger as his replacement should he 
become a casualty was a part of this effort. 
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done by the Marines aligned as cleanly with Army plans as possible in order to avoid undue 
criticism.  Army planners still censored their speech around Smith.21  Buckner and Geiger, 
friends since their time together at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, tried to 
minimize conflict.  Besides choosing Geiger as his replacement, Buckner tried to ensure that 
news media gave credit to all services involved.  He publically announced that “the Marines 
form a powerful and essential part of Tenth Army…it is most desirable that the Marines…be not 
ignored in any publication relative to the composition of Tenth Army.  The cordial relations 
existing among elements of various services…are always menaced by…partiality in matters of 
publicity.”22  Perceptions of unequal treatment plagued interservice team work.  Rumors of better 
living conditions and privileges given to other services added to the friction.  The Navy 
supposedly “lived well ashore.  They made themselves far more comfortable than the Army.” 
Marines ridiculed each other, calling each other “crazy,” if they expressed any small amount of 
respect for the combat performance of another service.23  Buckner penned a memo directly to 
Geiger insisting that he and his commanders enforce punishments for wayward Marines that 
were consistent with Army justice policies to ensure the “unity of the Task Force.”24   As his 
subordinate, Geiger respected Buckner as the commander of Tenth Army and attempted to model 
a positive interservice working relationship to his subordinates and superiors.  When Buckner 
                                                          
21BG Oliver P. Smith, “The Tenth Army and Okinawa,” Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith papers, Box 22, Folder 8, 
United States Marine Corps Historical Division, Quantico, VA, 46. 
 
22LTG Simon B. Buckner, Jr. to CG, United State Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, “Newsmap of Okinawa,” 
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24LTG Simon B. Buckner, Jr to MG Roy S. Geiger, “Discipline,” February 12, 1945, Major General Roy S. Geiger 
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visited III Amphibious Corps in late January 1945, Geiger found it important that his unit present 
a clean and orderly appearance.  In his report to Headquarters, he expressed the worth of pleasing 
his Army commander and also emphasized the attention and care that Buckner devoted to the 
Marine units.25 
Despite Geiger and Buckner’s efforts, rivalry continued to underscore the mission.  Each 
service, therefore, created programs and policies to prevent other services from usurping their 
control or resources.  To counter other services distorting Marine prerogative, the Marines sent a 
few officers to Army and Navy Civil Affairs schools to train for positions as military 
government liaisons.  Schools in Charlottesville, Virginia and at Columbia University, New 
York trained officers in a country’s culture and language and in military tasks such as cargo ship 
loading.  Graduates from the program at Columbia even earned Masters degrees.  Prud’homme 
and Winder entered the same class at the Naval School of Military Government and 
Administration at Columbia University on April 1, 1943 and Van Schiak graduated from the 
United States Army School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia on May 6, 
1943.26 
Less than twenty Marines served as military government liaisons in the Pacific.  The 
absence of Winder, Prud’homme and Van Schiak from planning meant minimal input from 
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specialized Marines in an environment where other services jockeyed for overall control and 
resources.  The slow arrival of Winder, Prud’homme and Van Schiak, who were then 
misdirected to other unrelated duties, wasted their field expertise and school training.  Tenth 
Army, therefore, produced the GOPER with nominal input from the Marines that would execute 
it.  Loomis, lacking a sufficient military government background, produced the Corps level order 
as an ancillary task. 
Based on the GOPER, the Joint Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil 
Affairs (Navy Department OpNav 50E-3, War Department Field Manual 27-5), and intelligence 
summaries, Annex “Able” outlined the mission and responsibilities of military government units 
attached to combat Marine units.27  Despite the inexperience of Loomis or the low priority of 
military government, as with all III Amphibious Corps orders, Annex “Able” reflected Geiger’s 
intent.  Indicative of Buckner’s concerns and priorities, Geiger placed the combat mission above 
the welfare of the civilians.  Minimizing American casualties and preserving operational secrets 
outweighed the comfort of the foreign population.   Mission success meant defeating the 
Japanese and gaining unfettered access to Okinawa for launching subsequent operations towards 
the mainland, not constructing a new society for the Okinawan population after battle 
destruction. 
Just as Buckner had done, Geiger molded his military government policies around 
combat mission priorities.  With limited resources, the needs of the American troops took 
precedence.  Marines would receive priority to food, water, shelter and medical care; civilians 
would receive such life sustaining items “to the extent necessary to comply with the minimum 
standards of humanitarian treatment and to the extent that the same can be done without neglect 
                                                          
27Annex “Able,” January 16, 1945, 10-11; Joint Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, War 
Department Field Manual 27-5,  November 4, 1943, RG 389, Box 879, NARA. 
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of, or detriment to, our own personnel.”28  While each division would travel with 70,000 rations 
intended for the civilians, Geiger and his staff planned for units to salvage local foods first.  
Building materials, clothing, fishing equipment, stray animals, vehicles, cooking ware and any 
possible medical provisions found were also to be salvaged.  Geiger expected the military 
government units to accomplish their tasks with the most minimal of resources.  While he did 
authorize his Division commanders to issue military rations to civilians in an emergency, he did 
not intend to expend vital military resources on a possibly hostile local population.29   
Through Annex “Able,” Geiger also directed his Marines to execute a certain level of 
control.  Using the exact rhetoric of the GOPER, Geiger directed his Marine commanders to 
“demand and enforce obedience” and to use “such powers of government as international law 
and military necessity may require.”  Civilians could earn their freedom back only through 
compliance with military government orders.  Geiger and his staff also quoted the GOPER and 
authorized “rigid control of civilians” while also allowing for commanders to exercise their own 
discretion dependent on the conditions they encountered.  With priority on the combat mission, 
Geiger directed his Marines to displace civilians away from the fighting and contain them in 
separated areas.  He intended to prevent civilians from “jeopardize[ing] public order” by 
restricting their movement and limiting their responsibility for their own lives.  He banned 
religious practices in an effort to prevent the mass organizing of people.  In the interest of 
safeguarding secret operational information, he stopped the mail and thus limited the abilities of 
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the population to maintain communication outside their encampment.  Consistent to that of Tenth 
Army, Geiger’s purpose for military government was “to control the civil population…in order 
to facilitate military [operations and] to relieve combat troops of civilian problems.”30  Military 
government was not a humanitarian mission.  The tasks of civil affairs officers directly supported 
the objective of the fighting forces to overtake the island. 
Beyond stating the mission, Annex “Able,” in eleven pages, covered organization, 
command and control, food allocation, labor, shelter, civilian estimates and handling procedures, 
and daily reports.  Expecting a maximum 60,000 civilians to appear during the combat phase, 
Geiger and his staff issued a thorough Annex.  While not a primary concern, Geiger recognized 
that the movement of thousands of displaced civilians, if handled poorly, had the potential to 
disrupt combat seriously.  He thus expected Loomis and his staff, despite their specialty in 
logistics, to write as robust an Annex as they could. 
Annex “Able” detailed the composition of the military government teams.  Joint military 
government teams were attached directly to Marine combat units throughout the assault phase 
and answered to the combat commander.31  Four levels of detachments, titled with letters of the 
alphabet to designate size, processed the civilians from the battlefield to high functioning rear 
encampments.  “A” and “B” detachments joined the Marines at the mounting area.  “A” 
detachments stayed with the division throughout combat and “establish[ed] civilian collection 
points separate from but adjacent to prisoner of war collection points; posting proclamations and 
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issuing civilian relief supplies.”  As the “A” detachments advanced with the attacking forces, the 
“B” detachments continued screening Okinawans, issuing basic supplies and containing civilian 
movement.  In concept, “A” and “B” detachments with the Marines had the same mission as the 
“A” and “B” detachments attached to Army units.32  Larger “C” and “D” detachments attached 
to corps level.  In addition to the civil affairs teams, Geiger authorized two Military Police 
Companies – one Marine and one Army – to assist in military government duties throughout the 
Corps.33 
Civilian labor policy within Annex “Able” aligned with the GOPER; the Marines viewed 
healthy male Okinawans as a labor pool for various physical military tasks such as graves burial 
and light construction.  Similar to Tenth Army, the Marines mandated that all able Okinawan 
males must participate.  Labor requests from the combat units were coordinated through the 
military government commander.  The combat units then needed to supply guards, lunch, and 
water for the laborers.  Labor parties originating from military government units attached to the 
Marines required payment, submitted to Military Government Headquarters, for their work.34 
Tenth Army required each military government unit commander to submit a daily report 
containing data about the number of civilians collected, any deaths or births from within the 
camp, communicable diseases encountered, location of the camp, military rations used, labor 
requests, and on hand salvageable materials.35  These detailed reports were to be submitted 
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through division and Corps to the Tenth Army Military Government Staff where they were to be 
compiled into an inclusive report for Crist.  Tenth Army and Crist tracked data on all military 
government units in an effort to manage limited resources and volume of civilian movement. 
In most ways, the Marine orders for military government at corps and division level 
reflected the intent of Buckner and Tenth Army.  The documents that the Marines produced used 
the same format and rhetoric and shared the same mission and tasks as Tenth Army’s GOPER.36  
Unlike the Army, however, the Marines included definitive information about the assumed race 
and identity of the Okinawans and provided directives on how they should be treated. 
The Army and the Marines both researched the culture and characteristics of the 
Okinawan population extensively.37  Military planners needed to predict, as best they could with 
the available information, how the Okinawans would react to an armed American presence.  
Okinawa and Japan had a complicated relationship that made the question of Okinawan loyalty 
difficult to discern.  Japan had never held Okinawa as a colony.  In 1609, the Satsuma clan, 
interested in exercising its militarism and looking to Okinawa for economic profit, landed 
hundreds of war-junks on the shores of the Ryukyu Kingdom.  The Satsuma clan preserved a 
slight level of self-governance for the kingdom by allowing traditional customs to continue and 
by retaining the Ryukyuan king.  Satsuma, however, strongly influenced the kingdom through 
governmental and financial posts.  Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese 
government began to transition from the Tokugawa feudal system to the prefectural system.  By 
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1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom stood as one of the last remaining hans.  On March 27, 1879, King 
Sho Tai abdicated his throne and Ryukyu Han, which had preserved a certain degree of 
independence in spite of the arrival of the Satsuma clan two centuries prior, became Okinawa-
Ken.  Representatives of the Japanese government escorted Sho Tai from Shuri Castle to Japan 
and the Ryukyu Kingdom came to an end without violence.38 
Despite lack of bloodshed, the Okinawans lost their kingdom, traditions, and 
independence.  Under the prefectural government, Okinawans did not share the same privileges 
as the mainland Japanese.  Okinawa sent representatives, elected by Okinawan men, to the 
Imperial Diet but only Japanese men from the mainland held the high prefectural positions; 
Okinawans could not run for office themselves.  The Japanese treated the Okinawans as inferior 
because of differences in language, ethnicity, culture, and religion.  Indoctrination programs 
sought to assimilate the Okinawans to Japanese custom and thus caused the elimination of their 
own ethnic practices.  Okinawans resented the Japanese because of such treatment.  As one 
Okinawan war publication expressed it, “Under Japanese rule, it’s kind of tough to be an 
Okinawan.”39 
While Okinawa had a comparatively better relationship with Japan than countries Japan 
colonized such as Formosa or Korea, Okinawans felt oppressed and threatened by the Japanese 
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government.40  Okinawans could either view the arrival of American troops as an opportunity to 
separate themselves from Japan or they could feel threatened by a foreign invader and resist. 
Army and Marine planners acknowledged that they lacked sufficient information to 
predict the actions of the Okinawans.  Crist recognized that the intelligence summaries did not 
definitively determine a probable Okinawan reaction.41  Colonel John McQueen, the Chief of 
Staff of the 6th Marine Division whose staff wrote the 6th Marine Division Military Government 
Plan and Special Order 124-45, applauded the work of the intelligence staff but also knew that 
the information lacked clear conclusions.  McQueen felt that intelligence estimates for earlier 
operations gave “pretty accurate accounts…more so than [the estimates for Okinawa] did [about] 
Okinawa.”42 
For the Army, such uncertainty underwrote a combat policy that urged caution and 
prepared for the most threatening possibility.  The Army informed soldiers about the potential of 
civilians to attack American units and referred to Okinawans as “enemy civilians.”43  Soldiers 
received the CINCPAC-CINCPOA bulletin #161-44, the Ryukyu Handbook, and the Tenth 
Army Technical Bulletin on Military Government approved by Crist, documents that detailed 
cultural information, but the Army did not ensure the soldiers fully comprehended the material 
and the intricacies of the Okinawan -Japanese relationship.  For their purposes, the soldiers 
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received a message that made them wary of the population based on the potential of the 
Okinawans to react with violence to foreign invasion.  The policy of caution, however, was 
defined by the mercurial nature of civilian behavior.  Soldiers needed to gauge how they should 
approach civilians “depending on how [the civilians] act.”44  Army planners did not feel that they 
needed to definitively align the Okinawans with the Japanese to ensure their soldiers safeguarded 
themselves against possible civilian sabotage.   
The Marines, however, under Geiger’s direction, clearly and absolutely stated in their 
military government plans that Okinawans, “while …not of native Japanese stock, are Japanese 
nationals of unquestionable loyalty” and referred to them as “enemy nationals” and “national 
loyalists.”  Orders about religion banned “nationalistic practices.”  Local goods procured for 
community use were to be “captured,” a term indicating acts against an enemy, rather than 
“salvaged.”  Military government teams would execute a “hostile occupation.”  “Inmates,” 
“refugees,” and “civilian POWs” lived in military government camps.  Propaganda campaigns 
“for use against Japs,” referred to the Okinawans as “Japanese civilians” and constructed 
messages enunciating the ties of the civilians to Japan and discrediting the Japanese military.45  
Marine planners assigned a fixed Japanese identity to Okinawans which implied a solidly 
predictable reaction to American troops.  The Marines’ categorization of the population as 
fervently loyal predetermined their interpretation of the motives and actions of the Okinawans as 
unchangeably hostile. 
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Aligning Okinawan allegiance with Japan stemmed in part from small methodological 
and analytical differences between Marine and Army intelligence summaries.  While both 
services agreed that they could not positively ascertain the disposition of the Okinawans to an 
invasion of their homes, the Marines compared Okinawa to previous engagements in the Mariana 
and Marshall Islands and Palau where American forces had also encountered civilian 
populations.  Marine intelligence used these combat examples as predictors of Okinawan 
response to Americans.  Unfortunately, conclusions based off previous combat areas lacked 
veracity.  Okinawans that lived on Saipan, for example, were geographically removed from the 
immediate discomfort of inferiority imposed by the Japanese upon those who lived in Okinawa 
Prefecture.  Marines that observed the invasion and occupation of Saipan surveyed the actions of 
Okinawans that had a different connection to the Japanese government.  Saipan, as an outer 
island rather than a prefecture, did not threaten to disrupt the ethnic balance within Japan in the 
way that Okinawa Prefecture did.  Okinawans living on Saipan, therefore, had a less contentious 
relationship with Japan.  The Marines, however, regarded their observations of Saipan’s 
population seriously and applied their conclusions universally.  Examining the behavior of local 
units on Peleliu and Saipan that lacked weapons and never fought, Marine intelligence 
concluded, without reducing their potential for lethality, that “civilian resistance [on Okinawa] 
will probably not be organized [in actual military units] to any great extent.”  Assessing the 
loyalty displayed by the civilians on outer islands, Marine intelligence summaries produced for 
the Okinawa mission stated that “the Okinawans…in general regarded themselves as completely 
Japanese.”  In explaining the history of the Ryukyus, Marines drew upon information from 
previous operations and assumed incorrectly that “the natives [of Okinawa] were Japanese in 
race, language, and tradition.  They differed…only in being more primitive and less affected by 
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western civilization.”46  Assigning a Japanese identity to the Okinawans resulted in postulations 
about possible action.  The “toughness and independence” of Okinawan fisherman combined 
with their ability to swim, prompted the Marines to assume the fisherman trained as suicide 
swimmers.  By wrongly categorizing Okinawa as the Japanese homeland and improperly 
identifying the island as “Japanese soil,” analysts predicted “that fanatical as his resistance has 
been…his efforts will be redoubled in defense of his home islands.”47  Marine intelligence 
described an enthusiastic, nationalistic populace that differed greatly from the character of the 
inhabitants of Okinawa.  Okinawans that fought did so because of conscription laws under the 
Nationalization Act in 1944, not because of spirit and nationally driven motivation.  Marine 
estimates underplayed conscription policies as well as the percentage of Okinawans that spoke 
English, had lived in Hawaii, or had relatives serving in American units.48 
Intelligence summaries formed the foundation for operational orders; planners used the 
summaries to determine how the enemy would fight so their forces could ascertain how to ensure 
victory.  For military government, intelligence determined the needs and temperament of a 
civilian population that required handling and herding.  Accurate understanding of the cultural 
leanings of a populace assisted military government in administration and helped to avert forms 
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of resistance and acts of sabotage.49  Intelligence estimates, therefore, were relied upon for their 
accuracy.  The estimates the Marines produced, however, established an explicit yet erroneous 
kinship between the Okinawans and the Japanese.  Despite acknowledging that they lacked 
enough information to make a confident, clear assessment of potential Okinawan behavior, 
Marine leaders largely accepted the conclusions that Marine intelligence reached.  Published 
military government plans duplicated the cultural content of the estimates.  Both the orders and 
the estimates, with their unambiguous declarations of loyal Okinawans, left no room for 
reassessment by the ground forces. 
Marine military government plans gave specific guidance to the ground forces about how 
to treat the Okinawans.  Directly connected to the assertion of Okinawan loyalty to Japan, 
military government personnel were to collect civilians by “searching out every ravine and 
village,” search them for weapons and important enemy documents, and process them as 
prisoners of war, following the procedural guidelines put forth in the enemy situation annex.  In 
addition to living in camps, the orders prohibited civilians free movement within the enclosure 
unless “under close surveillance of properly armed personnel.”  Military government personnel 
were not to evacuate wounded civilians to facilities outside camp boundaries.  Corps issued 
military proclamations that set curfew times and established punishments for disobedience.50 
Geiger’s directives for treatment of civilians generally aligned with mission priorities of 
safeguarding American lives and secrets.  Military government rightfully needed to conduct 
initial screenings of the population and restrict their movement so as to prevent the infiltration of 
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Japanese troops and the interference of civilians on the battlefield.  In comparison to Army 
orders for military government, however, Geiger’s restrictions for civilians were excessive.  
Marine orders regulated camp life so tightly that every civilian remained an adversary regardless 
of conduct or mutable situation.  Geiger and his staff prevented civilians not only from leaving 
the camps but from unsupervised movement within them.  Based on the assumption of 
Okinawans’ Japanese loyalty, the Marines viewed Okinawans as permanently hostile 
combatants, not as victims of war. 
Geiger and his staff laid the groundwork for possible catastrophic interaction between 
Marine military government units and civilians.  The orders described a warlike populace and 
guided American troops to sternly handle the people. Geiger envisioned Marine military 
government camps that herded the Okinawans like prisoners but he did not want harsh treatment 
to cause deaths.  Tenth Army’s mission for military government provided for only the minimum 
humanitarian needs, but it also urged humane treatment of the Okinawans.  Despite their 
potential for sabotage, civilians were to be moved away from the battlefield to reduce 
interference, and not unnecessarily harmed.  Since Marine orders described the Okinawans as 
loyal Japanese willing to disrupt American operations, Geiger had to set boundaries for his 
troops.  He “indoctrinated [his Marines] against wanton destruction… looting.”  He made it 
“expressly forbidden to kill, injure, or mistreat any persons acting in good faith…Rape [would] 
be severely and quickly punished.  The clothing of captured civilians [would] not be removed.  
Troops that damaged enemy supplies or equipment or participated in the “willful killing or 
mistreating of civilians” would be tried by courts martial.  He ordered his Marines to give 
“particular care…not to fire on innocent civilians while mopping up villages.”  Civilian labor 
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parties working in support of combat units “must not be fired upon.”51  Geiger devoted 
significant time to setting guidelines for the treatment of civilians, a topic never addressed in 
Army military government orders.  He felt strongly that the parameters of Marine behavior 
needed clarification.  While he viewed the Okinawans as enemy and purposefully communicated 
this to his subordinates, he feared that the hostility felt by his troops might lead them towards 
destructive, dishonorable behavior.  Buckner echoed the same concern.  He produced a 
memorandum for the Marines on discipline that authorized the death penalty for acts of violence 
against civilians.52 
Geiger recognized the power of the assumption of Okinawan identity on the conduct of 
his Marines.  While the Marines’ analysis of the cultural and historical relationship between 
Japan and Okinawa led them to an inaccurate conclusion, the analysis nevertheless influenced 
operational orders.  Once again, American planners processed cultural information when they 
devised their military government plans.  While practical considerations of geography, resources, 
and military personnel availability contributed heavily, cultural considerations and identity 
assignment shaped military government policy just as dramatically. 
     ***** 
On March 21, 1945, an estimated 1,400 ships left Ulithi and streamed across the Pacific 
Ocean towards Okinawa.  The convoy stretched for miles and, to men who chose to find a 
vantage point to appreciate the enormous trail of steel, it made the impending mission quite real.  
Raymond Johnson, an electrician who traveled on the heavy cruiser U.S.S. San Francisco, called 
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it a “spectacle.”  Most men, however, slept all day and all evening.  They debated the ability of 
the body to store sleep for increased energy and stamina to use on L-Day.53  Such arguments 
were justification for troops who were actually trying to fight the evil demons of boredom and 
fear. 
Despite the sleep patterns of the troops aboard, life on the ships enroute to the landing 
zone was busy with activity.  Each day, they trained on the detailed tasks related to their specific 
job.  Since most enlisted men had never heard of civil affairs before boarding, the training served 
as an introduction.  Those few who had received prior training found that it was limited.  
Interpreters, for example, received language instruction specifically tailored to interaction with 
civilians but no additional military training in civil administration.  Military Police assigned to 
military government received hasty lectures onboard about public safety, the law of belligerent 
occupation, and the treatment of property.  Others traveled on the wrong transports and missed 
all instruction.  As a result, with the exception of Prud’homme, Winder, Van Schiak, and three 
Private First Classes, the majority of the teams had no prior military government experience and 
began their training enroute to the battlefield.54 
 Besides technical expertise, military government personnel also lacked basic military 
skills.  Most had no weapons training, had never driven a military vehicle and had never endured 
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the hardships of field duty.  Officers that had attended the military government schools at 
Charlottesville and Columbia took a familiarization pistol course that made the officers amateurs 
at weapons handling.  Those who shot well, like Prud’homme, acquired those skills through their 
own endeavors, not from military training.55  Under the cramped conditions on the ships, the 
troops did not receive training on these tasks sufficient enough to resolve the individual 
deficiencies. 
In addition to training, planners and commanders held daily meetings and continually 
refined their plans.  This, in turn, meant that leaders passed new information to the troops daily.56  
The Marines circulated the division level military government plans, based on Annex Able, to 
their troops onboard.  Mere days before debarkation, Tenth Army distributed additional military 
government materials to the Marines that were incomplete and of questionable value.  The Tenth 
Army Technical Bulletin offered no additional information beyond division plans and simply 
presented the orders in the format of an Army manual.  The Marines never received the Tenth 
Army Pamphlet, written specifically for troops and containing information about the Okinawans.  
Military government officers felt they worked in “an atmosphere of uncertainty.”  They had no 
information about the rate at which the rations were to arrive, the protocol for posting 
proclamations or where to acquire equipment.57 
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 Lacking detailed guidance for the conduct of military government from the Army and 
having only the instructions from Annex “Able,” they wrote their own guidelines knowing that 
Tenth Army could change their plans.  With a dearth of input from Tenth Army, Geiger’s 
assumption of Okinawan identity and correlating orders for action filled the void.  In addition to 
the operational orders and Annex “Able,” the Marines wrote and distributed Corps General 
Order Number 33, Executive Officer’s Memorandum No. 94-45 and a memorandum from 
Geiger entitled, “Additional instructions relating to Military Government.”58  Corps General 
Order Number 33 gave specific instructions to the troops concerning the civilian population and 
included Geiger’s warnings to Marines about excessively confrontational behavior.  The order 
declared local buildings inaccessible, limited the destruction of religious sites to those impeding 
military operations, and urged the use of receipts when acquiring local property.59  Geiger’s 
memorandum forbade his troops from making any statements about the future of the Emperor 
and ordered the protection of previous prisoners of the Japanese associated with the United 
Nations.60  Ultimately, these documents promoted the policy of suspicion towards the civilians 
and annunciated the idea that the Okinawans posed a threat.  In efforts to rally the men, the 
documents stated that “no holds are barred…Let’s give it to them.”  They also taught the 
Marines that Okinawa bore no value and discredited it as a “worthless place.”61  Created without 
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a model from Tenth Army to use as a guide, these documents further demarcated a point of 
deviance between Army orders and conduct and that of the Marines. 
As the ships traveled closer to the target area, Japanese planes attacked the convoy.  As 
earlier as March 26, kamikazes, along with suicide boats and swimmers, dove towards the 
massive ships.  For those on board, the battle of Okinawa had, in some ways, already begun.  
The troops began to harden their concepts of the identity of the enemy.  Raymond Johnson found 
relief in watching the Marines blow up suicide swimmers on their rafts.  In a display of survival 
instinct, Johnson “was sure glad to see [a kamikaze pilot] hit the water and not us.”62  Geiger’s 
orders to regard civilians as enemy fed into the natural human reaction of the Marines to value 
themselves over their foe.  Further compounding this tendency was the apparent lack of civilians 
along the shore.  Troops observed that they could not “see any other life.”  Bombarded by a 
plethora of rumors about what they might encounter upon landing, troops sought what was 
tangible.63  The early assaults on the convoy combined with the visual absence of meek civilians 
added strength to Geiger’s assessment of the Okinawans in the troops’ eyes.  The troops knew 
they were already under attack and they did not see anything or anyone that acted otherwise.  
Under these circumstances, Geiger’s assumption that the Okinawans posed a threat seemed valid, 
unquestionable, and finite to them. 
The planners carefully considered the meanings of Okinawan allegiance and its impact on 
combat operations, yet the documents finalized Okinawan identity and left no room for debate or 
reconsideration.  Receiving the orders immediately prior to disembarking on hostile land, the 
troops had little time to analyze the reasoning behind the orders, if they had wanted to at all.  As 
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the bombardment roared and the Marines saw no civilians on shore, they accepted the statement 
that Okinawans were enemy and charged forth without asking questions or processing the 
cultural nuances of the Okinawans on their own. 
As the ships neared Okinawa, the magnitude of pre-invasion bombardment echoed for six 
days.64  Hours before the troops landed, the bombardment increased in magnitude.  War 
correspondent Ernie Pyle, watching from one of the ships, described it as “ghastly.  Great sheets 
of flame flashed out…gray-brownish smoke puffed up…then the crash of sound and concussion 
carried across the water and hit you…Smoke and dust rose up…the land was completely veiled.”  
The combined noise from carrier planes, naval guns, and machine guns deafened the incoming 
troops.65 
The night before L-Day, the message from each ship’s Captain attempted to inspire and 
motivate the troops.  They applauded American strength and instilled faith by pronouncing that 
the operation was already running smoothly.  Within this grandeur, the Captains made one last 
mention of the civilian population and restated the predicted reaction of the populace.  The 
population, some half million strong, would display “determined resistance.”66 
     ***** 
The troops saw no civilians on shore because an Okinawan District order on February 25, 
1945 followed by an order from the Japanese military on March 23 evacuated thousands of the 
population out of the central area around Naha towards the rough northern wilderness.67   By the 
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time the American forces landed on April 1, war had darkened the beauty of the warm island of 
Okinawa.  The bombardment burned houses, gutted crops and gardens and split open ceremonial 
urns filled with the ashes of the Okinawans’ descendants.  The pressure of military vehicles and 
marching men on the ground wet from the rainy season churned out a muddy paste.  One hospital 
corpsman described the mud in a letter to his parents as “so deep it’s like getting a perpetual 
enema.  And I mean a high colonic.”68 
Just back off the beach, Marines encountered scattered civilians who neither followed the 
Japanese and District orders, nor paid attention to preliminary instructions dropped from 
American B-29s during the bombardment and in the first days after the landing.  Meant to 
minimize initial confusion by instructing the civilians how to react to the battle, the air dropped 
pamphlets “discouraged [civilians] from coming through [American] lines.”  Proclamations of 
authority also were distributed upon landing.69  Geiger hoped that such information would 
encourage Okinawans to follow American direction, thus alleviating disorder and establishing 
control sooner. 
Military Government Detachments A-1 and B-1 attached to the 1st Marine Division found 
seventy-five Okinawans in their sector.  The group, consisting primarily of old men, women and 
children in poor health, lived on the beach, having lost their homes in the bombardment.  Further 
off the beach, elderly Okinawans, having already abandoned their homes during the initial 
bombardment, crouched in crumbling soft earth hand-dug caves.  Military government personnel 
searched for standing structures further inland in Sobe but found only skeletons of buildings still 
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standing.  The first evening, they simply held the people on the beach without shelter or any 
enclosure.70 
The next day, five hundred Okinawans had turned up homeless.  With the increase, 
military government personnel attempted to use the shells of the buildings for containment.  
Military Police units attached to the divisions guarded the civilians but civil affairs still did not 
erect any type of enclosures to hold the growing population.  Food was limited; on L-Day 
Marines offered their own rations to the Okinawans; military government could only provide 
each person one meal a day.71 
Quickly, the number of civilians grew to proportions larger than estimated by Tenth 
Army planners.  Some 9,000 Okinawans had wandered into American occupied territory by 
April 5, 1945.72  Most lacked shelter or food and those that came from villages that withstood the 
bombardment often needed some sort of medical care or assistance with basic sanitation.  The 
rapid advance of combat troops caused the needs of the population to grow and soon the loose 
plans created on board the ships fell apart.  Teruto Tsubota, an interpreter assigned to the 6th 
Marine Division, described the situation as a “madhouse, no control, no nothing.”73 Contrary to 
the orders stating that the Okinawans should be treated as prisoners of war and restricted, the 
rapid influx of civilians caused the military government soldiers attached to the Marines to 
reluctantly allow a permissive environment.  Short on personnel and resources, units that 
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encountered villages chose to leave them alone.  Without enough troops to assist, civilians were 
not searched for weapons or documents.  Except for appointing a local as an overseer, they 
allowed the civilians to stay in their homes, salvage through what remained of flattened crops, 
and roam freely throughout the area.74 
Supply shortfalls, particularly in transportation and equipment, contributed to an 
inadequate military government system by severely restricting what programs could actually 
accomplish.  In order to transport and house thousands of dislocated civilians, many of whom 
were wounded, units required transportation and ample tarpaulin and tents.75  Two vehicles per 
detachment was an inadequate amount for the volume of civilians that the military government 
needed to transport.  As for shelter, tentage for each detachment was allotted based on the 
predicted size of the civilian population to be processed.  “C” detachments, which also owned 
110 sleeping cots, were allotted sufficient tents.  “A” and “B” detachments, however, having 
only one small command tent and two tarpaulins, left many civilians exposed to the Okinawan 
spring rainstorms and defeated any efforts to contain the crowds. While the idea of separating the 
civilians from the Americans was thought necessary to mitigate fraternization and prevent 
exposure of American military secrets, in the first week of April, such defensive concerns proved 
impossible to address.  Shortages in equipment prevented the detachments from providing basic 
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humanitarian needs and precluded the development of established systems for long term or 
advanced care. Winder argued that the detachments needed “heavy trucks [2 ½ ton]…Three-
quarter ton weapon carriers and jeep trailers are not sufficient…[the “A” and “B” teams need] 
hundreds of 20 x 40 foot tarpaulins for emergency shelter…an absolute necessity for assault 
shipping.”  The two tarpaulins organic to the teams did not even arrive on time.  “Practically no 
equipment had been landed…for two or three days” for teams A-3 and B-3.76 
Overwhelmed, inexperienced troops saw the villages as an opportunity to ease their 
workload and used the village structure to provide for the population.77  From shelter to local 
government, the quasi-stability of the village community made the overworked military 
government units assign much of the responsibility for the civilian’s well-being to the civilians 
themselves.  Use of such villages was temporary; their size could not sufficiently support large 
groups of homeless Okinawans.  The troops’ acceptance of the temporary nature of the situation, 
however, inspired them to ignore their responsibility to enact any policies of their own.  
Identifying local leaders among the village residents did not signify a heightened trust between 
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the Americans and the Okinawans; military government personnel simply needed more people to 
work for them. 
Beyond using the village structure, the units improvised in other ways.  Military 
Government Detachment B-10, attached to the 1st Marine Division, salvaged building materials, 
clothing and food from the local population.  They used discarded American rations and acquired 
household goods from abandoned homes such as cooking pots and sleeping mats.  They obtained 
four Japanese trucks and used them to move civilians from forward collecting points to rear areas 
for medical assistance.  Most detachments forced all but the non-ambulatory to march towards 
collection areas miles away.  Others asked for assistance either by loading Okinawans on empty 
American military trucks driving by or by augmenting their organic trucks and acquired Japanese 
trucks with vehicles and Marines from combat units.78  Such cooperation caused tension between 
the operational units and the military government units.  The mission of civil affairs was to 
alleviate the intrusion of civilians into front line operations; borrowing combat resources for 
military government contradicted its purpose.  In essence, civil affairs became a burden upon the 
frontline fighters.  Empty military vehicles accosted for civilian transport and combat Marines 
that ferried Okinawans back to rear areas diverted from their combat missions.  Winder quickly 
realized that his efforts at civilian control, rather than providing support, became a “burden” and 
“retard[ed] the combat effort.”79  The divisions, which tended to retain interpreters and military 
police for use by the intelligence staff for interrogations, showed increased reluctance towards 
offering support to the military government agenda as civil affairs tasks strained combat assets. 
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While Marine military government plans, conceived late and without input from Tenth 
Army, crumbled upon landing, the belief that the troops held about the Okinawans as fervent 
nationalists, loyal to Japan, stood strong.  The majority of the Okinawans that streamed into 
American lines within the first week of the battle displayed docile behavior, posed no threat to 
the troops and only desired assistance in the form of food or medical procedure.  Despite meeting 
thousands of disheveled Okinawans on the beaches and throughout the island that appeared meek 
and helpless, the Marines still considered the local people as Japanese civilian enemy.  To the 
troops, Japan and Okinawa were the same.  Anything encountered culturally was assigned to the 
Japanese heritage.  In letters sent home, troops inaccurately described Ryukyuan handicrafts, 
clothing and cookware found in abandoned Okinawan homes as traditional Japanese items.80  
Despite behavioral evidence to the contrary, the Marines’ association of the Okinawans with the 
Japanese remained immutable.  Hatred towards the fighting Japanese enemy translated into 
repugnance for the weak Okinawans suffering the byproducts of war.  The Marines categorized 
the Okinawans as less than human; Corporal James Johnston, while bemoaning the size of the 
population, viewed them collectively as an overgrown pest infestation.81  Troops lamented that 
“the worst crosses to bear [as part of overseas duty in the Pacific] were the mosquitoes, the fleas, 
and the sight of the pathetic people.”82  By not differentiating between the effects of war and 
characteristics of culture, dismal living conditions were seen as indicative of the population’s 
way of life rather than the results of heavy bombardment and fire-fights.  They saw the 
Okinawans as “not very clean personally…their homes were utterly filthy.”  One Marine 
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remarked, “This would be a nice country if the people weren’t so dirty.”  Private First Class John 
David Jackson called them, “nasty…nasty people.”83  Such categorization spurred no ingenuity 
from the men to devise creative programs and systems to improve the Okinawans’ 
circumstances. 
Considered as an enemy, overexertion to improve upon the Okinawan situation seemed 
unsavory.  The Marines, seeing the Okinawans as adversaries and subhuman, dirty, vermin, were 
loath to contribute the herculean-sized effort needed to establish functional camps for the 
refugees.  To justify the desire for lack of action further, the Marines identified the particular 
Okinawans they encountered as physical incapable of causing harm; they described them as “so 
old and decrepit or young and harmless-looking that the best thing was to leave them alone and 
let them stay in their homes, tilling their fields, provided they did not get in the way of troops, 
keeping only the homeless ones in camps.”84  The troops’ disgust at the appearance of the 
Okinawans also translated to assumptions about their intelligence, demeanor, and worth.  The 
Marines thought of the Okinawans as naïve and simple, people to pity and mock rather than help.  
In the opinion of the Marines, the Okinawans seemed scared, shocked, and unable to 
comprehend the battle around them.85  Told through jokes among themselves, the troops 
ridiculed the civilians like children.  One Marine jested that the Okinawans were “poor devils” 
whose primitive comprehension caused them to think the war was apocalyptic prophesy.86   
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The Marines’ unwavering belief of the Okinawans as dirty enemy, along with the 
limitations caused by inadequate resources, stunted the implementation of Marine policy to force 
the population into restrictive, guarded camps.  In the opening days of the battle, an undertrained, 
overstretched military government chose the easiest option to deal with the growing number of 
homeless Okinawans – ignore them.  The demographics of the population they encountered, 
predominately groups perceived as weaker (old men, children and women), eased their fears of 
attack.  Regardless of the fact that the Okinawans found on the beach were not assessed as a 
threat themselves, they still belonged to the enemy, in the viewpoint of the Marines.  As a result, 
the troops detested offering them any assistance. 
Civilians, therefore, roamed haphazardly throughout American owned territory creating 
problems with both the operational and military government mission.  The detachments had no 
control over the massive number of Okinawans and this impeded their ability to provide rations, 
clothing, or medical care.  Without a system of distribution, the troops parceled out goods to 
those eager civilians that requested them.  Okinawans that avoided the Americans received none; 
those who asked received as much as the Americans could offer.  For the combat troops, the 
Okinawan civilian population intermixed with the Japanese troops made it difficult to 
differentiate fighter from farmer.  Units with previous battle experience in the Pacific Theater, 
such as the 1st Marine Division, found that the indiscriminate shooting, while also done in other 
island campaigns, resulted in an inordinate amount of dead civilians on Okinawa.87 
Exacerbating the problem, the number of Okinawans that found their way behind 
American lines continued to increase.  Detachments A-1 and B-1 encountered 12,000 civilians in 
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Chibana alone by April 6.88  Placing further strain on the disorganized detachments, the C camps, 
designed to handle larger numbers of dislocated civilians, did not receive them because the lack 
of control that the A and B detachments had over the population prevented the detachments from 
uniformly processing and moving groups of people.89  Buckner observed with consternation 40, 
000 civilians moving around the 1St Marine Division area of Chimu and Nakagusuku Wan.  The 
military government units lacked control to such a degree that civilians were “left practically to 
their own devices.”90 
Loose military government practices hindered aid distribution and increased accidental 
civilian casualties.  The freedom of the Okinawans to wander anywhere within American lines 
also increased the likelihood of exposing military secrets and compromising security.  On April 
5, in the area of Chibana, an attack by two armed men resulted in casualties on both sides.  
Similar incidents of attacks from within the local populations occurred at Taira, Zahana and 
Itoman.91  The attackers could have been armed Okinawans or Japanese troops.  In March 1944, 
Japanese officials traveled to Okinawa to enforce the Nationalization Act of 1944 that dictated 
that every Okinawan, regardless of age or gender, assist in the effort to defend the Home Islands.  
Whether conscripted as actual soldiers serving in the Okinawan Home Guard (Boei Tai) or the 
Blood and Iron Corps, or working as youth nurses or building fortifications as cave construction 
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crews, Okinawans did assist with the war effort.92  Just as likely, however, the attackers could 
also have been Japanese troops disguised as civilians.  Military Government Detachments 
loosely estimated that there were “hundreds of military personnel disguised as civilians” and had 
difficulty with prisoners of war infiltrating the civilian population.93 
The Marines, however, did not generally care to investigate the ethnic background of the 
instigators of the incidents.  Most often, their reports indicated that the offenders could have been 
either Okinawan or Japanese and did not spend time determining the difference.94  Trying to 
separate an aggressive Okinawan from a Japanese soldier disguised as a civilian proved difficult.  
Marine interpreter Teruto Tsubota acknowledged the presence of Japanese soldiers among the 
population but felt it was pointless to determine the attackers’ origins.  “Yeah. Some of them [are 
Japanese soldiers],” he said, “But we don’t know who they are.  Because they all look alike to 
us; they dress alike.  They try to look as much like the Okinawans as possible.”95  One Marine 
found it humorous that the “Japs and Okinawans and kids and old people and ducks and dogs 
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and cats…everything was being smashed together.  And it’s hard to sort them out.”96  The 
Marines also imposed their own American brand of patriotic national pride on the Okinawans 
and assumed that the sole reason an Okinawan would attack American troops was in faithful 
allegiance to country.  In the minds of the Marines, the violent acts served as tangible evidence 
to solidify the already absolute notion that the Okinawans displayed loyalty to Japan at such an 
intense level as to spur violence.97 
The incidents inspired a stark realization; tight restrictions, as originally planned, needed 
to be implemented to protect American lives from hostile actions staged in areas under American 
control.  By mid-April, the military government detachments began formally establishing 
controls and imposing restrictions upon the population whose numbers had made them difficult 
to manage.  The new policies expanded on the original pre-invasion plans and limited the access 
of Okinawans to American personnel and military secrets, thus increasing the security of both, 
and monitored the movement of the Okinawans in order to maintain better awareness of the 
residents of the camps.  In compliance with orders from the Marine division commanders to 
detain all civilians, the military government detachments erected barbed wire enclosures to 
cordon off areas and thus created decisive boundaries and definitive camps.  In some areas, like 
Berger Beach, the troops added fences around groups of people who had already formed 
themselves into informal communities.  With larger, less organized populations, military 
government personnel consolidated the civilians and transported them to predetermined locations 
away from the frontlines.  Detachments working in the 1st Marine Division area cordoned off the 
                                                          
96Lacey, Stay Off the Skyline, 72, told by Private First Class Richard Whitaker; O’Donnell, Into the Rising Sun, 264, 
266, told by Patrick Almond and Elmer Mapes. 
 
97Comments on Military Government Operation, July 6, 1945, 1St Marine Division, 9.     
 
105 
 
entire Katchin Pennisula and moved 30,000 civilians to within its boundaries.  Separate inner 
enclosures contained men ranging in age from 16 to 45, a demographic that mimicked the 
composition of American forces.98  Marines screened the male population in an attempt to 
identify any potential adversaries and did not allow them to reintegrate with the women, children 
and old men regardless of the results of the screenings.  Men considered of military age were 
guarded and questioned like captured Japanese soldiers.  The intense questioning infuriated the 
men since the tactics used by the Marines made the Okinawans appear untrustworthy to their 
fellow villagers, as if they served as spies.  Military police and military government soldiers 
guarded both the all-male inner enclosures and the outside perimeter camp enclosures.  No 
Okinawan could travel outside the designated camp area unless they were with an American 
guard and in a group no larger than five people.99 
As an unintended secondary consequence, measures emplaced to safeguard the troops 
also greatly improved the efficiency of the camps and therefore, ironically, allowed the 
detachments to organizationally render more aid.  Programs that dealt with supply distribution 
and personnel accountability stemmed from the need to maintain control and restrict the 
population.  Each Okinawan received a rations tag that allowed the detachments to track both the 
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amount of food consumed and the number of people present.  Detachment soldiers guarded 
towers of military ration cans in efforts to subvert thieves.100  Every Okinawan had to register 
when they arrived so all residents were properly documented.  To minimize movement within 
the camps, families were kept together within shelter compounds as much as feasible.101  With 
such programs in place, the detachments could accomplish more tasks without additional troops. 
In order to encourage compliance with the new regulations, the detachment soldiers wore 
armbands designating them as Military Police.  The troops did not fulfill any police functions, 
but the armbands gave them a certain authority that allowed them to corral the Okinawans.102  
The troops also identified Okinawans that carried prestige within the community and had them 
assume informal leadership roles.  These local leaders either had already held prominent 
positions within their villages in politics or education or could speak English and had relatives 
living in the United States.  For the Marines, the use of local leaders helped dissolve language 
barriers and eased the caginess of the population.  They were not viewed as equals in terms of 
authority but as workhorses to aid the outnumbered Marines, who remained very suspicious of 
them and kept them under close observation.103 
The Marines had learned from their own experiences that loose policies and absent 
systems made their mission of controlling the population much more difficult and exposed 
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themselves unnecessarily to danger.  While the idea for minimal restrictions had stemmed from 
the apathy that grew out of a work force inundated with more tasks than men to complete them, 
the move toward stricter controls grounded itself in the concept of self-survival and deep distrust 
towards the Okinawans.  Despite neglecting to identify the ethnicity of the attackers, the Marines 
believed that the Okinawans had proven themselves combative and had aligned themselves 
squarely with the Japanese.  Homeless Okinawan women were now viewed as combatants and 
captured as prisoners of war.  New regulations barred military government troops from sharing 
transport vehicles with the civilian population.  Dubbed “enemy aliens,” the Marines feared that 
troops would get killed if they traveled too close to the Okinawans.104 
With the attacks seen as proof of hostile intent and concerted coordination with the 
Japanese, the Marines’ adverse feelings towards the Okinawans increased and aligned even more 
squarely with negative racial assumptions.  Following the attacks, Private Charles Miller, 6th 
Marine Division, directed his hostility towards the Okinawans because “they had slant eyes.  We 
[are] very anti-slant eyes.  Guys [say], ‘There goes a slant-eyed chink, pow-pow.’”105  Intense 
racist feelings combined with agitation over the attacks translated into occasional aggressive 
action towards the civilian population. The 6th Marine Division knowingly opened fire on large 
groups of civilians traversing the roads and, when observing the damage, felt no empathy and 
refused to respectfully care for the bodies.  One group of Marines kidnapped and took turns 
raping Okinawan women in their tents for days.  After they lost interest, they obscured their 
debauchery by presenting the women to their commanding officer as captured Japanese nurses.  
Those who did not participate in the sexual assaults chose not to because they categorized the 
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Okinawan women as subhuman and inferior, not because they found the acts morally 
reprehensible. Okinawan women “represented filth,” they stated, “God, who would want to go 
into the tent with that thing?”106 
The sudden imposition of structure and the threat of harm did not mean that the 
Okinawans immediately became willing participants in camp life.  The abrupt move towards 
managing the population came with distinct limitations and consequences.  In the confusion of 
war, the Okinawans distrusted the Americans as much as the Americans distrusted them.  
Japanese propaganda told embellished horror stories about how the Americans treated prisoners 
and portrayed the Americans as racially biased and viciously cruel.107  The Okinawans, while 
desperate for help, remained wary of the actions of the Americans, particularly when the actions 
of the Marines in and out of the camps tended to lean towards violence.  Some Okinawans 
resisted the Marines by avoiding the camps and, once in the camps, purposefully moved slowly 
through processing.  Some even spat on the Marines.  One Okinawan wrote furiously in a letter 
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about how his “blood boiled over with uncontrolled hatred for the American bastards.”108  The 
Marines processed the civilians as captured enemy combatants and such classification resulted in 
an environment that lent itself to prison-like standards; but the level of treachery that the 
Japanese attributed to the Americans remained false.  Barbed wire enclosures, guards, 
regulations, and screenings did not compare to the Japanese accusation that the Americans 
“would chop [the Okinawans’] legs off; would ship them to Frisco to be used as dog meat” or 
“slice [them] up like a piece of vegetable.”109  Measures such as enclosures and guards allowed 
the detachments to maintain accountability of the residents of the camps and while the civilians 
could expect an austere environment with minimal room for independent action and occasion 
outbursts of violence in the form of rape or abuse, they also found that the extreme horror stories 
of grotesque mutilation proved inaccurate and the camps provided a steady source of food and 
refuge from the rampages of the battlefield.110 
The barbed wire, guards, accountability, rations, and movement restrictions of the Marine 
security system may have appeared similar to those used by the Army detachments.  The camp 
standards, however, were notably harsher and more stringent than those of the Army.  By basing 
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the design for security measures on an unwavering belief in the aggressive intentions of the 
Okinawans, the Marines carried out their military government duties with an element of 
harshness that was absent from the Army camps from their very inception.  Upon reception in 
Marine camps, Okinawans received an identifying number which hung crudely around their 
necks at all times. Military government soldiers bartered with the civilians as they entered camp 
by withholding certain amenities until the civilians agreed to the policies governing the camp.  
Newly arriving Okinawans did not receive any bed or shelter until the military government 
soldiers running the camps felt confident in their obedience.  Men separated for screening were 
“thoroughly grilled” through a series of questions that turned to fierce interrogations.111  Those 
deemed strong enough to work were housed in prisoner of war camps so they could be used as 
labor.  Called “civilian prisoners,” the men were forced to work, suffered stringent discipline and 
were closely guarded.  While working in forward areas doing tasks such as filling sandbags, 
some men died from misdirected fire.  Those who did stay in male only enclosures in the military 
government camps lived in quarters that were so cramped and overpopulated that the men stood 
shoulder to shoulder with no room to sit down.  Marines argued that the overcrowded population 
that occupied Katchin Pennisula “lived in freedom” and did not deserve their own homes.  They 
proclaimed that “Japanese Army camp followers and prostitutes [were] uniformly superior in 
intelligence, cleanliness and discipline to the run of refugees.”112  They unsympathetically 
viewed the Okinawans as useless because they disassociated them from humanity.  Even 
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Okinawans who spoke English or had ties to America and who were designated as interpreters 
and informal liaisons to the populations were considered forced labor with no authority over 
other civilians.113 
The attacks on the camps put all the detachment soldiers on edge.  Following the 
incidents, any movement of unknown people along the outskirts of the gathered populations 
caused the troops to fire their weapons indiscriminately and resulted in the deaths of innocent 
civilians.  Begun by individual soldiers independent of orders, shooting civilians that traversed 
unauthorized gradually became a common and accepted practice.  The Marines placed the 
responsibility of the shootings on what they considered the careless actions of the civilians.  
They reasoned that civilians who wandered in and out of territory held by armed Americans, 
sometimes at night, placed themselves in certain danger.  “Of course they were fired upon,” the 
Marines rationalized.114 
The first shooting of a civilian by Marine military government on Okinawa occurred at 
dusk on April 6 in Chibana, the day after the attack against the 1st Marine Division by a person 
within the population.  Civilians moving in the dim hours caused anxious troops from 
Detachment B-1 to open fire.115  The shooting occurred five days prior to the first shooting of a 
disobedient civilian by Army military government and, unlike the Army whose soldiers acted in 
accordance with an issued XXIV Corps order, the Marines as a whole adopted the practice on 
their own by accepting the behavior of their troops.  Despite not having an explicit order 
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authorizing civilian shootings, however, aggression towards the population was consistent with 
the Marines’ association of the Okinawans with the Japanese enemy. 
In Marine military government camps, the shooting of civilians who wandered without 
authorization in and out of the perimeter devolved into a cold ritual that extended beyond 
boundary infractions.  Marines knowingly shot civilians, at times without a clear purpose, and 
justified their actions by arguments of “survival of the fittest” and the complacent attitude that 
the civilians were guaranteed to get shot anyway.  Said one Marine, “There’s always somebody 
who would shoot them.”116  Shooting civilians became so commonplace and so obligatory that 
that Marines felt they “had to shoot [the Okinawans].”  The sight of wounded children and 
women failed to cause guttural reactions of remorse or disturbance.117 
Hostility continued through interactions with civilians outside of the camps as well.  
Military government soldiers both passively received Okinawans that made their own way into 
the camps and traveled forward into combat areas to collect those hiding in fear.  Limestone 
caves that littered the landscape of Okinawa housed Japanese fighting troops that fled the 
advancing Americans along with refugee civilians.  Marine military government units used 
dynamite to clear the caves or seal them shut without first allowing the civilians to exit.  Those 
few soldiers that disagreed with the practice and actively sought to secure the civilians before the 
explosives ignited were often disciplined by their commanding officers.  One officer placed a 
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pistol to the temple of an American interpreter whose efforts to evacuate a cave delayed a 
dynamite charge.118 
On April 11, Major General Pedro del Valle, the commander of the 1st Marine Division,  
repeated to his troops in an official order that all “civilians and prisoners of war will be treated 
with humanity and their persons and honor respected” and restated that troops that disobeyed the 
directive would receive “severe and quick punishment.”119  Del Valle opposed any treatment of 
civilians that would constitute a war crime and felt it necessary, in observing the conduct of his 
troops towards civilians and prisoners of war alike, to reiterate in a threatening manner the 
limitations of their roles as prison guards and keepers of the people.  His words, however, 
betrayed the distinct difference between the development of the Army military government 
camps and that of the Marines.  Grouping civilians and prisoners of war together in both speech 
and identity, del Valle insisted on keeping both groups detained involuntarily. 
The Marines disagreed with the Army on the precise parameters of humane treatment and 
the disagreement played itself out at all levels of command.  A product of rivalry and the poor 
working relationship between the services, some orders Buckner issued were broken by the 
Marine commands under him. One directive that prohibited all soldiers under Tenth Army from 
consuming local livestock and its byproducts was routinely broken by the Marines.  Issued with 
detailed guidance that specified the prioritized use of dairy and meat products for the Okinawan 
population, Buckner believed the preservation of local assets for local populations safeguarded 
military rations exclusively for troops.  By protecting the resources of the island, a basic food 
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supply could be provided to the Okinawans that would thus minimize the amount of American 
rations consumed by the locals.  Consumption of local farm goods by American troops also 
increased the likelihood of contracting food borne diseases and conflicted with the standing order 
against looting and pilfering the population unnecessarily.120  Marine troops, however, milked 
goats and butchered pigs.  While some livestock roamed away from their original pens 
unaccounted for, Marines also stole pigs and goats from struggling families in villages and 
abandoned farms that were frequently revisited by their starving owners.  While the Marines 
enjoyed the milk and roast pork as a welcome delicacy after many meals of military rations, the 
local population became desperate to recover their livestock as the battle left them in disarray. 121  
Lower-ranking enlisted Marines were not alone in their wrangling of local livestock.  The 
Marine division commanders brazenly disobeyed the order as well.  In an ostentatious show of 
defiance, del Valle served Buckner fresh pork chops when the Tenth Army commander visited 
the operating area of the 1st Marine Division.  After awkwardly eating the meal Buckner 
announced, “Now, General, this is a disobedience to my orders.  You have evidently killed one 
of the local animals.”  Del Valle beckoned to the mess sergeant who then explained that an attack 
last night had claimed the life of the local pig.  Cocky, del Valle proclaimed after Buckner left, “I 
don’t think the General swallowed it, but he couldn’t say ‘no’ because he [doesn’t] know the 
local situation [has] been perfectly calm for days and we [haven’t] had any shooting around 
here.”122  Buckner’s order prohibiting farm theft originated with his concern for the health and 
sustainment of American troops but it also had the secondary effect of protecting the scarce 
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resources of the local population. Del Valle’s smug disregard for the authority of Buckner, an 
Army commander, also had the consequence of endorsing poor treatment of the local population.  
Del Valle’s attitude towards both the Army and the Okinawans spread infectiously among the 
Marines.123 
In efforts to assert their authority and as a display of the adversarial relationship between 
the services, the Marines took further control over the military government units assigned to 
them by reorganizing the composition and command structure of the detachments.  Frustration 
mounted as the detachments, mixed teams of Army and Navy personnel, proved less efficient.  
Conflict arose largely due to duplications of effort and strains on resources.  Confusion over 
responsibilities between the services caused four different officers to attempt to draw the same 
supplies for one detachment.  It also complicated food distribution, salvage operations and 
contributed to overseas pay problems for Navy enlisted men.  Tensions among the team 
members increased as annoyances developed into mission impeding issues.  Navy officers 
brought heavy “A” boxes filled with extraneous comfort items, such as mattresses and rain boots, 
that bogged down transportation and infuriated the Army officers who had no such items.  Army 
military police prohibited the commander of A-1, a Navy Lieutenant Commander, from 
transporting civilians on his truck without Army guards despite the presence of Navy shore 
patrol.  The Army military government commander of A-5 “belittled navy personnel” and used 
“extremely offensive language and epithets.”  Interservice conflicts delayed essential mission 
tasks and tied up higher officers in dispute resolution.124 
                                                          
123Lacey, Stay Off the Skyline, 69, 74-75, told by Private First Class James Chaisson, Lance Corporal Don Honis, 
Private Joe Drago and Corporal William Pierce; Captain Roy E. Appleman, notes, 2-3.  Civilians became pawns in 
tense disagreements about battlespace between the Army and the Marines.  As the population roamed the island in 
search of family members and food, the services disregarded movement restrictions put in place by the other service. 
(XXIV Corps Military Government Daily Operations Log, RG 407, File 224-12, NARA). 
 
116 
 
To fix the issues, the Marines wanted to assert greater influence. Organically, Marines 
did not compose any part of the detachment teams and only served as liaisons with limited 
authority and scope.125  The Marine commanders, as well as the liaisons, believed that continuity 
and efficiency could be improved by making a Marine officer overall in charge of the 
detachment.  They favored an all-Marine detachment or, at least, a “nucleus of Marine 
personnel” to merge the other two services into a workable team.  Furthermore, they 
recommended that any non-Marine personnel should be Navy, not Army.126 
Marine division commanders reorganized the detachments to resolve immediate conflicts.  
Shepherd, for example, combined detachments A-3 and B-3, attached to the 6th Marine Division, 
and merged them into one team, placing Army Lieutenant Colonel M.A. May, the B-3 
commander and most senior officer, overall in charge.  Del Valle and the 1st Marine Division 
placed all military police under the direct supervision of the B Teams.  B Teams were typically 
headed by an Army officer and, since Army military police were more prevalent than Navy shore 
patrol, the consolidation was consistent with separating the services.127  Despite placing Army 
officers into positions of higher authority within the modified military government structure 
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because of seniority, the moves both Shepherd and del Valle made shifted control of military 
government more firmly over to the Marines.  Shepherd and del Valle kept a Marine in the 
position of Division Military Government Officer, a key billet that served as a link between the 
detachment commander and the division commander, and empowered him to impose directives 
upon the detachments.  More importantly, both division commanders exercised initiative to 
change the organization to their liking without requesting or securing approval from Tenth 
Army.  In this way, the modification of military government structure flaunted their disregard for 
Army rules and authority and served as a gateway to further deviation – from simple daily 
procedures to the demonstration of new standards of conduct. 
The violent attacks internal to the camps confirmed to the Marines their concept of 
Okinawan identity formulated during pre-invasion training; in the minds of the Marines, 
Okinawans were akin to their sadistic foes, the Japanese.  Growing from this belief, the 
necessary security environment of the Marine military government camps turned severe in 
comparison to the Army camps.  Compounding the tendency towards ruthless conditions, 
interservice rivalry prompted the Marines to resist some Army directives and act counter to 
Army policy, thus further solidifying trends of callous treatment towards the Okinawans. 
With the internment of civilians in camps now governed by stricter regulations, 
aggressive actions against the camp populations decreased.  Whether such a result signified an 
actual confirmation of the resistance of the civilians or of lessened opportunities for Japanese 
soldiers to infiltrate the populations was unconfirmed by the Marines.  It did, however, 
demonstrate that, regardless of the exact source of the hostilities, greater American control over 
the area created a safer environment for the troops.  In most areas, acts of belligerence “ceased 
almost entirely” and detachment soldiers faced massive populations that generally displayed 
118 
 
good will and acted meekly to avoid interactions with the Marines.  The most contentious 
confrontations were initiated by civilians who sought informal leadership positions or attempted 
to maintain their role as the head of a household.  Even these Okinawans, though, were eager not 
belligerents.128  The Marines acknowledged the behavior of the Okinawans and reported that 
“civilians of the occupied zones submitted to new rule with equanimity.”  They characterized the 
Okinawan manner as “co-operative, docile” and also noted that there were “no suspected cases 
involving sabotage, espionage, or subversive activities.”129  For the Okinawans, they recognized 
both the futility of acting independently and the benefit of remaining in the camps.  They had 
risked getting shot while attempting to secure their own individual food at nearby farms.  Labor 
parties, however, traveling under guard, procured the same food and distributed it to all camp 
residents.  It became apparent that patience and cooperation sustained them and their families 
struggling under the rough conditions of war. 
The Marines were cognizant of the cooperative nature of the Okinawans but did not 
modify their own behavior in response.130  Instead, counter to the reality of the situation, military 
government leaders saw the accommodating Okinawans as the exception to the general attitude 
of the masses.  In selecting local leaders, they chose from a batch of what they considered “the 
most intelligent and cooperative internees;” men viewed as rare and yet still categorized as 
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prisoners.131  Feelings of distrust persisted and restrictions remained in place well into July and 
August.  As late as July 2, B-10, despite acknowledging that “there was no problem of discipline 
either within the stockade or on work parties in the field,” still assigned guards to supervise the 
involuntary work parties closely.  Local men still received intense screenings and separate 
enclosures, the Katchin Pennisula was still considered a holding area for “enemy nationals,” and 
able-bodied civilians continued to form out the ranks of a forced labor pool.132 
As the Okinawans not only resigned themselves to Marine regulations but also relied 
upon them for sustenance and survival, the Marines exploited the weakened state of the 
population both in and outside of the camps by destroying or personally using what little shelter 
or food that they had.  Throughout the summer, the Marines continued to kill livestock for sport 
and food, and forcefully took up residence in any Okinawan structures that still stood, often 
rendering any remaining occupants homeless.133  As the battlefield gave way to American 
success, the way in which some restrictions were conceived and implemented, and the Marines’ 
treatment of the population appeared increasingly out of place, their functionality stretching 
beyond the necessity of the mission.  The 6th Marine Division herded civilians as livestock and 
tagged them like cattle.134  Camp shootings in Marine military government camps continued 
excessively into late June, well past the initial confusion of the battle and the noticed shift in 
Okinawan behavior and thus beyond any reasonable concerns or uncertainties with perimeter 
                                                          
1316th Marine Division Special Action Report, Section 11-Military Government, 52; Comments on Military 
Government Operation, July 6, 1945, 6th Marine Division, 4. 
 
132Ibid, 4; Military Government Activities, July 6, 1945, Detachment B-10, 9. 
 
133Operation Report on Military Government, OKINAWA, Southern Phase, July 1, 1945, 4. 
 
1346th Marine Division Special Action Report, Section 11-Military Government, 52. 
 
120 
 
security or Okinawan motivation.135  Despite an end to hostilities in late June, Marine violence 
towards Okinawan property and people continued.  Throughout the months of July and August, a 
group of Marines routinely traveled into an Okinawan containment that retained its village 
structure and kidnapped women for afternoons of forced group sex and sodomy.  As late as June 
22, 1st Marine Division soldiers burned down village structures that still housed civilians.136 
Infuriated Army leaders described such actions as “wanton destruction” and measured the 
personal cruelty and property devastation as outpacing the actions of other services on Okinawa 
and in previous operations.  After spending the day with military government units attached to 
the 6th Marine Division, Buckner reprimanded both Shepherd and Geiger for excessive damage 
to both the environment and the populace.137  In a visit to the 1st Marine Division moments 
before his death on June 18, Buckner further chastised the division leadership about the 
predicament of the Okinawans and the division’s lack of involvement in improving the situation.  
Such acute observations by the Tenth Army commander were truly extraordinary.  Buckner’s 
focus stayed primarily on the maneuver and fires of the battle that he orchestrated and the 
logistical challenges that it presented; consistent with his opinions towards Asian people, he did 
not display any overly charitable sentiments about the Okinawans.  His continual distress about 
the Okinawan condition, therefore, demonstrated an acknowledgement of notably inappropriate 
                                                          
135William Baumgartner Collection, (AFC/2001/001/16149), Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, 
Library of Congress; Comments on Military Government Operation, July 6, 1945, 1st Marine Division, 9-11. 
 
136 Hatfield, Heartland Heroes, 254; Operation Report on Military Government, OKINAWA, Southern Phase, July 
1, 1945, 4; Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1960, 85; MSgt Daniel Wheaton message to 
Public Affairs, April 27, Kadena Air Base History, KAB Active 7(7-2-C), Archives K-L, Kadena Air Base 
Archives; Calvin Sims, “3 Dead Marines and a Secret of Wartime Okinawa,” New York Times International, June 1, 
2000, A8. 
 
137Sarantakes, ed., Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell, 40; 
Operation Report on Military Government, OKINAWA, Southern Phase, July 1, 1945, 4.  
 
121 
 
behavior on the part of the Marines.138  Military government leadership attempted to underplay 
the severity of the mistreatment of people and property.  Winder argued that “military necessity 
has been confused with military convenience,” thus meaning to minimize the motivations behind 
the damage to simple soldiers seeking the comforts of home.139  Geiger’s response, however, 
harshly exposed the deeper driving forces behind the actions of his Marines and the units 
operating under him.  In a letter to Admiral R.H. Jackson dated May 20, Geiger described the 
Okinawans as “a very backward type of humanity;” they lacked “anything of value.”140 
Geiger, like his soldiers, separated the positive behavioral changes from his assessment of 
Okinawan loyalty.  For the Marines, the new demeanor of the Okinawans did not signify a shift 
in their allegiance and certainly did not lead the Marines towards drawing comparisons between 
themselves and the population.  They continued to identify the Okinawans as Japanese and the 
whole hearted acceptance of this identity molded Marine behavior towards the civilians and 
prevented them from constantly reassessing the dynamics of the relationship between the 
Okinawans and the Japanese.  This conclusion varied greatly from the one reached by the Army.  
By late April, an overwhelming majority of the population was docile and complied with 
American directives in both Marine and Army areas of responsibility.  The Army found that the 
obedience forged a kinship between the Okinawans and themselves; the Marines downplayed 
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any similarities.  Okinawans were “tiny oriental creatures…who could speak a little English” and 
ate in areas referred to as “gook-galleys.”  The Marines took advantage of Okinawan submission 
and opted to further subordinate and disrespect the native population as a function of 
paternalism.  The better the Okinawans communicated, the more the Marines used them as 
“office boys,” calling them Western names like “Clarence” and dubbing themselves their 
“masters.”141  In contrast, Army paternalism dissipated and morphed into a relatable bond 
between the two cultures; by late April the Army identified the Okinawans as more akin to 
Americans than the Japanese and used their limited resources to build extraneous recreational 
structures, such as playgrounds.  Engineer units attached to Marine Military Government units 
restricted their work to jobs associated with security and life sustainment even if they had extra 
salvage materials.  Official Marine documents published in May and June still referred to 
Okinawans as “Japanese civilians” and “enemy nationals.”142  The Marines, in continually 
viewing the Okinawans as a less sophisticated subset of the enemy, attributed the new, openly 
positive attitude of the population to a sudden disillusionment with the cause and a sense of 
defeat.  “Apparently aware of the hopelessness of the enemy’s cause,” the Marines reasoned, 
“[the civilians] began surrendering in overwhelming numbers.”143 
     ***** 
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Both the Marines and the Army conducted the wartime occupation of Okinawa based on 
practical wartime concerns such as security and mission accomplishment as well as on 
determinations of Okinawan identity and allegiance.  The Marines, however, never adapted their 
initial determination of Okinawan identity despite the changing combat environment and true 
combat posture of the populations. The Marines continued to perceive the Okinawans as fiercely 
loyal Japanese subjects.  In late June, a published Marine report described the actions of 
Operation Iceberg as the “first conquest of Japanese soil” and further identified the local 
inhabitants as “Japanese in race.”144  The continual misunderstanding of the Okinawan 
disposition caused the Marines to implement policy that was harsher and more restrictive than 
that practiced by the Army and remained so months after the completion of the battle.  The 
inability of the Marines to revise their original assessments of the Okinawans stunted the growth 
and development of their military government program and limited its ability to establish 
programs for sustained support.  The disparity between the Marines and the Army in 
expectations and conduct of military government displays the contested nature of the American 
definition of Okinawan identity and the malleable nature of race and ethnicity. 
Like their Army counterparts, the Marines researched and analyzed pre-battle the 
complex cultural foundations of Okinawa and its political connection with mainland Japan.  
They considered the differences between the Okinawans and the Japanese and also attempted to 
categorize the relationship between the country and its farthest outlying prefecture.  Despite 
obtaining and processing the same information, the Marines’ conclusions did not match those of 
the Army.  Whereas the Army determined that the disposition of the Okinawan people was 
inconclusive, the Marines declared definitively and without question that the Okinawans felt 
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strong nationalistic bonds to Japan.  As a result, the Army units were afforded more freedom to 
allow situational encounters to provide any missing information and analysis; a combination of 
intelligence data in history, culture, language and government structure supplemented by 
interaction with the local people would yield the most accurate representation of the Okinawan 
disposition.  As the Okinawans acquiesced to American military demands, the Army recognized 
this cooperation and modified their cautious stance towards an unknown population into 
congenial, welcome relations.  The Marines, on the other hand, by stating as a definitive, 
unarguable fact that the Okinawans were loyal Japanese, closed all discussion and further 
analysis of the situation from all levels.  Marines and military government soldiers attached to 
the Marines were instructed to be cautious of the volatile nature of the locals not because of the 
instability of the unknown but because of the hostility of positively identified enemy combatants.  
Such a label bred a level of distrust that was unshakable within the context of battle. The 
capitulation of the population was seen as a white flag of surrender rather than proof of a large 
body of bystanding victims. 
Interservice rivalry worked to push the Marines further towards their already unbreakable 
conviction of Okinawan loyalty to Japan.  Antagonism between the services compounded by the 
subordinated position of the Marines under Tenth Army led to rebuffing and sometimes blatantly 
defiant actions on the part of the Marines.  The Army’s shift towards empathy in its actions 
towards the civilians moved the Marines in the opposite direction.  Okinawans became pawns in 
an authority struggle between the American services indicative of the Pacific Theater; Shepherd 
and del Valle applauded actions from their troops that countered Buckner’s policies, as long as 
such actions retained the integrity of the operation.  Policies that indirectly affected the civilian 
population presented the perfect opportunity to display non-cooperation without endangering the 
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overall mission.  Lower-ranking enlisted soldiers from both services judged the others’ 
opportunities, privileges, conditions, and exploits.  In their jealous quest to validate the 
superiority of their own affiliation, they often times embraced actions that contradicted the goals 
of the other services.  As the soldiers of the Army acknowledged the amenable attitude of the 
Okinawans, the Marines fixed tighter to their notion that the civilians completely embodied the 
Japanese ideology; they took action against the civilians to prove the veracity of their claim and 
the erroneous ways of the Army.145 
Regardless of what specific conclusions were reached through cultural examination, 
scrutiny along lines of ethnicity proved pivotal in mission planning and execution.  The 
American military acknowledged the complexities of each cultural group, assigned a well-
researched, purposeful identity and molded policy around this assignment. The emphasis on 
cultural analysis did not undermine the centrality of military concerns such as security and 
supply demands.  Considerations based on military factors and battlefield analysis continued to 
drive the planning and executing of military government operations.  Together, however, 
military and cultural factors combined to provide the American military with a robust picture of 
the battlefield and allowed the military to make decisions that evaluated all aspects of the enemy 
and environment. 
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THE NAVY PERIOD: NAVIGATING THE TRANSITION TO PEACE 
On April 24, 1946, Mr. Koshin Shikiya stood in front of a small crowd crammed into the 
office of Colonel Charles I. Murray, the Deputy Commander for Military Government.  Dressed 
simply in American casual clothes, slacks and a shirt, he had a kind face and a reassuring smile.  
Well known in the Okinawan community, Shikiya had extensive experience as an educator; he 
served as a middle school principal and founded a secondary school in Naha.  Selected by a 
group of Okinawan peers, Shikiya accepted the office of Chiji, or Okinawan Governor in front of 
officers of Naval Military Government and members of the Okinawan Advisory Council.  
Lieutenant Commander John Tyler Caldwell, Director of the Civilian Affairs, stood in the 
audience.  Caldwell, who had pushed for Okinawan ownership in military government and 
whose plans had created the position of Chiji, felt an immense sense of accomplishment and 
pride.  He described Shikiya’s inauguration as “the most satisfying moment of my adult career of 
service to my fellow man.”1 
War between Japan and the United States of America ended in September 1945.  As the 
countries transitioned to peace, the responsibility for military government on Okinawa 
transferred to the Navy.  American combat troops on Okinawa adjusted their priority from 
enemy engagement to demobilization and military government changed its mission from 
amassing the population to full occupation of a prefecture of a defeated country.  The Navy took 
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control of a program in progress; unlike the Army or Marines that planned their military 
government operations prior to encountering the people, the Navy immediately assumed 
responsibility for a large, dislocated population that had urgent needs of basic sustenance and 
medical treatment.  Overwhelmed by the immediacy of the situation, the Navy issued ad hoc 
directives while simultaneously handling existing concerns and thus did not build strategically 
towards a defined, long term goal.  The loss of dedicated planning time stunted the Navy’s 
ability to analyze the changes brought on by the termination of the war and the impact the end of 
hostilities had on the Okinawan people.  As a result, many of the Navy’s policies reiterated 
practices adopted from the Army and grounded in battlefield realities.  Early Naval military 
government failed to adapt to the new peacetime environment; it did not attempt to rebuild and 
its assumptions of Okinawan identity sat stagnated in a wartime state.  Furthermore, the attrition 
of troops whose service contracts had expired stripped military government of leaders and sailors 
alike that had expert knowledge of military government operations. 
Navy leadership expressed concern for the malaise of military government and solicited 
input from their officers to reform the program.  With a military manpower shortage, the new 
concept aimed to place administrative control of local government in the hands of the 
Okinawans.  Through intricate analysis of the history and traditions of the Okinawan people, the 
Navy constructed a feasible and sustainable local government structure dependent on Okinawan 
custom and participation. 
Okinawans serving in positions of administrative influence demonstrated their ability to 
govern, the power of their leadership, and the sophistication of their intellect.  Seaman, no longer 
under the stress and fear of combat conditions, formed both formal and personal relationships 
with the Okinawans within the context of their duties.  Through close, meaningful interactions, 
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Naval troops reassessed Okinawan identity as not only separate from Japan but also free from 
congenial comparisons with America.  Naval Military Government identified Okinawans as 
competent and civilized: a group that formed a distinct, separate, unique ethnic community that 
was neither American nor Japanese in its likeness.  The Navy recognized the intelligence and 
aptitude of the local people and, along with practically considering its own shortfalls in 
personnel and resources, devised military government policy that led to Okinawan influence in 
government, medical structure, education, and crime management. 
     *****    
On June 21, 1945, Major General Geiger declared the end of the battle of Okinawa.2  To 
the soldiers and the Marines fighting on the island, Geiger’s statement seemed premature.  
Despite the suicides of the defeated senior Japanese military leaders, Japanese soldiers continued 
to resist.  Continuing through August, Americans lost their lives in Okinawa, with casualty rates 
reaching well into the hundreds.  American bombs harassed small groups of enemy troops 
moving in the early morning hours and Japanese planes continued to fly menacingly overhead.  
The tenacity of the Japanese fighter made mopping up operations dangerous and unpredictable; 
hundreds of Japanese barricaded in caves and thousands mounted offensives.3  General Joseph 
Stilwell, appointed by General Douglas MacArthur to replace Geiger as commander of Tenth 
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Army, arrived on Okinawa at 0730 on June 23.  Two days after Geiger’s announcement, Stilwell 
wrote, “Operations about over,” and gave credence to the idea that American troops would 
encounter more armed conflict on Okinawa, no matter how sporadic.  Stilwell viewed the 
persistent enemy action as a “bad set back;” only 5-10 Japanese troops surrendered a day.4 
As commander of Tenth Army, Stilwell immediately focused on preparations for the next 
stage of the war.  With the end of the battle, Okinawa began to transform into a garrison for 
approximately 90,000 troops and a staging area for an attack on the mainland.  Observing the 
devastation left by the long battle, Stilwell prioritized engineering projects.  He ordered the 
creation of three engineer battalions to include one for construction.  The battle had destroyed 
many key infrastructures necessary to support an attack.  Submerged ships obstructed ports and 
unleveled land hindered airstrip construction.  The grim task of burying the approximately 
12,000 American dead also impacted the use of the ground.  In his reports, Stilwell repeatedly 
described areas around the island – Naha Harbor, Naha city, Shuri -  as a “mess,” and equated 
the condition of the land to the bombed out craters of World War I’s No Man’s Land.  “We have 
got to get tough,” he lamented.  Tenth Army started rebuilding ports, constructing airstrips and 
erecting barracks buildings on makeshift bases.  In addition to rooting out Japanese troops that 
continued to resist, combat units trained and refined military plans for future battles.5 
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Within the harsh environment of decimated farmland, cratered ground, and unexploded 
minefields, nearly 320,000 Okinawans lived as refugees.  The battle left an estimated 75% of the 
people dislocated by destroying nearly 90% of structures and associated household items.  By 
late June, most Okinawans resided in temporary American military government camps.  During 
the fighting, military government detachments herded the people into controlled areas to prevent 
interference with military operations.  The camps provided a limited amount of resources and 
relative stability in a battlefield environment.  The few Okinawans who still struggled outside the 
camp environment scavenged for food and ran from combat troops.  Despite the contributions of 
the camps to the survival of the people, the population still required more than the camps could 
adequately provide.  The Okinawans suffered from war wounds caused by stray munitions or 
direct exchanges of fire.  They wore clothes, covered in dirt and lice, which loosely hung off 
their emaciated bodies.  The people needed medical care, adequate food, and water.  Separated 
from their families as they fled, the Okinawans anxiously wanted to return to their now 
uninhabitable home areas or reunite with lost loved ones.6 
The pressing needs of the Okinawans did not derail Tenth Army from their operational 
missions aimed at the defeat of Japan.  Stilwell did not commit additional leadership, manpower 
or material resources into solving the problem of the large, dislocated local population.  Similar 
to Buckner’s concern during the battle, Stilwell only required that the population not interfere 
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with military operations.  Island Command (IsCom), an organization originally conceived in 
early 1945 to manage the military government detachments - a task it never fully assumed, 
acquired responsibility for military government in late June 1945.7  Its authority for the program, 
though, only accounted for a small portion of the command’s obligations.  The command 
handled logistics, administration, base development and base defense in addition to military 
government.  It tracked enemy aggression, pacification, surrender, resources and morale; it 
accounted for Prisoners of War, recorded building progress of airfields, runways, and work 
structures, calculated requests for troop replacements and managed supply.  IsCom also handled 
the entirety of garrison operations.8  Day to day tasks of military government, a small piece 
within a vast scope of responsibility, received negligible consideration.   
IsCom did produce a nine-page cultural study about Okinawa intended to analyze the 
potential of Okinawa to house semi-permanent military facilities in support of IsCom’s mission 
of base development.  Along with topics such as geography, climate and resources, the study 
explored the people of Okinawa and the historical question of sovereignty.9  Major General Fred 
C. Wallace, commander of IsCom, directed the study as a tool to further plans for base 
development, not to construct a robust plan for military government.  IsCom’s analysis of the 
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temperament of the Okinawan people and the state of their society provided data that was useful 
for determining the feasibility of longer term American military presence on the island.  
Although not the purpose of the study, it also presented information important for military 
government program building and post battle planning; no matter the project type or length, no 
plans for the island of Okinawa could exclude even the most cursory acknowledgement of the 
320,000 Okinawans struggling to reconstruct their life. 
Consideration of the Okinawan population slightly improved when military responsibility 
for the Ryukyu Islands shifted to the Army on July 31 to align with the Army’s status as the 
primary service proponent for the attack on Japan.  Meant as a temporary transfer, it served the 
sole purpose “to facilitate preparation and execution of Olympic.”10  Stilwell, as Tenth Army 
Commander, became the Military Governor of the Ryukyus and Island Command was renamed 
Army Service Command I (ASCOM I).11 
ASCOM received a new mission that expanded its role in military government.  While 
simultaneously building Okinawa as a base for a final attack against Japan, ASCOM sought to 
relocate the “population into the Okinawan hinterland and to adjust the people to new and greatly 
restricted ways of life.”12  The command’s mission of resettlement signified a change in military 
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government thought; whereas early military government efforts during the battle had focused on 
temporary answers to an immediate concern, post battle resettlement plans sought to lay 
foundations for more solid communities.  ASCOM defined resettlement as the return of 
Okinawans to their home areas, a necessary objective to set the stage for longer lasting and better 
functioning villages.  Resettlement planning began by first asking the military government 
detachments to submit recommendations.13  The submissions included proposed timelines, 
transportation concepts and suggested methods of identifying village areas.  Plans included 
information on providing basic needs such as a decent water supply, adequate food and 
inhabitable structures.14 
Within the camps, the Okinawans demonstrated docile behavior and acted as a people 
who “passively accept…change.”  Consistent with the Okinawan village tradition of community 
cooperation, they contributed to camp life by harvesting food, laundering, and caring for 
patients.  Informally, they designated leaders, distributed tasks among themselves, and 
contributed to policing.  Such group involvement demonstrated their desire and aptitude to live 
in functioning communities.  Not only did the cooperation improve camp life but it also inspired 
military government to add the establishment of social structures to the resettlement agenda.15 
     ***** 
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Japan surrendered on September 2 to General Douglas MacArthur aboard the U.S.S. 
Missouri.  Five days later, on September 7, Stilwell accepted the Japanese surrender of the 
Ryukyu Islands on Kadena Airfield.  The Japanese delegation waited, rigidly standing at 
attention for ten minutes, until Stilwell walked out towards the surrender table to the tune of the 
general’s march played by an Army band.  The Japanese signed first, followed by Stilwell who 
then ordered the delegation to leave.  “We threw the hooks into them,” Stilwell said, “Just cold, 
hard, business.”16 
Following the surrender, the War Department prioritized the demobilization of combat 
units and the return of war weary troops back to the United States.  Swiftly returning the fighting 
men back to civilian life appeased Congress and the public but also aligned with military 
commander’s concerns for the well-being of their troops.  In a memorandum to Geiger, Major 
General Pedro del Valle, commander of the 1st Marine Division, explained with empathy that his 
division fought “on the front line continuously for the past fifty five days…sustained 1200 dead 
and 6200 wounded…[and had] not seen civilization or lived in a prepared camp for over twenty 
two months.”17  Movement of troops began within a few days of the surrender; Navy ships 
transitioned from combat roles to transports for military personnel returning to the United 
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States.18  A system where each man earned points based on time overseas, months in service, 
medals earned, number of campaigns participated in and number of children allowed the men to 
qualify for release from the service.  For the Army and Marines, eighty points earned a 
discharge, sixty points disqualified them from overseas duty.  For the Navy, forty-four points 
allowed men to return to civilian life.  Men short on points watched others quickly return home 
while they stayed overseas.19 
Yet, the War Department also considered the “job of [occupation to] take priority over 
everything…Therefore, [the] No.1 task [was] to get enough men on the spot as soon as possible 
and in the right places to insure a real peace.”  The mission of combat forces adjusted to 
“consolidat[e]…victory [through] occupation, disarmament, and enforcement of surrender 
policies,” tasks that required an estimated 2.5 million men.20  Since occupation duties naturally 
occurred alongside demobilization, the War Department’s personnel policy for post war 
Okinawa contradicted itself.  Occupation required manpower yet demobilization necessitated the 
return home of American troops.  The point system did not make special consideration for 
military occupational specialties and failed to effectively retain troops skilled for occupation 
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duties.21  Many trained military government personnel, to include those educated at the 
university Civil Affairs schools in New York City and Charlottesville, were released from 
service once they reached the appropriate points thresholds.22 
September 21 marked the transfer of military government to the Navy despite the Army 
retaining operational control of Okinawa.  Rear Admiral John D. Price, the Commandant of 
Naval Operating Base, Okinawa (NOB) became Chief Military Government Officer and Colonel 
Charles I. Murray, United States Marine Corps, continued as the Deputy Commander of Military 
Government.  Murray held most of the responsibility for the planning and execution of 
Okinawan military government.  With the exception of approximately 100 enlisted Army 
translators, the transfer of Army civil affairs officers to Korea and mainland Japan caused the 
composition of military government on Okinawa to become almost entirely Navy.23 
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A modest group of devoted, college-educated Lieutenant Commanders and Ensigns with 
military government experience opted to stay in the service and overseas, an available option 
once they had accumulated enough points.24  After spending years away from their families, the 
officers and ensigns that chose to continue their military service in the Pacific did so with great 
gravity.  Navy Lieutenant John Tyler Caldwell, a Labor Officer, originally had no intention of 
staying past his obligation.  He wrote to his parents, “I’m resolved not to volunteer to hang 
around here when my points mature…I feel no compunction to stay on the job…So, boy, I’m 
pulling out when the day permits.”  Caldwell did chose to stay but not because of the offer of 
promotion; he stayed because he believed in the mission of military government, sought to 
improve it and was granted a position with authority to create change.   “The extra half stripe in 
rank to Lieutenant Commander was not important,” he wrote.  Most who extended their overseas 
service shared an enthusiasm and devotion to military governance. 25 
Officers like Caldwell were the exceptions; few troops chose to stay.  To compensate for 
the exodus of experience, replacement troops came in slowly from deactivated units on Okinawa.  
A lack of formal military government training limited the usefulness of the replacements and 
their accumulation of points made their contribution temporary.  Although grateful for the 
extensions of officers such as Caldwell, Murray still complained that the “trouble with [the] 
outfit [was] we’ve got too many damn college professors.”26  The Navy sought to adjust its 
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personnel requirements, both along lines of skill level and rank, in coordination with the Navy’s 
assumption of full responsibility for military government.  Redesigning the requirements, 
however, did not result in their fulfillment.  Even combined, the volunteers that extended their 
overseas service and the replacements could not offset, either numerically or by skill set, the 
personnel shortfalls created by demobilization.  Unfortunately, the military government mission 
expanded just as trained personnel departed.  Occupation duties encompassed programs for 
rebuilding and rehabilitating the island.  In addition to the immediate humanitarian concerns of 
food, clean clothing and sanitary conditions for the dislocated population, Naval military 
government’s mission called for programs to restore farmland and reconstitute community 
structure.  With only 2,700 men, the Navy faced a gap in manpower that leaders sought solutions 
for with increasing urgency.27 
The Navy’s military government program, titled “United States Naval Military 
Government, Okinawa,” separated from ASCOM.  Three organizations now handled operations 
on post war Okinawa: ASCOM, U.S. Naval Military Government, Okinawa and NOB.  The 
responsibilities of each differed greatly.  ASCOM focused on tasks necessary to enforce the 
surrender such as disarmament and demobilization since the Navy now handled civilians through 
military government programs.  NOB completed missions congruent to Naval base operations 
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such as providing sea and air transportation.  All three organizations’ duties overlapped in some 
ways.  ASCOM, for example, handled opening ports which required coordination with NOB.  To 
combat any confusion over priorities or resource allocation, both NOB and Naval Military 
Government assigned a liaison officer to each other’s Headquarters.28 
The Navy grew the military government program into a large, centrally run organization 
by dissolving all field detachments teams and reorganizing the island into sixteen districts.  
Naval Military Government had a headquarters, and various departments, operational units, and 
institutions such as a port and a bank.29  The Navy combined multiple departments created under 
ASCOM into one Civilian Affairs Department which served as the planning cell for resettlement, 
economic development and education.30 
The Navy did not have the indulgence of a protected planning period to devise and refine 
policy before implementation.  As naval military government officers and seamen assumed 
duties at the camps, they soon discovered they could not wait for higher guidance before 
distributing food or erecting medical facilities.  Mopping up operations and the declaration of 
surrender caused camp sizes to swell as captured Okinawan men that had fought in Japanese 
units and in the Boei Tai were quickly released from prisoner of war camps and reunited with 
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their families.31  Massive destruction to structures and the land remained even though the 
bombings and carnage had stopped three months prior.  The Okinawans, having lost their homes, 
belongings and ability to farm in early April, lacked the capacity to rebuild or recover on their 
own.  Naval Military Government Headquarters relied on operating parameters established by 
ASCOM to provide continuity and initial direction.  Research into resettlement and land viability 
continued.  Labor tasks assigned to the population served the purpose of keeping the people 
occupied and content.  Adherence to the standard of providing “minimum humanitarian needs 
…[that] include basically food, clothing, housing, and medical care” also derived from 
ASCOM.32 
Building on ASCOM’s resettlement initiatives, the Navy expanded the mission of 
military government to include “actively and materially…encourage[ing] the rehabilitation of the 
island socially, economically, and politically” but “within the limits of military demand.”  By 
aiming to develop the foundations of an Okinawan society, the Navy hoped to strengthen the 
Okinawan community and improve its agility and responsiveness for whatever unknown purpose 
Okinawa may serve to the United States government and military in the future.  Resettlement 
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became identified as the necessary first step that, once accomplished, would better facilitate the 
growth of societal institutions.33 
The Navy also sought to “admini[strate] the civilian population.” 34  Such language 
signified further commitment to an American attitude in favor of the Okinawan people.  During 
early combat, U.S. military personnel had referred to the Okinawans as “enemy civilians.”  In 
use only a few months after the end of organized combat and several weeks following the 
surrender, the term “civilians” without the qualifier of “enemy” became the norm, indicating a 
more widespread acceptance of a fundamentally different interpretation of the relationship of the 
Okinawans to the Japanese and the Okinawan disposition towards the Americans. 
Despite a noteworthy expansion of the mission, Navy military government headquarters 
did little in its early directives to define any achievable goals or provide any framework to build 
towards long term accomplishments.  In published orders, the Navy carefully used words that 
allowed the seaman to exercise their own initiative.  They directed sailors to “supervise” the 
reestablishment of societal constructs without explaining how to reconstruct economic or 
political institutions.  The orders assigned military government personnel to supervisory roles yet 
did not define who they would supervise.  Non-descript, general definitions of duties allowed the 
Navy to react and adapt to ever-changing conditions.  Conversely, the lack of any goals, 
procedures, or standards left sailors and troops working with civilians in camps and makeshift 
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villages with little day to day direction and no tangible targets to strive for.35  Planning efforts by 
headquarters moved slower than the urgency the situation demanded and, since planning and 
execution happened concurrently, directives often arrived at the camps far after field actions 
occurred.  Military government officers felt uninformed and critical of higher headquarters. 
Caldwell “felt the Military Government was not moving, was sort of in the doldrums, and did not 
have its sights set either high enough for full realization of its possibilities and 
responsibilities…most action we take is based upon decisions dictated by circumstances, not 
imagination or planning ability.”36  Field officers, however, contributed to the disconnection by 
failing to report their projects or results to headquarters.37 
Disagreement about occupation policy also occurred at the strategic levels of the Navy.  
Naval Affairs Committee hearings addressed the precise locations of future Naval bases in the 
Pacific and debated the details of a strategic military government plan for the region.  The “Plan 
for Post-War Civil Government,” written by the Office of Island Governments, was a generic 
policy meant to apply to all Pacific Islands under naval jurisdiction.  Immediately, it created 
friction.  As the Plan moved slowly among differing levels of approving authorities, the 
comments it received varied widely.  Captain L.S. Sabin, an author of the Plan, diligently 
incorporated the input only to discover that, as the document continued to circulate, concepts 
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deleted to appease one authority reappeared when another high official offered their 
contribution.38 
Two issues created the widest fissures: authority to oversee military government 
activities and removal of the resident populations from the islands.  Admiral Richard S. Edwards, 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, issued a directive in early September in response to the Plan.  
He instructed the Office of Island Governments to keep the civil administration independent 
from the military administration.  Military government, when dealing with camp and village 
residents, did not require a military command chain.  Edwards’ concern lay with public 
perception of undue military control and influence outside the bounds of declared war.  “It must 
be made clear to the public,” Edwards wrote, “that we propose to set up a system of civil 
administration separate and distinct from the chain of military command.”39  Military authority 
would control military compounds only, a viewpoint that was consistent with the Navy.  Admiral 
Nimitz, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, disagreed with Edwards.  While Nimitz 
agreed that “civilian commissioners from other Federal agencies” should head the administration 
of the islands, he strongly felt that a military command chain, with himself as Governor General, 
would improve the efficiency of the operation.40 
Clashes over policies regarding the removal of certain groups from Navy administered 
Pacific Islands revealed unresolved misconceptions about local ethnicities.  Without question, 
both Edwards and Nimitz agreed that the return of the Japanese to mainland Japan was consistent 
with strategic efforts to dismantle the Japanese Empire and its holdings.  For Edwards, such a 
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removal sufficiently met the objective.  “We will kick out the Japs,” he stated, “Others, including 
Okinawans, should be left.”  Removal of other groups, he reasoned, would make America appear 
as a victorious conqueror.  He clearly identified Okinawans as a distinct ethnic group from the 
Japanese and as bystanders to the violence of war.41  Nimitz, however, desired the removal of all 
groups to even include those residing on the islands whose ethnic roots tied them to Spain and 
Germany.42  Edwards’ view of the Okinawans and others who had served the Empire as 
distinctly different from the Japanese was consistent with the Navy.  Nimitz’ favor for complete 
removal grew from his desire for clear command in the region, not from deep adversarial 
sentiments.  His call for the disposal of Spanish priests and nuns and the appointment of 
American clergy, for example, streamlined American authority and funneled an approved 
message to the local populations.43 
Sabin appealed to both viewpoints and highlighted the benefits of each side when 
presenting the conflict to higher Admirals.  Sabin suggested the submission of a previous version 
of the Plan that contained the military oversight that Nimitz required.44  Sabin’s willingness to 
adjust the document so readily to an earlier draft demonstrated the fluidity of the directive and 
the lack of urgency on the part of Naval leadership to act directly and decisively in the execution 
of military government.  The Plan lagged through revisions and approvals for months while 
Navy men solved military government problems in the camps and villages daily.  Sabin made his 
offer of resurrecting an older version of the document, an act that undoubtedly would require 
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additional processing time, in October.  Such variability at the strategic level made it difficult for 
Naval Military Government Headquarters in Okinawa to set definitive guidance for their military 
government officers to follow. 
Naval military government continued to operate with few trained military government 
officers and ensigns.  American military presence on the island decreased by approximately 
2,000 troops per a month.  As the weather cooled, some units fell to as low as six officers and 
twenty enlisted men.  Murray saw his roster reduced by more than 71%.45  The exodus of 
qualified military personnel placed an increasing amount of strain on military government 
operations.  As expectations of projects expanded from providing basic humanitarian needs to 
full resettlement, repatriation and society construction, naval military government was pushed to 
the edges of its capability.  Military government policy-makers sought more viable solutions to 
the manpower shortage than the temporary assignment of soldiers borrowed from demobilizing 
combat units. 
One contested option was to increase the involvement of the Okinawans in administrating 
the camps and districts.  In varying forms, Okinawans had participated in American controlled 
military government since the first soldiers landed on the island in early April.  During the battle, 
however, the Army and the Marines had used Okinawans in administrative positions only as a 
temporary and limited measure with no intent to build an Okinawan owned community.  The 
Army entrusted only select individuals with ties to the United States to serve in limited capacity 
as informal leaders in the camps. The Marines’ lack of interest and commitment to Civil Affairs 
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caused them to divert aspects of military government to the Okinawans in order to avoid 
conducting such tasks themselves.46 
In July, ASCOM devised a group of Okinawan advisors that, by August, evolved into the 
Okinawan Advisory Council.  Fifteen Okinawan men, recommended by one hundred of their 
peers, served as advisors to the Deputy Commander for Military Government.  ASCOM 
described the assembly as a “permanent advisory group of Okinawans as a communication 
device to assist the [military government] authorities in planning and decision-making.”47  The 
creation of the Okinawan Advisory Council marked a significant development in the American 
military’s assessment of the capability of the Okinawans.  The establishment of the council 
demonstrated American confidence in the intellect, maturity and overall competence of the 
Okinawan people.  ASCOM selected each member of the council based on both exhibited 
informal leadership and credentials of higher education and superior business sense.48  Selected 
councilmembers had experience as journalists, police commissioners and businessmen, positions 
consistent with American definitions of prominence.  The formation of the council provided the 
Okinawans with an opportunity to shape their own society, to contribute to the trajectory of their 
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lives and to demonstrate to the Americans that they could govern themselves.49  The organization 
elevated Okinawan influence above the rigors of daily village life and broke them out of the 
constraints of minor leadership roles within the camps, such as laundry supervision or food 
rationing. 
The full launching of the council moved slowly.  By mid-September, the men had only 
received orientations but not yet offered advice on any issue.  By design, the council did not 
transfer any responsibility to the Okinawans.  As mere advisors, the men provided input to 
Murray who retained sole decision-making authority.50  While the formation of the council 
signified a marked departure from early opinions of the Okinawans as helpless and weak, 
military government still remained an endeavor strongly held and controlled by the Americans. 
Military government officials consistently placed themselves in positions to dictate action and 
control direction.51  Okinawan councilmembers could only offer advice not devise or lead a 
project.  Practically, the disorganization of Naval military government precluded the option of 
releasing any control from American authorities. 
While still limited, Okinawans exercised slightly more influence within the sixteen newly 
formed districts and at camp level than at the higher levels of military government 
administration.  In efforts to build the economy, local industries such as handicrafts, laundry, 
carpentry and tea and tobacco production stayed under the auspices of the Okinawan population.  
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Naval military government directed that “the leadership and management of various industries 
should be placed in the hands of skilled native leaders.”  District commanders supervised the 
work, albeit with directorial responsibilities.  In addition to economic benefits, the Navy 
encouraged Okinawan efforts in sewing, cutting hair and peanut farming because it “aid[ed] in 
the health and comfort” of the population.  While Okinawans gained more ownership over daily 
community routines, their contributions to the commerce of their district were restricted to 
manufacturing.  Few, if any, Okinawans oversaw mass production of a local industry and 
services rarely grew beyond the individual district; the products almost exclusively benefitted the 
district residents.  Military government cultivated local industry projects to assist in the 
establishment of the community but also to occupy its residents.  By retaining a supervisory role, 
district commanders contained Okinawan local leadership initiatives and regulated the direction 
of economic growth.52 
The involvement of Okinawans in both goods production at the district level and the 
Okinawan Advisory Council helped alleviate some of the strain on military government 
operations caused by a lack of military manpower.  Okinawan participation in military 
government programs, however, served a greater purpose than simply offsetting personnel 
shortages.  The Navy sought to establish economic, political, and social structures that reflected 
Okinawan customs and traditions, a task that they could not complete without the contribution of 
the Okinawan people.  Practically, a shortage of sailors made reconstructing the Okinawan 
community in an American image an impossibility.  Okinawa bore no resemblance to America; 
creating institutions based on American principles required work beginning at the most 
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rudimentary level and a greater level of expertise in complicated areas such as law and 
democratic government.  An Okinawan society built on a foundation of its own traditions and 
customs presented many advantages: with a limited work force, the Navy could build off of the 
basics that already existed and the Okinawans readily accepted the improvements because of the 
cultural familiarity.  Participation of the population became a key component; the Navy lacked 
the in-depth cultural knowledge to restore a viable Okinawan community.  For the civilians, 
military government programs now presented more opportunities for involvement and 
leadership.  Okinawans played a role in resettlement; elected local mayors called “shicho” 
organized the people by their former villages or “muras” and compiled manifests for 
movement.53  Committees of Okinawans mediated conflicts among the civilians.  “Okinawans 
themselves managed the details of the resettlement,” military government reports acknowledged, 
“[they] determined the location and layout of the new settlement…the allocation of land for 
farming purposes, the establishment of community projects such as schools.”54  An Okinawan 
police force augmented the military police and assisted with escorting the resettlement 
movements and handling local disputes as well.55 
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While the Navy’s decision to base economic and political institution building on 
Okinawan practices stemmed from practical considerations such as a lack of personnel and 
resources, the emphasis on Okinawan tradition forced the Navy to consider the differences 
between Okinawan and Japanese customs and to commit to the conclusion that the Okinawans 
were ethnically distinct.  Enthusiastic young officers like Caldwell began laying the foundations 
for programs that greatly increased the role of the Okinawans beyond participation and toward 
ownership.  Their work rested on the belief that the Okinawans had the intellectual capacity to 
handle the intricacies of government and the leadership abilities to form strong, united 
communities.  “The Okinawans have demonstrated convincingly that they possess sufficient 
indigenous leadership to manage their own affairs in much larger degree than is allowed them at 
present,” they wrote.56 
The plans championed a new view of the Okinawans as a civilized group rather than as 
docile, obedient people.  Ideas such as the creation of a Chiji or Okinawan Governor went 
beyond an advisory body of local men; the Chiji held responsibility for the design of the 
government.  The military government officers did recognize the ethnic differences between the 
Okinawans and the Japanese but, in keeping with the simplicity of using structures already in 
place, the plan proposed the continuation of the Japanese prefectural system.57  The Chiji, 
however, could shape the substance of the government in the model of his own traditions and 
customs; he would “develop and appoint a central administration and would propose local units 
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of government.”58  The Okinawan Advisory Council, also referred to as the Civilian Advisory 
Council, would remain as an advisory body to the Deputy Commander.  Consistent with the 
Navy’s requirement to ensure military government development remained within the boundaries 
of the budget and political interest of the United States, the military still retained some oversight; 
the Deputy Commander appointed the Chiji and the Civilian Affairs Department “supervised 
[the] activities” of the Civilian Advisory Council.59  The plan included a “competent [military 
government] inspection system” as a mechanism to monitor the work of the Okinawans and 
safeguard the evolving government from drifting outside of what the United States could 
support.60  Despite naval oversight, the proposed plan greatly increased the influence of the 
Okinawans; it even assigned authority for establishing civilian conduct regulations to a civilian 
administration.61 
The plan circulated through higher levels of military government leadership throughout 
the fall to generally positive responses and, by late October, the Commandant of Naval 
Operating Base granted Murray authority to enact any changes he desired.  Thorough planning 
did not translate into immediate implementation.  Despite his enthusiasm for the plan, Murray 
remained bogged down in immediate emergencies and daily decisions.  Even though he 
complained of a small staff, he failed to manage them efficiently.  The plan stayed with Murray 
for months; he did not distribute responsibility for projects among his staff.62  From November to 
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mid-December, Navy military government continued to operate in an ad hoc, disorganized 
manner.  Innovations stalled and military government officers at the districts continued to solve 
immediate problems within their areas on a day to day or month to month rate.  While the Navy 
did begin to rely on civilian participation to round out military government programs, 
disenchanted officers that worked in the districts described the use of the local population as 
“clumsy and inadequate.”63 
      ***** 
As fall transitioned into winter, the island began to settle into a peacetime pace.  Engineer 
units built clubs, messes and living quarters while more officers traveled freely in military jeeps 
for personal use.64  The absence of a threat relaxed the troops and gave them opportunities for 
individual activities.  Sailors could visit movie houses and enjoy beer.  Planning for family 
housing began.  John Dorfman, a Navy military government officer who managed the 
distribution of civilian labor, taught high school mathematics to fellow seamen and learned how 
to type.65  Okinawa Base Command (OBASCOM) started a University Study Center for the 
soldiers, sailors, and Marines.   By late November, the United States raised a flag over the newly 
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established Okinawan Base and slightly lifted the restrictions on late night movement for both 
civilians and the military.  In response to the calm, troops turned in their weapons.66 
Occupation duties still required seaman to work every day from early morning to late 
night.  The island lay in ruin from destruction caused by the battle, its land, riddled with half 
buried unexploded munitions, unable to support sufficient farming.  Tactical military units still 
dominated routes.67  Typhoons ripped through the island destroying construction projects, living 
areas and ports.  Stilwell complained that typhoons made it “a struggle to get to the mess hall.”  
He described damage caused by the storms with one simple word, “Bad.”68  The high winds and 
rains destroyed 15% of the few crops that could be planted and forced the civilians to continue to 
rely on military government support for food.  Some civilians resorted to foraging outside of the 
districts.69 
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Devastating typhoons and the prioritization of mainland’s occupation caused delays in 
supply shipments.  Navy military government’s tendency to operate with temporary programs 
and its failure to have foresight or patience caused many initiatives to fall short of completion as 
well.  Mismanagement by the Navy placed strain on the Okinawan people; poorly planned 
relocation movements forced civilians to walk long distances to destinations that ended only at 
another district, rather than an established mura and uneven food distribution caused a cut in 
rations by half.  Despite some military government officers setting aside excess food without 
adding it to the quota, Okinawans still rummaged through dumps and refrigerated vans for 
spoiled food.70  Above all, the Okinawans longed to return home and reunite with family 
members.  Relocation moved slowly; months passed and the population continued to reside in 
districts and camps.  Even Okinawan participation in organizing resettlement did little to increase 
the efficiency.71 
Dissatisfied with the unsuccessful efforts of the Navy, some Okinawans abandoned the 
camps to search for homes and food by themselves.  Most of their efforts only caused additional 
hardship.  Those that left the camps and districts abandoned what support the military 
government did provide.  The civilian population depended on military government for 75% of 
their food supply.  “If [the Okinawans] had anything, it was from the military,” explained one 
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military government officer.72  Okinawans that trekked out on their own encountered unspent 
munitions and barren land that prevented farming.  Rarely did they locate family members.73 
Okinawans that wandered outside designated military government areas encountered 
American combat troops but those that stayed within the districts did as well.  With most 
significant mopping-up missions culminating by early winter, approximately 30,000 tactical 
troops found themselves less engaged in military work.  Looking to unwind from the tension of 
combat, troops roamed into areas heavily inhabited by civilians.  As a result, two sizeable groups 
interfered with military government operations by circulating “unauthorized [and] uncontrolled” 
around the island.  Free movement and co-mingling among the military and civilians outside the 
parameters of official duties ignited fears of fraternization and disrupted resettlement.  Without 
proper accountability of the Okinawans, the Navy could not accurately send the people to the 
right villages and homes.  NOB, OBASCOM, and Naval military government worked together to 
enforce measures to separate the military from the civilians.  Regulations prevented combat 
troops from entering civilian districts and camps; the Okinawans reserved exclusive access to the 
area north of Route 6 and military traffic outside of military government required a pass issued 
from either Naval Military Government Headquarters or the Provost Marshall.74  As a control 
measure, the Navy continued the wartime practice of requiring all civilians to move under guard; 
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no civilian could attempt relocation by themselves.  Military police delegated some of the guard 
duty to Okinawan police.  Police returned civilians moving freely “at large” back to camps for 
punishment under a military government court system.75  Unlike control measures implemented 
by the Army and the Marines during the war, Navy military government had no concerns with 
safety; it did not control Okinawan movement to protect American military secrets or troops 
from armed civilians.  The military no longer viewed Okinawans as possible enemy; combatant 
Okinawans had returned to their families from Prisoner of War camps and U.S. soldiers had 
turned in and locked up their weapons.76 
Close living with the Okinawans encouraged congenial feelings between the Navy 
military government personnel and the civilians.  The change happened gradually as the days 
moved farther away from the end of the war.  Sailors emphasized with the tragic circumstances 
of the civilians and acknowledged “their difficult time.”  With sympathy came a desire to help 
and a belief in the nobility of their work.  Lauding their accomplishments, they saw the camps as 
a place of great benefit; the population “could get whatever they needed.  It really helped their 
lives.”  Within the districts, military government personnel related to Okinawans on a human 
level; they knew them, they learned about their families, they connected with their personalities 
and they cared about them.  They formed relationships.  “[Okinawans were] very friendly, you 
know – just good,” a labor officer stated, “Good people.”77 
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As military government built rapport with the population, the idea of Okinawans as 
competent contributors became less controversial.  Americans began to attribute more 
characteristics of intelligence and cultural sophistication to the population.  References to 
Okinawans in official documents used the words “the people,” a term that implies humanity and 
civic responsibility, rather than the previously used “natives,” a term that implies savagery and 
basic living.  Military government policy created regulations for Okinawans that differed from 
regulations devised for the Japanese as fears of an Okinawan enemy disappeared.  American 
troops continued to patrol for Japanese Prisoners of War and, once found, still detained them in 
Prisoner of War camps.  Okinawans that fought alongside the Japanese left Prisoner of War 
camps for military government camps and reunited with their families as quickly as practicable.  
Re-categorized as Okinawan civilians, each former Prisoner of War had only one minor 
accountability task to “report to [the] Chief of Police of [the] district once each week.”78 
On November 24, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance replaced Admiral Nimitz as the 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC-CINCPOA).  A 
United States Naval Academy graduate, Spruance had performed brilliantly in the Battle of 
Midway and earned a reputation through his years of service for high intelligence, modesty, 
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composure, decisiveness, yet also a willingness to listen to the contributions of others.79  
Spruance’s methodical approach to military challenges made him well-suited to face the malaise 
of Naval military government.  He published two orders related to military government 
operations.  One announced an incentive program designed to retain skilled military government 
officers and the other detailed Spruance’s policy for military government procedures throughout 
the Pacific, to include the Marianas and Marshall Islands as well as Okinawa.  He issued 
comprehensive guidance that included a clearly defined mission with five sub points and 
identified mission completion criteria.  He greatly expanded upon the idea of setting up Okinawa 
economically and socially, and centralized the development of education programs.  Spruance’s 
directive contributed far more than simple clarity and defined direction.  The directive changed 
the core program of Naval military government and moved it towards a new intention.  Spruance 
ordered Naval military government to assist in establishing “self-governing communities” that, 
once firmly formed, would serve as the basis of a permanent structure with appropriate authority 
to regulate itself.  The directive took the current program of building communities based on 
Okinawan traditions and expanded it by minimizing and gradually eliminating the role of the 
American forces in the construction and sustainment of Okinawan society.  Spruance saw the 
Okinawans as full leaders, administrators, and officials.80 
Self-sufficient Okinawan communities would allow for the termination of American 
occupational responsibility.  Strategically, Washington, D.C. recognized the geographic and 
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political advantage of Okinawa; the island extended the influence of the U.S. out into the Pacific 
Ocean without offending the amiable development of Japan’s occupation under MacArthur.  
Okinawan air bases could serve as strategic deterrence platforms against the questionable 
intentions of former Allies.  Okinawa needed a self-reliant population, functional institutions, 
and adequate sustenance in order for the island to support multiple American air strips, bases, 
and military platforms.  A lengthy commitment to humanitarian assistance would bog down 
military manpower and delay Okinawa from transitioning to its long term role.  Spruance 
understood the strategic interests of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and modified his military 
government program to support their intent months before they published an order directing him 
to do so.81 
The success of Spruance’s directive rested on the intelligence and competence of 
Okinawans to administer their own government.  While driven by strategic military plans, the 
investment in Okinawan capability signified Navy military government’s greatest departure from 
previous underestimations of the worth of the Okinawans as a people.  The directive called for 
structures built on Okinawan organizational and cultural principles and run exclusively by 
Okinawan leadership.  “Local governments,” Spruance wrote, “should be patterned on the 
politico-social institutions which the inhabitants evolved for themselves…ultimate ownership 
and management can be transferred.”  Education programs “fostered and encouraged instruction 
in the native language and history and…arts and crafts” and, although instruction in English was 
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“a prime necessity,” Spruance specifically made note that this reversion to American references 
was “not to be construed as discouraging instruction in native language.”82 
The fundamental driving principle behind the directive was to swiftly eradicate the need 
for naval personnel in occupation duties.  Rooting the society in Okinawan practices eased 
implementation and thus supported a quicker withdrawal.  Spruance fully recognized the 
practical military reasons for increasing Okinawan authority but he also had confidence in the 
Okinawan ability to govern themselves to the extent necessary for American release from the 
military government mission.  He authorized the use of training centers on Guam for educating 
Okinawans “who demonstrate a capability and adaptability for advanced work and who should 
be considered as a potential source of teachers and government officials” and he approved the 
Medical Training Center on Guam to train Okinawan doctors and nurses.  He condemned cheap 
labor practices so that the Okinawans could “enjoy the full benefits of their own labor and 
enterprise.”  To ensure Okinawan autonomy, Spruance moved officers and ensigns to an 
ancillary role and ordered the placement of Okinawans at the forefront of military government 
operations. 83 
Under the incentive program, Murray appointed Caldwell as Director of the Civilian 
Affairs Department, endorsed his plan for increased Okinawan responsibility and allowed him to 
select his own team of officers.84  Caldwell took over his new position with full support for his 
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ideas from not only Murray but the CINCPAC as well.  In Caldwell, U.S. Naval Military 
Government had a leader who strongly believed in the intellectual and managerial competence of 
the Okinawans and in the Navy’s support role of assisting them.  “Our job,” he stated, “[is] to 
take care of these people, to get our feet muddy.”85  With a crew of like-minded officers and an 
approved plan that now corresponded with the intent of his higher headquarters, Caldwell had 
full power to create dramatic change.  Spruance’s vision not only laid out a comprehensive new 
approach to military government but his personnel policies allowed the right officers and ensigns 
to implement it.  As a result, December marked a spectacular shift in military government policy 
that wholly embraced the already growing acknowledgement of the Okinawans as a sophisticated 
people with skills and acumen akin to those found in developed societies. 
The Navy began an overhaul of existing programs.  Starting with resettlement, military 
government dissolved and merged districts in order to reconstitute the mura in its correct form, 
complete with settlement sub-divisions called azas.  The construction of the muras gave the 
civilians a place to relocate to and camps closed in the late spring and early summer as their 
usefulness as holding areas expired.  To aid in the development of the villages, the American 
military returned unused land.  Within five months, over half of the dislocated population arrived 
at close approximations of their home villages.86 
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Within the azas and muras, Okinawans served as headman (soncho), assistant headman 
(joyaku) and chief (shunin).  By April 1946, the Okinawan Advisory Council along with mura 
leaders, selected Koshin Shikiya as the Chiji, governor of Okinawa.  The Chiji’s responsibilities 
included following directives outlined by the Navy, submitting mandatory monthly reports, 
working directly with the newly formed Central Okinawan Administration and expanding the 
accountabilities of the Okinawan committees and organizations.  Shikiya also managed councils 
at all levels and supplied men to fill vacancies in the interim between elections.87 
A pleasant man, with a long career as a principal and educator, Shikiya approached his 
duties as Chiji with the utmost seriousness.  He fully exercised the power granted to him by 
representing the concerns of the population, pushing for changes and working on equal footing 
with the military government officers.  His well-presented speeches and eloquently written 
letters served as vehicles to inspire confidence in the civilians, establish the legitimacy of his 
administration and mollify the Americans.  His message to his people emphasized that the 
government belonged to them and urged them to actively shape their own communities.  He 
issued proclamations written by the Navy to the population; his image and title allowed him to 
influence the people through positional and charismatic leadership, and thus inspire Okinawan 
agreement under empowered conditions.  Shikiya’s ownership of the only Okinawan newspaper, 
“Uruma Shimpo,” offered him an outlet for further control.  Through the command of 
information distribution, he affected the population and garnered their support for all military 
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government programs as he saw fit.  Most Okinawans recognized the fundamental shift in 
military government and readily embraced their newfound ownership in government and society.  
Shikiya embodied the physical example of Okinawan rule; his policies and programs further 
increased the involvement of Okinawans in administration from small, informal actions like 
voting to larger leadership in councils and in villages.88 
To ensure a successful transition from American oversight to Okinawan governance, 
Navy military government instituted a process of sequential steps that sought to gradually 
relinquish control.  Each administrative department had an assigned military government officer 
that would develop his department on the Okinawan model, staffed by Okinawans.  Once the 
department appeared ready for independent operations, the military government officer would 
assume an advisory role only.89  Ultimately, the process would reap a complete transfer of 
military government over to the Okinawans by means of a structured timetable that ensured the 
Okinawans assumed control only when ready.  Establishing sturdy, permanent Okinawan 
institutions required time as the Okinawans recovered from the damages of the war.  Steady, 
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slow implementation safeguarded against failure.  American oversight continued as a stabilizing 
force that aided Okinawan recuperation while paving the way for their inheritance.90 
Military government worked meticulously to reconstitute an amenable Okinawan society 
based on accurate Okinawan traditions and practices.  Only authentic structures had any chance 
of gaining permanence.  The men that Caldwell chose as his top advisors had backgrounds in 
political science and extensive knowledge of Okinawan culture.  In building the framework for 
the Okinawan run programs, they carefully analyzed Okinawan customs and history, and 
separated Japanese practices from Ryukyuan tradition.  Caldwell’s men had an elevated 
understanding of the ethnic differences and political strain between Japan and Okinawa.  They 
acknowledged not only Okinawan competence for leadership but also the civilians’ identity as a 
disparate group from the Japanese; military government efforts did not rehabilitate an enemy but 
rather revitalized a victimized island people.  Lieutenant Commander James Watkins believed 
that laws firmly grounded within the cultural beliefs of a society built a strong foundation for 
civil order.  Economist Henry Lawrence “advance[ed] any way possible the human welfare of 
the people” and championed initiatives that worked within the framework of the present 
Okinawan economy.  Willard “Red” Hanna, described as “absolutely determined,” worked to 
restart schools and invigorate the handicraft industry; he empowered Okinawans by assigning 
them the responsibility of beginning and managing community projects.  School subjects 
included Okinawan History and Geography taught by Okinawan teachers.  The reorganized 
Okinawan Public Works designed homes with traditional Okinawan style porticos.  “The 
                                                          
90The Government Program for Okinawa, United States Naval Military Government, January 15, 1946, RG 200, 
Folder 3-V-7, Reel 5; The Mission of US Naval Military Government, Okinawa, United States Naval Military 
Government, January 15, 1946, RG 200, Box 1, Folder 2-VII-2, Reel 3; Directive Number 129, March 18, 1946, 
United States Naval Military Government Headquarters, 6-8; Directive Number 84, January 2, 1946, United States 
Naval Military Government; Serial 0048, February 8, 1946, Admiral J.H. Towers, 2-3; CINCPAC, Dispatch 
110206/NCR 2590 to NOB, April 11, 1946, RG 38, Box 157, NARA. 
 
165 
 
attitudes and characteristics of the Okinawans,” stated Murray, “in great measure conditioned all 
Military Government.”91 
As they fulfilled their military government duties in accordance with Spruance’s 
directive, most soldiers and seaman felt they had gained a basic understanding of Okinawan 
ethnicity and how it differed from that of the Japanese.  By January, 1946 they visually 
differentiated between Okinawan and Japanese people with a discerning eye that noticed more 
than just filthy clothing and states of duress.  Sailors noticed distinct physical characteristics that 
they attributed to ethnic lineages.  They classified the Okinawans as “really, really tiny people” 
with mixed roots from New Guinea, China, and Japan.  Seamen explained that “you could tell 
[who the Japanese were] because they were generally taller.  And their heads were a different 
shape; their heads were slightly pointed.”92  The ability to differentiate between the Japanese and 
the Okinawans during peacetime military government under the Navy did not hold the deadly 
consequences that it did during wartime for soldiers and Marines.  Under battle conditions, 
accurately separating friendly from enemy was vital to survival.  In contrast, military 
government sailors needed clarity between the two ethnicities to properly distribute benefits and 
correctly execute repatriation and community building.  Dorfman, as labor paymaster, relied on 
his ability to visually discern the Japanese that waited hopefully in line for pay or work.  Like all 
its benefits and programs, military government reserved the opportunity for work for the 
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Okinawans.  The Japanese scared Dorfman but he related to the Okinawans who he called “the 
nicest people.”93 
Navy military government officers like Dorfman viewed Okinawans as a people ravaged 
by war and exploited by Japan.94  Navy men correctly attributed the impoverished lives of the 
Okinawans to devastation caused by the battle and not to an absence of civilization.  Sailors, 
noticing the pride with which the Okinawans recounted their Ryukyuan Kingdom history, 
referred to the population as “independent operators,” despite accepting their status as imperial 
subjects.  Repatriation initiatives transferred 105,000 Okinawans away from Japan and back to 
Okinawa.  Several military government officials sought the restoration of an independent mail 
service and international trade.  Okinawan theatrical performers entertained American troops in 
military base theaters; museums in the United States exhibited Okinawan oil paintings and water 
colors.  The Navy even went so far as to call Okinawa a former prefecture.  To the Americans, 
Okinawa held all the charm, sophistication, and autonomy of a civilized nation.95 
Esteem for the Okinawans did not mean the Americans accepted the people as cultural 
equals.  Instead, the Americans believed in an ethnic hierarchy.  The Japanese, assessed as 
inferior and animal-like, and blamed for extinguishing the comfortable, flourishing rural life 
Okinawa enjoyed previously to war, held the bottom rung of development.  America naturally 
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placed itself, with its deemed superior Western way, on the civilized top.  The Okinawans, 
categorized as “oriental,” remained relegated to a middle space, the benchmark for civilized 
success set at a much lower standard than that of Western nations.96  Nevertheless, the ethnic 
hierarchy elevated Okinawa above Japan in terms of societal progress.  Marking a development 
far beyond the initial impression of the Okinawans as a subservient, ingenuous group, Americans 
now viewed Okinawans as a sophisticated people with an identity independent from Japan. 
Pleasant interactions between Okinawans and Americans led to increased incidents of 
fraternization.  As military government sailors began to value Okinawans as intelligent people, 
their curiosity and desire for interaction grew.  Not all contact linked to sex and love; some 
sailors found themselves fascinated with the lifestyle of the islanders.  Fraternization, however, 
signified a massive nightmare in order, discipline, and control.  Overly friendly encounters 
disrupted operations since they threatened the sailors’ ability to remain unbiased and distracted 
them from their duties.  Pregnancies and births also strained the medical and supply systems.  
Despite regulations restricting intermingling, Military Police arrested 904 soldiers and sailors for 
trespassing into off limits areas.97 
Okinawans expressed conflicting feelings about the American interest in building 
personal relationships.  They recognized the advantages to closer associations with Americans; 
even though the island remained a prefecture of Japan, the political and economic future of 
Okinawa did best on a global stage if closely bonded in positive diplomacy with America.  Some 
Okinawans even genuinely fell in love and married.  Most military government personnel held 
the Okinawans in high regard and co-mingled peacefully with the population in business and 
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romance.  Unfortunately, some American troops committed crimes against the population that 
included rapes and assaults.  The incidents of poor conduct happened at such a frequency that 
military government officials felt they needed to minimize the appearance of the misconduct; 
Lieutenant Commander Paul Skuse, the Chief of Police, tore up most reports of American 
criminal wrongdoing and Murray wrote in his closeout report on July 1, 1946 that Naval military 
government had no court martials, its members exercised high discipline.  The willful destruction 
of the reports called into question law enforcement’s ability to protect civilians from troops; it 
also clearly signified a failing by senior military government officers in their “responsibility for 
discipline of [their] officers and men.”98  The Okinawans did not accept the inappropriate 
behavior and, empowered by their increased ownership in their communities, took a stance 
against fraternization.  As their leader, Shikiya spearheaded a campaign to remove offenders by 
methodically cataloging the crimes committed against his people.  Some Okinawans acted within 
their communities; residents of one mura alleged killed three Americans for repeatedly raping 
the women.  The civilians demanded to keep anti-fraternization laws in place well past most 
other post war occupied territories.99 
By the spring of 1946, the Okinawans began to move into roles of greater responsibility 
within the government.  Work in textiles, pottery, lacquerware and woodworking blossomed into 
full industries that benefitted beyond the immediate village.  Common elections for local 
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government positions happened as early as July.  Okinawan doctors and nurses took over 
primary responsibility for treatment and care of patients.  With the exception of U.S. supplies 
and cadaver disposal which the Navy regulated within American health and sanitation 
regulations, Okinawans ran their own hospitals and clinics with minimal interference from the 
Navy.  Okinawan doctors numbered in the sixties and handled patients in over 120 dispensaries.  
An additional workforce of 1,100 people handled administration, supplies, nursing and 
cleanliness.  The local police established a Police Department with a commissioner who 
reorganized and expanded his forces to over 1,000 men.  At the forefront of local dispute 
resolution, local police served as first responders for civilian matters while military police 
provided back-up as needed.  Once relegated to augmenting the military police and handling 
only the civilians, Okinawan police expanded their authority to arrests of American military.  
Okinawans presided over legal actions as well.  Effective April 15, low jurisdiction civilian 
courts ran by Okinawan court officials backed up police action.100 
Okinawan life in the muras improved throughout 1946.  With Okinawans at the helm of 
government, the people felt industrious, useful and galvanized.  They lived in rebuilt houses in 
areas relatively close to their original homes.  As much as feasible, they reunited with family 
members that had survived.  They healed from war wounds and ate more regular meals.  They 
attended councils meetings, farmed collectively on healing land and created wares that aided the 
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economy.  As the Okinawans returned to a life of routine and productivity, frivolous and relaxing 
tasks found a place.  One man spent his time sculpting.  Within a budding political, economic 
and social structure, the Okinawan people found a way to reconstruct their lives.  While the 
muras did not yet resemble pre-war conditions, comparatively they represented a great 
improvement from tent living in the districts.  Mura construction moved slowly and gradually. 
Repeated storms combined with the low priority of Okinawa’s rehabilitation from Washington 
D.C., caused the restoration of Okinawa to lag behind that of Japan.  Spruance’s policy, 
invigorated by passionate men like Caldwell and executed by the dedicated Okinawans had, 
though, pushed the civilians out of a state of urgent distress.  Okinawans still lived on meager 
resources but, with the bones of society in place and the facilities to foster growth established, 
the Okinawan people moved beyond the critical poverty brought on by the war.101 
      ***** 
The Navy officially retained responsibility for military government for only a short 
duration.  The Army, who still held the battlespace, started sending military government 
personnel back to Okinawa as early as May.  On July 1, 1946, military government officially 
transitioned from the Navy back to the Army.102 
In a short ten months, the Navy made tremendous progress towards rehabilitating a war 
torn community.  Recognizing the impossibility of constructing a community based on American 
laws and regulations, the Navy restored Okinawan society by laying a foundation based on 
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Okinawan tradition.  Okinawan ownership and leadership in government allowed for the Navy’s 
release from the military government mission by not only providing manpower to take the places 
of seamen returning home but by entrenching the society in practices familiar to the people.  
Firmly cementing the military government design in common Okinawan practices and customs 
led by the Okinawans themselves ensured the permanence of the emerging society and increased 
the rate of demobilization. 
As Okinawans served in the forefront of military government operations, they 
demonstrated their competence and intelligence to the Americans.  Under peacetime conditions, 
the proven ability of the Okinawans combined with the amiable relationships formed between 
the population and sailors yielded a new interpretation of Okinawan identity that further severed 
the cultural correlation between Japan and Okinawa.  Naval military government viewed 
Okinawans as competent and civilized: a group that formed a distinct, separate, unique ethnic 
community that was neither American nor Japanese in its likeness.  Assessed above the 
intelligence of the Japanese, the Okinawans were categorized as an advanced Asian people in the 
eyes of the Americans.  Okinawans fundamentally shaped the execution of Naval military 
government.  The practical military requirement to offset the loss of demobilized troops and 
build Okinawa as a strategic base placed the Okinawans at the head of constructing their society; 
once the people sat in positions of influence, the gradual acknowledgment of the population’s 
capable, intelligent, independence by the Americans led to a reassessment of Okinawan identity.  
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HAVING A SAY: OKINAWAN MANIPULATION OF IDENTITY 
In early summer, outside the village of Maehira, a small Okinawan family huddled inside 
a limestone cave to protect themselves from a recent barrage of bombs.  The family – two young 
children, a teenage girl, a middle-aged woman, and an elderly woman – had survived over two 
months of battle conditions.  They had cowered in numerous caves, abandoned houses and under 
rock overhangs.  They had scavenged through old crops and slurped from drying creeks for 
nourishment.  Now, with momentary silence signaling a pause in the onslaught of ammunition, 
the teenage girl ran from the cave in search of water.  The quiet served both as a relief and a new 
source of tension, as the Japanese military also saw the stillness as an opportunity to move.  One 
Japanese soldier, looming in the entrance of the cave, cast a dark shadow over the faces of the 
Okinawan family inside.  Blocking the sunlight, he stood still and peered into the blackness in 
front of him.  Abruptly, he asked the family if any other people lived in the cave.  The old 
woman, fluent only in Luchuan, the Okinawan dialect, attempted to answer.  Her Japanese, laced 
with traces of Okinawan parlance, came out incoherently.  A flash of anger and frustration 
ignited within the soldier.  Swiftly, he severed the head of the old woman with his sword, 
causing the head to thud into the lap of the other woman.  After a moment’s pause in horror, the 
two children scrambled past the soldier and rushed towards the cave’s entrance.  They did not 
travel far; the soldier doggedly pursued the young ones and, upon catching them, disemboweled 
them.1 
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The nightmare continued for the rest of the cave’s residents.  Retreating from American 
troops that surrounded them, the Japanese soldiers of the 24th Division systematically executed 
almost twenty civilians in order to occupy the cave themselves.2  The killings in Maehira and 
other similar incidents around the island jarred the Okinawans, who had identified as Japanese 
subjects.  The violence ignited feelings of betrayal, confusion, and insecurity.  Most of all, the 
brutal episodes conflicted with the lessons the Okinawans had learned through indoctrination 
programs aimed to align their loyalty with Japan. 
Inculcated on their responsibilities as Japanese subjects since the acquisition of Okinawa 
as a prefecture in 1879, the Okinawan population adopted a belief system that hinged on loyalty 
to the Emperor and allegiance to the nation; every Okinawan dutifully fulfilled prescribed roles 
as dictated by Japan.  The population served the Emperor through military service, supported 
government offices, and displayed a level of commitment to Japan similar to that of a soldier.  
Enthusiastic mobilization programs enforced service to the nation for the entire Okinawan 
population. 
The chaos of battle created insufferable conditions for the people.  Hundreds of thousands 
of Okinawans fled their homes and struggled without adequate food, water, or shelter.  In their 
desperate travels, the Okinawans had numerous encounters with the Japanese military, 
sometimes seeking out the troops for protection.  Most encounters, however, ended in violence 
and brutality.  Shaken by the dissonance between the rhetoric of indoctrination and the acts of 
cruelty that demonstrated an abandonment of the preached ideals of shared nationhood, the 
Okinawans processed the duplicity of the Japanese by practically pursuing methods to ensure 
survival and by reevaluating their own identity.  The severity of the Okinawans’ experiences 
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with the Japanese military during the war derailed years of teachings and propaganda.  
Okinawans felt discord both physically from clear threats to their safety and mentally as they 
suffered from feelings of betrayal and the dissolution of their sense of self.  The population 
began to question their loyalty to Japan and their identity as Japanese subjects. 
The Okinawans actively reconstructed an identity to improve their situation, whether that 
meant protecting themselves from physical harm, gaining better access to nutrients, or alleviating 
the mental anguish of contradiction and duplicity.  The population formed their identity through 
conscious process and interaction with both the Japanese and the Americans and thus came to a 
collective understanding of the meaning of themselves that they then branded and distributed.  
The process of identity reconstruction, however, presented difficulties.  Each individual 
Okinawan wrestled personally with the harsh conditions of the battle and the treachery of the 
Japanese.  Molded by the particular confrontations they experienced and their own perceptions 
previous to the conflict, each Okinawan followed his or her own path at their own pace towards 
identity reevaluation.  Young Okinawans, who idolized the Japanese soldiers and aspired to 
battlefield glory, suffered from the abrupt destruction of their idealized fantasy and the sting of 
disillusionment learned painfully through violent acts against them.  Adult Okinawans, already 
maturely aware of their second rate status within Japan, capitalized on the benevolence of the 
American troops as a catalyst to reject Japanese association and responsibility.  Okinawans who 
fought alongside the Japanese in official military units as soldiers recoiled at battle’s end as their 
combat brethren deserted them and left them to question their own decency after their willful 
participation in cruel acts sponsored by their units. 
All paths, however, eventually led to a collective identity as Okinawan.  Not chosen as a 
default because of historical or ethnic familiarity, an Okinawan identity provided the people with 
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a distinct advantage – whether that meant food, shelter, protection, or relief from the 
psychological discord that resulted from Japanese deceit – that increased the likelihood of 
survival.  A strong identity as Okinawan, forged out of deliberate choice, built a collective 
community of sameness, gained the advantage of good treatment by the American victors 
through disassociation with the enemy and quieted the cacophony of the mental trauma of 
betrayal.  Through deliberate choice, the population elected an Okinawan identity in a conscious 
effort to improve their situation.  The active participation of the population in forming their own 
identity demonstrates the malleability of race and ethnicity. 
     ***** 
Since Okinawa’s integration into the Japanese nation as a prefecture in 1879, Japan 
embarked on a program of propaganda and indoctrination to impart loyalty in their new 
Okinawan subjects.  Unlike the indoctrination practices used by the Japanese towards the 
colonies that dissolved existing traditions, manipulated work conditions, and enslaved the 
population, propaganda for the Okinawans sought to assimilate the people to shared Japanese 
custom and nationhood.  In practice, indoctrination caused the Okinawans to compromise their 
ethnic distinctiveness as the Japanese directed them towards the national cultural consensus.  
Japan expected the Okinawans, as subjects of the Emperor, to conform to national policies and 
support the principles of the nation.  Japan, however, excluded the Okinawans from full 
participation in government and politics because of their Ryukyuan heritage.  Okinawa held a 
position as a demoted minority within the Japanese family.  While regulated by the same rules as 
the mainland population, the Okinawans lacked full privileges as their people.3 
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War waged by Japan against the Allies throughout the Pacific did little to hamper the 
daily lives of the Okinawans in the early 1940s.  Families tended their small plots and children 
spent their days outside at play and at work.4  No military infrastructure existed on the island 
with the exception of a small submarine base at the port of Unten in northern Okinawa.  Small 
islands within the Ryukyu archipelago, such as Miyako and Yaeyama, provided air strips and 
barracks to a few Japanese divisions.  The primarily rural central island, Okinawa itself, provided 
little economic or technological advantage.  Okinawans contributed to the war effort through 
conscription; sons served in the Japanese military on the mainland or fought in China or on one 
of the Pacific islands.5 
The trajectory of the war, however, aimed northward towards the island of Okinawa as 
the southernmost prefecture of Japan.  Successful combat operations of Okinawa would provide 
the Americans bases and airstrips from which to stage an invasion of the Japanese mainland.  
Recognition of the looming danger of American invasion from the south led to the arrival of the 
32nd Imperial Army on Okinawa in March 1944 and the enactment of the National Mobilization 
Act of 1944 that enlisted all able-bodied Okinawans in the war effort.  Japan’s mobilization plan 
had a broad scope that encompassed the skills of all fit people and capitalized on the strengths of 
Okinawa’s environment.  In addition to building infrastructure and standing up military 
organizations composed of Okinawans of all ages, the Act mobilized farming assets.  Ordered by 
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the government, local families provided food from their small farms to arriving Japanese units.  
An Okinawan man who raised his four children alone provided sweet potatoes to a Signal Corps 
unit training near his home.  His responsibility to feed the Signal Corps soldiers exempted him 
from Civilian Defense Force duty.  Women and children also worked for the war cause.  
Children enlisted in youth corps as soldiers and nurses and Japan encouraged Okinawan women 
to reproduce for the war effort.  Japan published an eleven point edict to encourage population 
growth.  It banned birth control, modified taxes, encouraged marriage and established 
employment policies that kept women of child bearing years out of work.   Japanese war slogans 
circulated around Okinawa proclaiming, “Umeyo fuyaseyo (Reproduce and multiply)!”  The 
Prime Minister distributed personal congratulatory letters to Okinawan women who had over ten 
children.  Despite a perceived racial difference, Okinawan women still carried an acceptable 
albeit secondary biology to the Japanese; their offspring could further the advancement of the 
Japanese Empire as rightful subjects.6 
Japan mandated that all civilians resist and fight if the battle came to their village.  
Colonel Hiromachi Yahara, Senior Operations Officer of the 32nd Imperial Army, stated that 
“any person who can be of help must march under the battle flag in time of war…for Japan, 
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survival as a nation is hanging in the balance.”7  Resistance required civilians to engage in 
martial activities outside the scope of traditional military actions.  Civilians received orders to 
“infiltrate deep into enemy territory” as spies, “assassinate enemy leaders, destroy army 
barracks.”8  Japan demanded the same steadfast endurance from the population that it did of its 
trained soldiers; assaults against the enemy could only end in victory or death by either the 
enemies’ actions or by self-infliction.9 
Japan invoked images of civic duty and obligation to the nation in their appeals to the 
civilians for guerilla tactics.  Soldiers, ordered that “indoctrination [towards the population] must 
be thoroughly carried out,” tied the civilians to the Empire through an onus of civic honor by 
rhetorically including Okinawans in the central ethnic structure.  Mobilization slogans referred to 
the Okinawans as Japanese to create one like group against a common threat, mutual nationhood 
and a collective commitment to defense.  The soldiers gave “thorough instructions [to the 
civilians]…to the effect that the embodiment of the characteristics of the Japanese [people] is to 
fight the enemy without regard to the danger of your own life” and called for “civilians [to] 
demonstrate this spirit and…fight for glory as Japanese.”10 
The National Mobilization Act made Okinawa a military campus; every resource 
supported the war effort and every person prepared for war.  Under total mobilization, little 
tolerance existed for those who could not contribute because of a lack of self-sufficiency.  Japan 
published a civilian evacuation order to remove Okinawans who required care or who had 
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impairments.  Although many stayed in Okinawa out of fear of Allied torpedoes aimed at the 
ships, 80,000 infants, elderly, sick, handicapped, and their caregivers traveled to Formosa and 
the mainland under the order.  Japan capitalized on the evacuations as an opportunity to further 
inspire Okinawan loyalty by explaining the passage of the ships as benevolent acts.  Japan used 
identity rhetoric as propaganda to disguise the evacuations’ true purpose of discarding the 
useless.  Japanese government officials serving in Okinawa also used the ships to transport their 
families to temporary safety, an option found too expensive for most Okinawan families.  
Instead, healthy, strong, able-bodied Okinawan children received orders to serve in military 
corps.11 
The residents of Okinawa stood by their role in the upcoming fight.  While most 
Okinawans recognized the entitlements they lacked under the Japanese, they also felt that the 
Americans had no claim on their island.  Mobilization policy, supported by propaganda rhetoric 
in use for years, did not hit a discord with the population.  Okinawan schools had followed 
curriculum regulations from the Japanese government for decades.  Called Tennoist education, 
instruction centered on obedience and veneration for the Emperor.  Teachers recited sayings in 
the classroom such as “out with the enemy!”  Children learned “to respect and honor the country 
and the Emperor” at an early age.12  Parents expressed pride in their sons’ service in the Japanese 
military.  Although Okinawans felt bitter about filling a disproportionate percentage of the 
conscripted Army, families respected the bravery of their sons and fathers and framed their 
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feelings in expressions of national pride.  One sister articulated her reverence by saying that her 
brother “fought for his country.”13  Before the battle touched the shores of Okinawa, most 
Okinawans saw themselves as Japanese subjects working hard to protect the Empire. 
Young Okinawans rallied to nationalism with innocent fervor unmatched by their elders.  
Since children learned propaganda as curriculum in school, it penetrated deeply in their minds.14  
Nationalistic ideas looked exciting to young Okinawans whose age lent them an amount of 
naivety, a certain lack of experience and little understanding of the weight of responsibility and 
hardship.  Playing into a child’s need to belong and to form peer bonds, patriotic youth 
organizations served as delivery mechanisms of the national pride message.  Okinawan boys and 
girls readily joined the groups as thrilling outlets and opportunities to build friendships.  Fumiko 
Nakamura, a young Okinawan girl, led the Girls’ Youth Organization.  The group supported 
Okinawan military men serving overseas.  Girls stood on the docks of Naha Port and waved 
farewell to soldiers sailing off to war; the girls attended funerals and sent packages and letters.  
The organization supported Japan’s military conquests and practiced Japanese customs.  The 
girls’ proclaimed mantras of Japanese solidarity like “Kyokoku icchi (National Unity)” and 
“Jinchu hokoku (Do your best for your country)!”  They stitched senninbari belts for soldiers to 
wear in battle under their uniforms.  Belts provided luck and protection on the battlefield.  Each 
belt had one thousand red stitches, each stitch completed by a different woman.15 
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Juvenile Okinawans shocked their parents with their hasty eagerness to die for the 
Emperor.  As children filled the membership of the newly formed military organizations such as 
the Blood and Iron Corps, they quickly vowed to die with honor.  Miyagi Kikuko, a nurse in the 
Himeyuri Student Corps, (also called Lily Student Corps), sought approval from her parents for 
her forthcoming glorified end when she told them she “would win the Imperial Order of the 
Rising Sun, eighth class, and be enshrined at Yasukuni.”  Kikuko so strongly believed in the 
virtue of death for Japan that her father’s disgust with her desire to die repulsed her.  She 
“thought he was a traitor to say such a thing.”16 
Japanese soldiers, prevalent on the island by spring, emerged as heroic figures for 
imaginative Okinawan children.  During mobilization, Japanese soldiers readily offered their 
companionship to the young, eager Okinawans that brought supplies or lingered curiously close 
to the encampments.  Children saw the newly arrived soldiers as their friends, protectors and 
countrymen.  One young Okinawan girl became close with the troops while delivering sweet 
potato crops to their unit.  The soldiers “thank[ed her] heartily, and [gave her] sweets.”  In return, 
she built a special relationship with them and called them “good friend[s]”; she enjoyed 
piggyback rides and shared stories.17  The kindness that the soldiers showed the children built 
trust and comfort; the compassion affirmed feelings of sameness between the young Okinawans 
and the Japanese and confirmed for the children their own Japanese identity as taught to them in 
school.  The soldiers looked strong, mysterious and safe; emblems of national pride.  Playful 
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interactions with the soldiers convinced the children that the Army arrived on Okinawa as their 
protector.  Children loved the soldiers as their nation’s military and aspired to join them.18 
The older population did not share the intensity of the young’s nationalism nor did they 
have the innocent ability to accept all arriving Japanese troops as saviors and equals.  While all 
Okinawans identified as Japanese subjects before the battle, maturity and a closer connection to 
the former Ryukyuan Kingdom separated older Okinawans from the enthusiasm of the young.  
Japan’s cultural impact on the Ryukyu Islands started in 1609 with the invasion of the Satsuma 
clan, but Okinawa’s definitive transition into a Japanese prefecture occurred during the lifetime 
of the elderly; the independent Ryukyuan Kingdom under King Sho Tai ended only sixty-five 
years earlier.  Older Okinawans still practiced distinctly Ryukyuan traditions in their homes.  
They played Okinawan instruments such as the sanshin and sang early Ryukyuan songs.  They 
spoke fluent Luchuan, an Okinawan dialect not compatible with the Japanese language.  The 
structure of village life honored the Okinawan practice of collective community support.  At 
harvest, villagers pooled efforts to help each other with the crops.  The leaders of the villages 
established moai, a customary way of collecting communal money for loans among the 
villagers.19 
Practicing Ryukyuan customs in the home, however, did not derail older Okinawans’ 
commitment to serving the Japanese Empire as loyal subjects.  Okinawans identified as Japanese 
with a Ryukyuan heritage and, despite discontent with unequal treatment, claimed the nation of 
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Japan as their own.  Okinawa’s status as a prefecture, rather than a colony, attributed to a greater 
sense of belonging because the people felt like marginalized second classmen, not powerless 
captives.20  Adult Okinawans accepted Japanese propaganda messages of shared nationhood 
even if they lacked the youthful spirit of younger generations. 
As parents, however, older Okinawans at times retained a relatively cautious view 
towards the most extreme messages of Japanese propaganda, especially in regards to their 
children.  Parents expressed distress at their children’s passionate and earnest proclamations of 
loyalty to the Emperor until death.  One parent exclaimed in horror, “I didn’t bring you up to the 
age of sixteen to die!"21  To the young, the wholesale acceptance of all propaganda by their 
classmates proved its veracity.  Adults had the mature ability to process the details of the 
messaging and to contextualize it within their roles as a subject of the Emperor.  Parents 
imparted values of Japanese loyalty to their children but also introduced Ryukyuan customs and 
instructed offspring about the importance of fitting their vernacular into the Japanese message.  
“It doesn’t matter what you hear or who tells you,” one father told his children, “you mustn’t 
ever say that Japan is losing, even if you’re wrong.”22 
Adult Okinawans prepared their families for the rough conditions that may result from a 
battle waged on their land.  As early as 1944, mothers and fathers talked to their children frankly 
about the hardships to come.  One father explained that, “Okinawa may soon become a 
battlefield, and when that happens there may be terrible confusion and families may become 
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separated.”23  The warnings parents issued to their children grew more serious and urgent by 
early 1945 as Okinawans overheard military information from Japanese troops stationed 
throughout the island.  Parents tried to teach their young children survival but offered mostly 
general advice such as “keep your head” or “decide for yourself what to do.”  Children struggled 
to comprehend as they listened to warnings from their parents that did not explain war in the 
glamourous terms used by the schools.  One young girl recalled, “I looked at [my siblings’] faces 
and at my father’s face in turn, for I had no way of knowing how to react on my own.”24 
Parents directed their children towards Japanese values as a guiding source of protection 
and stood by their identity as Japanese subjects.  Having lived long lives under the Japanese flag 
in relative peace, indoctrination played no less of a role in defining their sense of self than it did 
for the young.  On the brink of a battle, Okinawans saw Japan as their country and felt compelled 
to protect it along with their families.  Adult Okinawans took very seriously the civil defense 
roles dictated to them by the Japanese government.25 
***** 
As American naval bombardments hit the shores of the Kerama Islands just south of 
Okinawa in March 1945, the last civil defense measures and student military corps activated.26  
The concussions of the artillery also popped the building pressure of anticipation that had 
lingered for the past year.  Okinawans acted relieved, happy, thrilled; the feelings of glee came 
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from a release of “indecisive gloom” and “the constraints of deadlock.”27  The opening of the 
battle had arrived and, with it, all anxious, tense waiting disappeared as focus turned towards 
both the execution of their emergency plans and standing in defense of their land and villages.  
The First Okinawa Prefectural Girls’ High School became the Himeyuri Student Corps as the 
“loud thunder of the guns” prompted the students to “mobilize straight from the school dormitory 
to Haebaru Army Hospital,” which consisted of bunks in numerous caves.  The children had not 
yet graduated; the ceremony occurred in a barracks building, lit only by candlelight, while the 
cacophony of guns echoed outside.  The children sang, “Give your life for the sake of the 
Emperor, wherever you may go” and one young girl “went to the battlefield feeling proud of 
[her]self.”28 
Thunderous impacts of almost three million shells gutted fields and crops.  Artillery 
destroyed homes and displaced hundreds of families.  Dead bodies, floating in wells and streams, 
contaminated the water supply.  The people experienced such severe dehydration, they went days 
without urinating.  Unable to wash, lice and fleas covered their bodies.  Makeshift shelters built 
of soft earth caved in at the slightest tremor.  Numerous shells did not detonate; their weight 
pushed them deep into the sucking mud created by the rains of the monsoons where they waited 
for a misstep by a civilian.29 
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Many Okinawan men ran towards the battle as part of organized military units such as the 
Boei Tai (Okinawan Home Guard).30  Work as farmers, fisherman and schoolmasters also forced 
men away from their families.  One farmer traveled to Makabe to collect meat, milk, fruits and 
vegetables for the Japanese soldiers.  The trips, which took days, separated him from his family 
as the battle made any passage impossible to complete.  He left behind four children, the eldest 
girl 17 years old.31  With most men gone, young children and women, along with elderly family 
members who had refused passage on ships to Formosa and mainland, searched for safety by 
themselves.  One woman traveled with her five-year-old son, five-month old baby and her 
mother-in-law who suffered from asthma.  The old woman needed to rest often; the younger 
woman carried both the elderly woman and her baby on her back.32 
***** 
The Japanese allowed the Americans to land on the shores of Okinawa with little 
confrontation.  Deep inland, 117,000 men of the Imperial Army waited for the invaders from 
strong, deliberate positions.33  Along with the mainland born, Okinawan men built defenses, 
shouldered weapons, and secured terrain.34  Committed to combat against the Americans, 
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conscripted men lived, trained, and waged battle as soldiers.  Maintaining cohesion within their 
units, they set up defensive perimeters, kept guard, ate collective meals, and occupied key 
ground.  Fighting under the flag of Japan, they shared the hardships of war with the Japanese.  
The two ethnic groups worked together, protected each other and formed a bond against the 
common American enemy.35  Even those that fought in ethnically pure formations, like the 
16,000 Okinawan men of the Boei Tai, unified with the Japanese against a mutual foe.  As the 
treachery of battle began, the Okinawan soldiers strengthened their sense of Japanese identity 
through shared mortality.  One badly wounded Okinawan explained in his final hours with pride 
that he had “fought hard for the Emperor and the country.”  Okinawan soldiers noted similarities 
between themselves and the Japanese.  One observed, “Yamatunchu [mainland] soldiers were no 
different.”  Dying in the caves alongside Okinawans, Japanese soldiers cried for their wives and 
mothers rather than shouting, “Banzai” or “Long live the Emperor.”  Okinawans found 
surprising comfort in shared raw human experiences. “We thought we were just the same as the 
Japanese,” one local soldier believed, “that we fought together as one.”36 
As a part of martial units, Okinawan soldiers absorbed the military cultural beliefs of the 
Japanese.  Soldiers from Okinawa viewed hara-kiri as an accepted practice and, even though 
difficult, some did complete the act on their own initiative.  Those who did carry out the ritual 
suicide tended to do so in dire situations where death loomed certain.  Severely wounded soldiers 
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in intense pain willingly chose hara-kiri over slowly succumbing to wounds.  The drastic nature 
of the practice, though, caused shocked outcries from fellow soldiers that witnessed the act.37  
Hara-kiri remained a controversial practice for Okinawan soldiers, entered into with hesitation 
and rarely executed under a cry of glorified sacrifice to country.  Although the conscripts would 
dutifully execute hara-kiri if ordered to do so, retreat remained the favored option for able-
bodied Okinawans facing a military defeat.  Okinawan soldiers’ view of ritualized suicide did 
not deviate greatly from the feelings of Japanese soldiers towards self-harm.  Even the Japanese 
responded to hara-kiri with a natural human trepidation despite their belief in the honor of the 
act.38 
The benefits of serving in a military unit extended beyond emotional support.  Despite 
expectations placed upon the civilians to resist the invading foreigners, the people had little 
means to defend themselves or their homes.  They lacked adequate weapons, training, and 
organization beyond the village leadership.  Japanese troops briefly organized some of the 
population from villages into groups and armed each with two grenades – one to throw at the 
Americans and one to use against themselves – but the military offered only limited instruction 
on what to do against the advancing forces.39  The civilians did not have surpluses of food, 
clothing, or medical supplies in the amount needed to handle damage caused by shells, bombs, 
and bullets.  Okinawan soldiers received basic rations, uniforms, weapons, and military training.  
The units took over homes, villages, and caves as military leadership positioned their troops and 
planned attacks and counterattacks.40  Civilians faced displacement from deadly artillery, 
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unexploded shells on the ground, advancing foreign troops, and the conflicting needs of their 
own military that they had thought would protect them. 
The shock of war immediately impacted the population but it stunned the once energetic 
and innocent youth.  Within the opening days of the battle, young, enthusiastic nurses saw 
Japanese soldiers missing entire faces, arms, and legs.  Child nurses fainted at pools of blood in 
hospital caves.  Children watched their school friends attempt to stuff their intestines back into 
their wide open stomachs.  Some young boys, misled into thinking that service in the girls’ nurse 
corps provided safety, modeled their hair in feminine styles to avoid fighting and death in the 
boys’ Blood and Iron Corps.  Of the 2,000 students mobilized as nurses or soldiers, 1,050 died.41 
Working in hospital caves or traveling through fields in search of safety, children’s 
observations of war rattled their concepts of the reward of battle.  Witness to the extreme 
violence of war-caused injuries, many insufficiently trained student nurses responded clumsily to 
emergency trauma.  The Japanese met the young girls’ hesitation by screaming at them and 
calling them names.  “You idiot!,” they would chastise, “You think you can act like that on the 
battlefield?...Fools! Idiots! Dummies!”42  Frustrated with the inadequacies of the nurses in 
urgent, life-threatening situations, the soldiers’ demeaning treatment was reasonable.  It did, 
however, awaken the girls’ to their own “naïve and unrealistic” fantasies about the glory of war. 
“Victorious battle! Our army is always superior! That was all we knew,” one young girl 
proclaimed, “We were so gullible, so innocent.”43 
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As the fighting spread throughout the island, children witnessed behavior by the Japanese 
military towards the population that contradicted indoctrination principles.  Propaganda 
convinced the Okinawan people that they stood as contributing subjects of the Emperor and 
shared a stake in the battle and the future of the nation; Okinawans augmented troops and 
fulfilled distinct roles, from child-rearing to farming, in preparation for war.  Once the battle 
began, however, the tactical usefulness of the large population waned.  Soldiers found the mass 
of civilians onerous and a hindrance to battlefield activities.  The Japanese troops had a certain 
level of control to loosely consolidate civilians that still lived in villages yet the destruction of 
war forced many civilians to abandon their damaged homes.  Roaming the island haphazardly in 
disjointed, small groups, the people inadvertently interrupted combat operations with no 
intention of engaging in the fighting.  A group of soldiers pushed along a small band of people 
found sleeping in makeshift divots in the ground by screaming, “Move off, move off!  There’s 
going to be fighting here soon.  Go somewhere else!”44  Where the family went, did not matter.  
The Okinawans soon discovered that the military they supported and called their own exposed 
them to danger rather than safeguarding them; children watched in confusion as the Japanese 
denied them protection.  Battle damage destroyed natural food sources on the island and the 
Japanese forcefully took food from the civilians by pistol, knife point, or overbearing physical 
strength.45  With bombardments raining down and close fire pressing in, soldiers claimed some 
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caves for exclusive military use and refused civilians entrance.  Outside the caves, the people 
faced an unsure fate with no shelter from the monsoon rains and uncertain nutrition.  Most 
concerning, the Okinawans feared possible deadly confrontation with the Americans.46  A young 
mother, whose infant’s constant shrieks led to her exile from a cave, soon met death through a 
torrid round of machine gun fire.  The people in her cave, to include young children, watched 
Japanese soldiers forcefully pull the woman out of the shelter only to see her die moments later.  
They then listened to the baby’s continued cries as he lay strapped to his dead mother’s back.47 
In their efforts to conceal their positions, the Japanese military also directly killed 
civilians and children.48  One abandoned girl searched numerous caves for her lost sisters.  She 
made excessive noise calling out their names and caused a soldier to charge out of his cave with 
a sword, intent on killing her.  Terrified for her life, the girl also “was flabbergasted” that her 
assailant was a Japanese soldier. “My father and the soldiers at the Signal Corp unit had always 
told me that soldiers were there to protect us, and here was one raising a sword to kill me!,” she 
lamented.  Another teenage girl watched in stunned silence as a group of soldiers strangled a 
crying four- or five-year-old boy with a medical bandage.  According to one eyewitness, some 
soldiers threw babies up in the air and speared them with their bayonets.  The Japanese also 
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ordered Okinawans to kill themselves.  Instructions distributed with grenades to the population 
stated that, “in defending the Imperial soil not only soldiers are obliged to give their lives but 
all.”49  While the population did not carry any military status, civilians felt obligated to obey 
military orders as if they served as soldiers themselves and followed troops’ instructions from 
relocation edicts to executing violence.  Many Okinawans committed suicide out of feelings of 
obligation to Japan and commitment to the Emperor.  Several student nurses killed themselves at 
Arasaki.  One boy explained with exasperation, “you have to grasp here the relationship between 
the military and the residents as a whole or you’ll never understand…we…await[ed] orders from 
the military.”50  Trust, built on the foundation of propaganda that rallied all Okinawans together 
with the Japanese under a fabricated shared sense of nationhood, compelled the young to follow 
the orders of the Japanese military. 
Japanese soldiers also killed members of their own ranks who threatened the security of 
their unit.  Under sobs and apologies, soldiers stabbed their injured friends to death to silence 
their painful cries or as a part of their duty to protect pertinent military information.  Soldiers 
offered milk laced with cyanide to the badly wounded and nobly instructed their victims to 
“achieve your glorious end like a Japanese soldier.”  Surrender, an unacceptable compromise to 
the Japanese, also caused soldiers to shoot each other.51 
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Children watched killings occur right outside the caves and young nurses participated by 
poisoning their patients.  The experiences of war weighed heavily on the light, motivated hearts 
of the youth who earlier spoke of willingly sacrificing their lives in defense of the nation.  The 
heroes that they strived to emulate now threatened their families and neighbors; soldiers that had 
once given them piggy back rides now tried to kill them.52 
The nationalistic pride of the young, however, was grounded in peer pressure, respect for 
figures of authority, and desire for self-discovery and independence.  Moreover, its core was 
fueled by an indoctrination system so strong that it held captive the minds of the adult population 
as well.  Shock at watching grotesque displays of brutality did not automatically transform young 
Okinawans once fiercely loyal to Japan into those who denounced the nation.  Children excused 
much of the cruelty by the soldiers, especially when the violence did not cause immediate death.  
They rationalized their suffering as vital to the success of the military mission and the troops in 
battle.  The youth considered it “unthinkable…that one of [their] own soldiers could kill a 
defenseless mother, a small child like [them], or a baby, just to save his own skin.”  They 
justified such devastating acts as essential for military victory.53  Within the unsafe turmoil of 
battle, the children sought security through stable consistency.  Okinawan youth contrived 
reasons to cling to a Japanese identity and to validate the teachings of honor in the military.  
Solidifying this identity, the young used the pronouns “we” and “our” in reference to Japan, its 
soldiers and the battle; they practiced Japanese courtesies and called themselves subjects of the 
Emperor, “we Okinawans, Great Japanese all.”54  As the Japanese delivered commands to the 
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population, the youth followed the orders under the duty bound teachings of commitment to the 
Emperor.55  Memories of pleasant interactions with the Japanese in 1944 sustained the children’s 
convictions even in the face of violence.  One young girl still referred to a soldier friend of hers 
as “young, and gentle, and kind” and comforted dying soldiers with assurances of national 
victory.56  The Japanese, despite their behavior towards the population, represented the familiar 
and therefore, ably kept the trust of the eager youth, who had so willingly accepted the ideals of 
nationhood and military might during preparations, through the opening of the battle. 
Fear also drove the young to hold on to the illusion of safety with the Japanese 
throughout the beginnings of the battle.  The Japanese told explicit and grotesquely detailed 
stories of what the Americans would do to the Okinawans if captured.  The stories exaggerated 
Japanese stereotypes of Americans to mythical proportions and exploited the darkest fears of the 
Okinawans.  Grandiose U.S. tanks, products of industrial production and material extravagance, 
would crush the Okinawans effortlessly.  The unclean, demonic Americans would sexually 
violate young girls to satisfy their brutish desires and hedonistic ways.  “We knew that if we 
were captured we’d be chopped to pieces,” one teenager explained, “They’d cut off our noses, 
our ears, chop off our fingers, and then run over our bodies with their tanks.  Women would be 
raped.”  One story threatened children: “[the Americans] were killing children by ripping them 
apart from the crotch.”57  Terror at the possibility of death or torture ignited hatred.  One five-
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year-boy wanted to survive the battle so that, once grown, he could avenge the havoc brought to 
his home by killing the Americans himself.58  During the early weeks of battle, propaganda 
taught the young Okinawans to seek some sort of refuge with the Japanese and avoid the 
Americans.59 
The conflict, however, lasted far longer than weeks.  As the battle stretched into months, 
more people died and children, left alone, scavenged for scarcer amounts of food.  As the 
situation for the civilians grew more desperate, it became more difficult to ignore the actual 
brutality and death that the Japanese inflicted on the population.  Repeatedly, children fell victim 
to cruel acts by the Japanese.  Troops killed their family members and stole their food.  While the 
young Okinawans feared the possibility of American aggression, the Japanese harmed the 
population during most interactions with them.  The more frequent and severe the encounters 
with the Japanese, the more difficult it became to fabricate reasons to justify the cruelty; the 
children started to lose confidence in the indoctrinated teachings about the might of Japan and 
the loyal role of Okinawans.  Japanese cruelty devastated the young’s understanding of 
themselves and their world because it betrayed an alleged kinship that propaganda had ensured 
existed.60  Continued exposure to recurrent acts of betrayal eroded the strong patriotic feelings of 
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the young over time.  Many reluctantly recognized the duplicity of the Japanese, sometimes 
holding tight to the illusion of protection despite many months of intense fighting, death, 
hardship, and atrocities until the aggregate of their experiences made ignorance impossible.61  
For others, a single act of cruelty of an intensely devastating or personal nature propelled them 
towards disillusionment.  One sixteen-year-old boy watched his brother and niece, both under 
three years old, die when Japanese troops injected the children with a lethal substance.  The 
soldiers believed the children’s noise would alert the Americans to their location in the shared 
cave.  The Japanese refused the boy’s offer to leave the cave with the small children and, by the 
next morning, attempted to kill the boy as well.  Previously, the boy had justified minor acts of 
cruelty; when soldiers’ stole his family’s food, he reasoned that “it was the soldiers who had to 
do the fighting.”  The deaths of his brother and niece, however, caused the boy to feel “so 
shocked [he] didn’t know what to say.”  The event stripped away the illusions he had clung to 
and broke down his gallant convictions of patriotism.  He now saw the food pilfering as a selfish 
act to ensure the soldiers’ own survival.62 
Weak devotion by some soldiers to national standards of honor dismantled trust between 
the young and the Japanese as much as acts of violence.  Young Okinawans committed 
themselves as warriors for Japan; they fought in child military units, served as nurses or 
protected their families as loyal subjects.  Living the Japanese ethos of valuing nation over life, 
some youth even harmed weaker civilians under the auspices of honor or in support of alleged 
battlefield necessity.63  While Japanese soldiers did support the same principles, Okinawans met 
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any deviation from complete commitment with disdain and distress.  The realization that some 
Japanese troops committed atrocities to preserve their own survival shocked and enraged young 
Okinawans who dedicated themselves to the principle of self-sacrifice for the advancement of 
the nation.  Two teenage boys, watching the horror of mass suicide and murder among 
Okinawans at the demand of the Japanese, delayed their own suicide out of a desire to kill one 
enemy before they died.  As they left the cave to join the fight, surrendering Japanese troops ran 
past them, clearly alive and avoiding death.  The experience caused instantaneous fury in the 
boys: “We felt…anger and distrust, boiling up in us.  Could it be possible that we, alone, had 
gone through this horror?  Our sense of unity with the military – that we would be forever tied 
together in death, which had reached its peak in those deaths – dissolved completely.”64  A 
young nurse, who may have euthanized the wounded with cyanide as a part of her dictated 
duties, watched a Japanese soldier climb down a cliff towards the Americans in capitulation.  
She felt stunned, “A Japanese soldier raising his hands in surrender? Impossible! Traitor!”65 
Betrayal, whether by harming the population or by failing to equal the commitment to 
national beliefs of sacrifice that the Okinawans still upheld, undermined the trust in the Japanese 
soldiers to which the young clung so desperately at the onset of the battle.  The actions of the 
Japanese contradicted the propaganda campaign of unity and created an environment of 
instability and unpredictability for the children.  When the mounting death toll denied 
rationalization to explain away the dissonance between the actions and the rhetoric, the young 
Okinawans became fearful of the Japanese troops.  The youth could no longer deny that the 
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Japanese took their lives, shelter, and food and, in efforts to avoid the treachery of the Japanese, 
some jumped off cliffs to their death.  “Now,” said one teenage boy, “the Japanese more than the 
Americans became the object of our fears.”66  The children’s fear demarcated along atypical 
lines of the living and the dead.  Abandoned children, roaming the island by themselves, found 
dead soldiers useful since their carcasses tended to carry uneaten food in their satchels.  
Inanimate dead soldiers posed no harm to the children but instead offered a chance at survival.  
Living soldiers, on the other hand, chased the children and threatened to kill them.  “I always felt 
that dead soldiers were my friends, providing me with things to eat, and was no longer afraid of 
them, but I was really afraid of the live soldiers,” explained one girl.67 
 The erosion of patriotism in the young realigned their sense of identity.  As the battle 
progressed, the young pulled away from a shared Japanese identity and started to see themselves 
as separate from Japan, as innocent victims of propaganda lies.  Burning under the slap of 
betrayal and seeing clearly where the responsibility for the atrocities lay, the young chose to 
disassociate with the Japanese and define the military as an organization with loyalty outside of 
and at odds with Okinawa.  The young quipped that what motivated the Japanese troops was a 
desire to “get back to the mainland” and spoke about the home islands as an alien place to which 
they did not belong.68  By stating the troops’ desire to return home, they implied that the 
Japanese in Okinawa stood on foreign land.  As the battle grew progressively worse for the 
Japanese, young Okinawans witnessed soldiers shouting statements of devotion to the Emperor 
during final stands.  Amid the constant violence, destruction, and carnage that wore down their 
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own resolve, the Okinawan children could no longer understand how some Japanese troops still 
proclaimed faith in the Japanese nation and its future nor did they share those ideas of nation any 
longer.  The confusion the children felt signified a growing chasm between the Japanese and the 
young Okinawans; any statement of nation by the Japanese now seemed unconnected to the 
young’s experiences and lives.  The youth referred to themselves as “we islanders,” which 
referenced the geographic relation of Okinawa as an island separate from Japan’s mainland; they 
consciously moved towards an Okinawan identity that provided them a defining source of 
strength from which to combat the mental and physical anguish of Japan’s betrayal.69 
***** 
Children comprised only one part of the refugee population that crowded into caves and 
walked on thin shoes along water logged roads.  Although many of the young traveled only with 
other children, such as their siblings, the Okinawan refugee population also consisted of many 
women and elderly as well.  Older Okinawans, who bore responsibility as providers and 
caregivers, instinctively protected their wards above all else.  With bombardments raining down 
and cratering rooftops, they scrambled to pack food, spare clothes, and a few cooking utensils, 
hopefully enough supplies to sustain the lives of their entire traveling party for as long as 
possible.  They fled their homes in attempts to outrun the battle and find makeshift shelter.  
Some hoarded ammunition and weapons they found along their route to protect their families.  
Others, struggling with a lack of water because of contaminated streams, drank their own urine. 
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Traveling families started out as large groups; one woman had ten people under her care even 
with all the men gone to fighting units or Civil Defense duties.70 
Before the battle began, the adult Okinawans unquestionably considered themselves 
Japanese yet concern for family overtook any temptation they may have had for political or 
patriotic gallantry.  Under the stress of combat and the struggle for survival, adult Okinawans 
found it difficult to abide by the Japanese state ideology that linked the integrity, stability, and 
growth of the family to national strength.  With bombs leveling their homes and gutting their 
fields and errant bullets threatening their lives, they found it impossible to maintain the 
housekeeping projects and childrearing expected of them by Japanese propaganda.  No longer 
receiving congratulatory letters from the Prime Minister for pregnancies, women now gave birth 
on the side of the street without medical help.71  Absconding among cratered, empty homes and 
unattended fields, they felt an eerie sense of abandonment despite walking among the shots on an 
active battlefield. 
Unlike the youth, the older Okinawans held no lofty ambitions crafted in school 
classrooms and refined during mobilization for glory, nor did they idealize the Japanese soldier 
as hero.  They had maturity and wisdom that came with age and a realistic viewpoint that drove 
their priorities towards survival of loved ones rather than towards promotion of patriotic 
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nationhood, as the children did.  The opening of the battle shook the comfort they once felt in 
their homes but, without preconceived convictions of patriotic grandeur, the harsh conditions did 
not dismantle any pre-battle concepts they held about their relationship with Japan.  As they 
rushed to protect their charges in the immediate opening shots, they acknowledged only that they 
were Japanese subjects and their homes were under fire. 
Defenseless infants and slow-moving grandparents relied upon the able-bodied women 
for their survival.  The women, as caregivers, remained wary towards all who carried weapons.   
To the best of their ability, they challenged any acts by the Japanese military that placed their 
families in further jeopardy; if they noticed the potential for harm, they pushed back against the 
troops in any way possible.  One woman had only a tea kettle filled with boiled sweet potato vine 
to nourish her family.  When Japanese soldiers took it from her, she grabbed it back.  “My 
children would have starved to death without it,” she retorted.  Differing from the young who 
attempted to justify theft in favor of the troops, the adult Okinawans immediately reviled such 
crimes and countered against them.  Adults did not make excuses or offer understanding for the 
cruelty.  When they watched Japanese troops in shared caves strangle noisy children to death, 
they called the murders “unbelievable…so horrible [they] couldn’t watch to the end.”  Yet 
despite their strength to retaliate against the Japanese at times, horrific violence triggered fear in 
the adults.  Some did not even need to witness the brutality to feel dread and anxiety towards the 
Japanese military; simple talk of troops killing children caused fear to build.  Threats proved just 
as powerful.  “They would demand food from us,” one woman lamented, “rattling their bayonets 
and saying they’d been ordered to kill any civilians who’d become a nuisance to military 
operations.”72 
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Survival drove the actions of the adult Okinawans.  Preserving a kettle of sweet potato 
water meant a few more days of life.  Fleeing from destroyed communities offered a chance of 
finding water, food, or refuge.73  Aware of the vicious deeds committed against them by the 
Japanese, older Okinawans knew that avoiding the army offered their family the best protection 
from harm.  The trajectory of the battle, however, made circumventing the military a near 
impossible task.  Civilians and soldiers both flowed into caves.  Soldiers passed through areas 
with large congregated civilian populations with the intent of commandeering resources and 
organizing the communities into fighting forces.  Facing the demands of the armed military, 
some adult Okinawans believed that compliance gave them the best chance of preserving their 
family and dutifully accepted grenades for suicide.  Coerced by the threat of punishment, women 
silenced their smaller children, sometimes by abandonment, in hopes of protecting their older 
children.74 
While horrified by the behavior of the Japanese troops, the atrocities did not immediately 
alter the adult Okinawan’s sense of identity.  Amid growing fright, full awareness of the 
brutalities, and the mettle to stand up to the troops in small ways, the adult Okinawans still 
unquestionably classified the Japanese troops as friendly forces. “I was most afraid of friendly 
troops,” one woman said as she described her feelings towards the Japanese.75  As before the 
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battle, the older Okinawans saw themselves as subjects of Japan with a unique Ryukyuan 
heritage that set them apart from the mainland and, at times, politically disadvantaged them.  The 
acknowledgment of their ethnic background did not divorce the Okinawans from their belief in 
their place in the Japanese Empire and their role as subjects; they thought of Japan as their 
nation.  While the battle brought unheard of brutalities, the older Okinawans had come to accept 
the inequalities and disadvantages they experienced at the hands of the Japanese over the years.76  
For over sixty years, Japan had limited the rights of the Okinawans.  Unlike the young who had 
bolstered the image of the troops to romanticized epic myth, the adults maintained a more 
grounded view of Japan and their relationship with the mainland.  A more levelheaded and 
realistic perspective better prepared the older Okinawans to absorb the horrific events without 
immediately dismantling their sense of self.  They saw Japanese brutality during the battle as 
another instance, albeit extreme in nature, of the unfairness with which Japan treated their 
Okinawan subjects.77  Older Okinawans immediately abhorred the Japanese for the cruelty that 
served as the latest offense against them but, already fully acclimated to the tense relationship 
between Ryukyuans and Yamato Japanese over the years, the violence of the battle did not rattle 
their identity as Japanese.78 
     ***** 
By the end of April, the Japanese forces had fallen back from their defensive position 
along a ridgeline south of Machinato and Kakazu towards Shuri Castle, the symbolic seat of the 
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once Ryukyuan Kingdom.  The new Japanese defenses along Shuri Line held for only a few 
weeks before American forces took both Conical Hill and Sugar Loaf Hill.  Situated on the east 
and west ends of the line, the capture of the high terrain enabled the Americans to outflank the 
Japanese.  By May 29, the Americans easily captured the nearly abandoned Shuri Castle as the 
Japanese retreated towards Kyan Peninsula.  On the northern part of the island, the Americans 
quickly sealed off the Motobu Peninsula as early as April 7; by April 13, they reached Hedo 
Point, the northernmost area of Okinawa.79  As the battle advanced up and down the island with 
the American forces aggressively uprooting both northern and southern Japanese strongholds, the 
Okinawan population came face to face with the feared foreign invaders. 
For Okinawan men and boys who fought with the Japanese units, interaction with the 
Americans occurred through exchanges of fire.  Side by side with the Japanese soldiers, the 
Okinawans that fought saw a hardened, hated, and faceless enemy on the other side of the 
battlefield.  Loyalty to their unit, the country of Japan, their fellow soldiers, their homes and their 
families compelled them to fight the enemy.  An Okinawan soldier who found himself separated 
from his unit knew he “had to get back to [his] company, and that determination kept [him] 
going.”  Encountering the Americans in battle spurred even more commitment to propaganda 
ideals than military training had inspired during mobilization.  Feeling the emotionally 
heightened sensation of bullets shooting past them, the Okinawans who fought as official 
soldiers reviled the foreign invaders.  Americans, engaged in direct combat with them, stood as a 
well-defined enemy.  Hard fighting also drew the Okinawans closer to the Japanese with whom 
they fought; they shared a survival mentality and lacked concern for the population.  One 
Okinawan soldier dismissed the needs of civilians he encountered out of concern for his own 
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necessities.  Although he realized he had no means to offer medical help to badly wounded 
civilians he encountered, he also refused water to people who begged for a simple drink.80 
The collapse of the Japanese defensive lines brought the Americans cascading into all 
areas of the island.  Civilians in both the northern and southern portions of the island found 
themselves pushed to the edges of the land, trapped on peninsulas and cornered in caves.  In all 
these areas, the civilian population sat deeply intermingled with the Japanese military, a situation 
that placed them in serious danger of getting caught in an attack.  American troops rooted out 
pockets of Japanese resistance – inflicting casualties among Okinawans.  Into the openings of 
even the smallest caves, Americans threw charges, ignited gasoline and aimed flamethrowers.  
As they closed in on the caves, they attacked from a position above the opening to prevent the 
escape of anyone inside.  The method, called “blowtorch and corkscrew” or straddling a cave 
(Umanori by the Japanese), killed thousands of civilians and military.  One student nurse recalled 
the devastating effects of a gas bomb sent into a hospital cave.  The bomb was “thrown into the 
cave with the – fifteen-year-olds!,” she recalled, “The way they died!  Their bodies swelled up 
and turned purple…It was like they suffocated to death…Forty-six of fifty-one perished there.”  
While the Americans did not target the population, they also did not make special consideration 
for the Okinawans at the risk of allowing the Japanese to escape.  In caves that housed an 
inordinate number of military compared to a few civilians, the risk for the Okinawans increased.  
A teenage girl found temporary refuge in a cave in Makabe called Sennin-Go or A Thousand 
People Cave.  The cavern held mostly Japanese military and only a few civilians.  The 
Americans mortared the entrance, sealing it and trapping everyone inside.  Deaths of civilians 
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also occurred outside of caves.  Rifle fire decimated groups of Okinawans hiding in foliage or 
moving on roads if the people intermixed too densely with Japanese troops.  In one episode, an 
American rifleman opened fire on a Japanese soldier and, in the same burst, also killed three 
Okinawan students.  In most instances, U.S. troops did not intend to kill the population directly.  
If a cave appeared to house civilians, they would bring an interpreter to coax the people out.  
Firing on the students stopped once the teacher, carrying the dead body of one of the students, 
stood upright in front of the rifleman.  An observing student commented, “Random firing 
stopped.  The American, who had been firing wildly, must have noticed he was shooting girls.”81 
Children encountered Americans in sizeable numbers after the momentum of the battle 
favored the foreign invaders.  Battle interactions between the population and the Japanese 
military, however, had occurred at the very opening of the conflict.  The young, therefore, had 
already lost their trust in the Japanese military before facing the Americans.  Experiences with 
the Japanese taught the youth to remain wary towards any soldier.  For the young, safety only 
existed among themselves.  Knowing nothing about the Americans outside the propaganda 
stories that described them as vicious animals, the young Okinawans felt threatened, convinced 
that the foreign troops intended harm.  Most children lacked the clarity to understand why their 
family perished by cross-fire and instead believed that the Americans purposefully aimed their 
rifles and flamethrowers at them in the same manner that they engaged with the military.  
Smoked out of the depths of a cave by a charge singeing the entrance, young Okinawans crawled 
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out to face armed Americans who herded them with the barrels of their rifles.  “If we stand up, 
they’ll shoot us,” the children thought.  As they saw ships offshore, they believed the Americans 
would use naval guns against them as well.  “We were in full view of the ships at sea.  If they 
wanted to…they could kill us with a single salvo,” one youth imagined, “I shuddered.  I was 
completely exposed.”  As mortars rained down near a village, a teenage boy remarked, “I guess 
the killing had already started,” as he assumed that the Americans dropped the mortars 
intentionally on the population with the simplistic purpose of mass slaughter.82 
The young gripped tightly to the image of the Americans created by the Japanese.  
Tragically, fear of torture prevented the children from accepting earnest offers of safety from the 
U.S. troops.  Using translators to persuade civilians away from cliffs, beaches, and out of caves, 
Americans corralled the people into military government camps that provided food, shelter, 
clothing, and medical help to the limits of what U.S. resources could support.83  The Okinawans, 
however, had no way to know the sincerity of the offers.  Hundreds of civilians died because of 
American rifle fire and incendiaries thrown into caves.  The Japanese warned of rape, mutilation, 
and torture by the hands of the foreigners.  The young, who still reeled from the betrayal of the 
Japanese, presented the stiffest resistance to the coaxing words of the Americans.  The children 
recoiled and called the rescue pleas from the U.S. translators the “voice of the enemy…the 
voices of demons.”84  As the interpreters declared, “We’ll save you…We have food! We will 
rescue you!,” the young Okinawans stubbornly ignored the offers and ran away.  As one girl 
explained, “We’d only been educated to hate them…we didn’t answer that voice but continued 
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our flight…we were simply too terrified…we never dreamt the enemy would rescue us.”85  
Resistance and hesitation placed the young in danger.  Without hearing any responses from 
fearful youth huddled silently in caverns, the interpreters considered the caves empty of civilians 
and, therefore, clear for engagements with the enemy.  U.S. troops would then fill the cave with 
gasoline and light it with a tracer round.86  With the American military domination, few routes 
existed without soldiers.  Young Okinawans that fled from the Americans found themselves in 
dire situations such as cornered on the edges of cliffs or facing desperate and deadly Japanese 
troops.  Losing whatever hope they once had, the young resorted to suicide.  Bands of students 
cried in despair, “We can’t take it anymore.  Teacher, please kill us.  Kill us with a grenade!”87 
Regardless of their attempts at evasion, the children did interact with the Americans.  
Ever observant, the young deeply considered what they experienced.  In the same way they 
recognized insincerity and discord between the promises and behavior of the Japanese military, 
they noticed dissonance between the actions of the Americans and the fabricated stories.  Despite 
the apprehension with which the young approached all militaries, the Americans provided 
tangible evidence of their sincerity.  The stunned youth watched the U.S. troops fulfill promises 
of safety and nourishment.  The Americans administered medicine and bandaged the wounds of 
their classmates.  “Until that moment, I could think of the Americans only as devils and 
demons,” one girl thought, “I was simply frozen.  I couldn’t believe what I saw.”88  An injured 
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girl, after watching Japanese soldiers kill their wounded with cyanide, crawled away as best she 
could.  U.S. forces picked her up near Haebaru and took to a medical dispensary.  She survived, 
later saying that she “hated and feared these Americans, but they treated me with great care and 
kindness, while my classmates, my teachers left me behind.”89  A child, choking on smoke as she 
exited a burning cave, caught her breath because of a piece of sugarcane stuck into her mouth by 
a U.S. soldier.  Her two sisters, unconscious from blood loss, survived after they received aid 
from the Americans.  Just as the continually aggressive actions of the Japanese towards the 
population drove the youth towards distrust, the persistent acts of humanity by the Americans 
left an indelible impression on the young that inevitably drove away their fear of the foreigners.90  
While shocked by the positive interactions in contrast to the threatening, mythical stories of 
torture fabricated by the Japanese, the consistency of charitable acts by the foreigners caused the 
intelligent youth to rethink their definition of enemy.  American encounters also made the 
perceptive youth realize additional advantages to an Okinawan identity beyond the relief of the 
mental and physical anguish brought on by Japanese duplicity.  Identified as Okinawans, the 
children received treatment as innocent refugees and found themselves herded into military 
government camps that offered relative protection, food and shelter.91  The young’s ability to 
analyze their circumstances, purposely adjust their conduct and redefine their identity created 
conditions that increased their chances of living. 
Adults, influenced by the same storytelling about the evil Americans as the young, 
reacted with similar initial hesitancy towards the foreigners.  A twenty-one-year-old woman 
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“never thought of surrendering [to the Americans].”  Instead, she and her grandmother chose to 
follow a Japanese military unit which exposed them to sparring between the two forces.  Hiding 
among the Japanese soldiers under a cliff overhang, she watched American grenades kill one 
man and injure her grandmother.  From this experience, she believed that the U.S. targeted 
civilians and represented a great threat to her family.92  Trapped between the reality of Japanese 
cruelty and the assumption of American torture, several adult Okinawans hopelessly opted to end 
their own lives.  One woman tried to strangle herself with her obi.  Another woman gave detailed 
instructions to the civilians with her on when and under what circumstances they should kill 
themselves.  “If the Americans kill men only,” she advised, “then we women should kill 
ourselves.”  She also instructed her group against fleeing from the Americans because “they 
would shoot anybody who would try to escape.”  Death by the foreigners seemed guaranteed; far 
better to end their own lives as they saw fit.93 
Adults reacted with pleased bewilderment when the Americans unexpectedly offered 
their hands in assistance or carried the weaker civilians to safety.  Older Okinawans felt surprised 
relief when they discovered the benevolence of the U.S. troops.94  Dismayed at the ill behavior of 
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the Japanese, American kindness created an opportunity for the adult Okinawans to seek benefits 
that did not exist before the U.S. military advancement.  With survival and caring for their 
families still priorities, the adults actively sought advantages that might bring comfort or safety; 
the Americans presented such possibilities.  Deliberately, the older Okinawans appealed to and 
allied themselves with the Americans to gain favor with the foreigners.  A group of fifty 
Okinawans from the village of Aragaki approached the Americans with a white flag, seeking 
refuge.  Adults highlighted any associations they had to America, such as any ability to speak 
English or relatives living in Hawaii or California.  Locals who had medical skills worked as 
doctors and nurses in U.S. military hospitals, their efforts described by the Navy as a 
“willingness…to cooperate with American authorities.”95  Whereas the young stumbled upon the 
benefits of military government camps, the adults purposely positioned themselves with the 
Americans as counterparts; they built kinship and actively sought treatment as equals. 
Ingratiating themselves to the Americans, however, required a departure from the 
Japanese.  Unlike the young who wrestled emotionally with betrayal and broken trust, many of 
the adults weathered the discord between the expectations and the reality of the behavior of the 
Japanese and the Americans with more resilience.  Older Okinawans remained more cognizant of 
Japanese inconsistencies and the inherent disadvantages of membership in the Okinawan 
prefecture throughout their lives.  Their mature awareness allowed them to transition away from 
a Japanese identity when the opportunity for improved conditions required such a shift.  Much 
like preserving sweet potato water, making a deliberate choice about their identity protected 
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themselves and their families.  Informal, collective communities, under the extreme duress of 
war, used comparisons of sameness and distinctiveness to consciously select the Okinawan 
identity.96  In dialogue with the Americans, the people purposely redefined themselves as 
exclusively ethnic Okinawans and disassociated themselves from the Japanese.97  The conscious 
realignment of their identity earned them relaxed security in the U.S. military government camps 
and was so effective that U.S. troops believed that the population supported the American way of 
life and governance.98  Recognizing the benefits of American benevolence, adult civilians fully 
committed to their new identity as full Okinawans and dismissed their civil obligations as 
subjects of the Emperor.  Not only did they draw similarities between themselves and the 
Americans, they actively fought against the Japanese.  They helped locate and capture over 200 
resisting Japanese soldiers and, at times, beat up any Japanese that attempted to hide among 
them.99  The strained historical relationship between the two ethnic groups allowed the 
Okinawan’s close interaction with the Americans to spawn a drastic divergence from their 
previous sense of Japanese identity.  While the abuses at the hands of the Japanese had not 
turned away adult loyalty as sharply as it did with the young, the older Okinawans nonetheless 
always recognized the disadvantages they faced in the Empire.  The Americans offered a chance 
to improve their lives not only in the immediate situation but potentially in a larger, more 
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fundamental way.  While motivated by present concerns of safety and survival, Okinawan 
abandonment of their dedication to Japan was not temporary nor meant to only ease their present 
hardship; adults fully internalized a shift in their identity that redefined their views and actions.  
The Okinawans now stood by the Americans as opposed to the Japanese; they blamed civilian 
deaths caused by errant U.S. fire on Japanese troops intermixed with the population.100 
     ***** 
As the days pushed into late June, the weather on the island of Okinawa turned to heat 
and sunshine.  The hot sun dried up the wet of the rainy season.  Throughout the fighting, mud 
had sucked on feet, stealing shoes with its grip and standing water had made waist deep ponds 
out of fields and roadways.  As full summer arrived on the island, however, the ground cracked 
from the dryness.101  Official military and political dialogue announced the conclusion of 
hostilities in favor of the American on June 21, 1945.102  To the Okinawan people, the shift in 
weather marked a distinction in their environment more clearly than a high level declaration.  In 
the months following the end of the battle, much stayed the same for the civilian population.  
Americans and Japanese still engaged each other in firefights that placed civilians in danger.  
The population still scurried around for food and shelter in a setting where none existed.  In what 
officials called mopping up operations, the Americans often encountered sizable resistance in 
their efforts to bring the Japanese in compliance with the surrender.103 
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Despite their considerable size, the post-battle engagements took on a different fighting 
quality.  With the punishment of the American military momentum, the Japanese forces began to 
disintegrate.  Days before the Americans claimed victory, Japan dissolved several units heavily 
manned by Okinawans.  The Blood and Iron Corps, for example, disbanded on June 19, 1945.104  
As their last defensive lines fell and defeat loomed, many senior officers committed suicide, 
including General Mitsuru Ushijima, commander of the 32nd Army, and his second in command, 
General Isamu Cho.105  The lack of leadership on multiple levels led to sporadic resistance 
fighting.  Weakly organized and lacking structure, the post-battle clashes changed much of the 
camaraderie that fueled the Okinawan fighters’ sense of Japanese loyalty.  The Okinawans that 
fought in the battle, therefore, were the first civilians to experience the impact of the cessation of 
formal fighting.  Much of the security that they experienced by their inclusion in the Japanese 
military fell apart as the units resorted to individual survival. 
In the disorder of a crumbling army, the fighting Okinawans splintered off in the same 
way as the Japanese; they dodged the enemy and fought with the same devotion to principles that 
inspired their organized fighting.  Each soldier strived to return to the normalcy that had 
provided them comfort over the past few months by continuing their wartime duties or by 
tirelessly seeking full reunion with their unit.106  As the Americans sought to eradicate pockets of 
opposition that still waged battle, Okinawan soldiers felt hunted in an unrelenting predator-prey 
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game.  “The hunting for us stragglers was severe,” one Okinawan soldier said, “Every day 
Americans came to the heights of Mabuni with automatic rifles, stripped to their bare 
chests…When we went looking for food along the beaches, they would shoot at us from the 
heights, as if it were sport.”  While some Okinawan soldiers did surrender in the chaos of defeat, 
many of the military Okinawans continued to define the Americans as a dangerous enemy worth 
fighting.  Actions by the American forces aimed at the opposing military, such as puncturing 
food cans to cause rot so the stragglers could not eat the food and writing profanities on Japanese 
graves, ignited anger within the hearts of Japanese and Okinawans alike who faced them in 
armed conflict. 107 
In fractured units, however, Okinawan fighters saw the first displays of Japanese 
indifference and bias against them.  While the rest of the population had months earlier 
processed the shock of Japanese cruelty, the Okinawans fighters realized such duplicity only 
with the onset of military defeat.108  Okinawans who worked actively as spies, for example, 
tasted bitter betrayal as the Japanese became wary of the close relationships that espionage 
necessitated between the infiltrators and their subjects.  Despite units like the Okinawan 
populated Chihaya Unit, a spy organization under the intelligence section of the 32nd Army 
Headquarters, the Japanese published secret orders that called for the “investigation of the 
[Okinawan] men who are in the enemy occupied area.”109  Japanese suspicions of cooperation 
between the Okinawans and the Americans ran high and bore a deadly penalty.  Conscripted 
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Okinawan spies along with civilians, both innocent and guilty, suffered death because of 
accusations of such collaboration.110 
Okinawan fighters that lost the evasive game with the Americans found themselves in 
Prisoner of War camps.  U.S. troops separated the Okinawans from the Japanese in these camps 
and thus allowed the people to talk among each other and share their experiences.111  Under 
tolerant prison conditions, the Okinawans questioned the teachings of the Japanese and re-
evaluated what they had witnessed and participated in as soldiers of the Imperial Army; they 
found themselves reflecting on the violence that their units had administered to the population.  
Caught in the hypocrisy, the Okinawan soldiers placed blame on the coercive Japanese.  
Islanders who carried out violent acts against the population under military orders disclaimed 
responsibility by attributing their actions to a temporary, uncharacteristically confused state. “I 
was in a sort of daze myself,” reasoned one Okinawan soldier, “I could hardly care for other 
people.”112  They also disassociated their actions from the outcome, often times claiming that 
they did not know what happened after they fired their weapons, thrust their swords, stole food 
or pulled people from caves.  Some Okinawan soldiers only admitted to bearing witness to such 
events and denied any participation at all.113 The prisoners commiserated and tried to understand 
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why such events had occurred.  In their efforts to deny any active role they may have played, 
they accused the Japanese of acting like “bullies” to the population and to them as soldiers.114 
Okinawans in the Prisoner of War camps arrived there by the help of fellow soldiers that 
had surrendered.  While not an accepted practice, several soldiers did chose to submit to the 
military victors.  Okinawans did so in groups along with the Japanese or when unit disintegration 
left them with a low chance of survival on their own.  Some surrenders also began as 
unsuccessful suicide attempts.  One Okinawan, crouched in hiding with fellow soldiers for 
months, offered the remainder of his food ration to his comrades before he rushed towards the 
enemy.115  Okinawans that capitulated worked for the Americans; they coaxed soldiers and 
civilians out of hiding.  Called placation squads, the small groups stood outside known refuges 
and shouted messages that broadcast the Japanese defeat.  “We’ve lost.  We were defeated,” they 
called, “Your friends and teachers are all in a camp.”116 
Placation squad missions exposed the Okinawans to the different ways the two countries 
treated the population; where the Americans expressed empathy, the Japanese conveyed 
contempt.  Despite noticing the different behaviors, Okinawan fighters, both those in Prisoner of 
War camps and on placation squads, did not attempt to ingratiate themselves with the Americans.  
The experience of engaging with the foreigners in deadly, armed conflict for months barred the 
Okinawan soldiers from viewing the U.S. troops as anything but an enemy; they continued to see 
the Americans as a force that had fired at them with malice and desecrated the graves of their 
dead.  Rejecting the notion of appeals to the Americans and reeling under the splintered military 
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units’ exposure of the falsehood of Japanese brotherhood, the islands soldiers awakened to a 
newfound sense of being Okinawan.  Bolstered by a collective share of the combat trauma, the 
imprisoned Okinawan fighters questioned the order of the Empire, both verbally and 
physically.117  Nightly, they rose in anger and violence against those who they believed had 
subjugated them or those Okinawans who moved too slowly towards the group consensus.  As 
they watched or participated in the beatings, they thought, “What’s the difference between 
Okinawans and people from outside the prefecture?”118  The revelations profoundly resonated 
with the Okinawan soldiers and brought them to a definitive conclusion.  “For the first time I 
began to be awakened to differences in our cultures,” one soldier said, “I began to see that I was 
an Okinawan.”119 
      ***** 
On June 21, the American forces transitioned to a new phase of military operations on 
Okinawa, the central tasks of which focused on rooting out Japanese resistance and corralling all 
civilians into military government camps.  From the military standpoint, June 21 designated a 
definite shift in priorities and operations.  For the civilian population, some of whom had already 
found their way to U.S. military government camps during the battle, the transition appeared 
gradual, if not invisible, throughout June and early July.  During heavy fighting, American 
military success had already placed the civilians face to face with the foreigners and greatly 
increased the resident numbers in the camps.  Under the official declaration of the end of the 
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battle, civilians continued to see more and more Americans and to fill the rosters of camps at a 
greater rate.120 
The end of the battle did not bring a grand departure from camp practices during the 
fighting.  By the end of April 1945, restrictive policies and strict punishments in the camps 
relaxed as the Okinawans demonstrated cooperative and obedient behavior that contributed to the 
effective control and management of large camp populations and built kinship between 
themselves and the Americans.  The end of the battle only helped to further enforce an amiable 
camp environment that had already cultivated for months.121 
The population continued to have complicated feelings towards the Japanese, however.  
One boy found a pair of Japanese officer leather leggings in the bushes while gathering sannin 
ginger leaves and recoiled in fear while one young girl attributed her resilience during the 
fighting to the Japanese teachings she received in school before the war.122  The Japanese 
military still waged a propaganda campaign for Okinawan inclusion.   Rear Admiral Minoru Ota, 
commanding officer of the Japanese Navy Underground Headquarters, described Okinawan 
actions during the battle as those of allegiance with the Empire.  “In their heart,” he 
telegrammed, “they wish only to serve as loyal Japanese.”123  The experience of the battle, 
however, had altered the population’s acuity about the Japanese to such a great extent that 
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rhetoric alone, particularly contradictory rhetoric, could no longer significantly influence the 
people.  The Okinawans witnessed actions by both militaries that derailed years of Japanese 
propaganda designed to inspire loyalty under claims of national inclusion.  As munitions cratered 
land, singed crops, flattened homes, and pulverized people, the Okinawans faced violence at the 
hands of the Japanese rather than safety.  Stunned by the dissonance between promises of 
nationhood and violent behavior, the population distrusted and rejected the Japanese by battle’s 
end. 
In their denial of a Japanese heritage, however, the Okinawans did not adopt the 
American culture.  Okinawans that did appeal to Japan’s foe did so seeking refuge, not 
assimilation.  The dismissal of their Japanese association resulted in a full embrace and elevation 
of their already recognized Okinawan roots.  Each Okinawan – young, old, fighter or refugee - 
processed the severe experience of war at their own pace and in a unique way; yet all 
demographic groups ultimately re-established a definitive connection to an Okinawan identity.  
The trauma of the war forged shared experiences of hardship that promoted solidarity built 
around experience.  Mutual destitution drawn along lines of similar ethnicity led to a renewed 
embrace of their likeness as they sought reason and reassurance within the chaos of war.  
Gravitating towards others that shared the traits that made them outsiders, collectively the people 
found strength in understanding themselves in terms that not only led to communal comfort but 
also shunned the oppressor; they were Okinawan above all else.124  As more of the population 
pooled together in military government and Prisoner of War camps, relatively safe environments 
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with possibilities of resources, their conversations led to consciousness - a sociological process 
of realizing a group exists and understanding its position in relation to other groups - which 
further united the people in a collective Okinawan identity.125 
The Okinawans reached determinations about identity through active and deliberate 
consideration of the conditions of their environment.  Okinawans fully participated in the 
formation of and a commitment to an identity that brought safety, reassurance, and comfort and 
gained them an advantage, no matter how small, in a grave situation.  A strong Okinawan 
identity worked to secure relative physical safety and satisfied mental discord brought on by 
Japanese duplicity and war.  Okinawans participated as full actors in their identity formation and 
thus helped shape their own fate during the volatile conditions of war.  
                                                          
125Ibid, 104. 
 222 
 
CONCLUSION 
War, as an instrument of political will, begets destruction.1  War kills people, levels 
buildings, and burns crops; it dismantles economies, destroys political bodies, and places social 
constructs in peril.  Successful war, despite its purpose to forcibly impose an alternate political 
will, erases the offending way of life; war does not transform the losing country or belligerent 
group into a less vile yet functioning entity.  War consists of blood, weapons, disease, and fire.  
War brings ruin; it does not create. 
War, therefore, serves as only one step towards achieving political objectives.  Following 
a resounding defeat of an enemy, a victorious country or governing body must face the 
perplexing question of what to do with the carcass of their foe.  Leaving the enemy in a 
distressed state may be an option but long term political stability often times requires the victor 
to rebuild their devastated opponent towards at least a minimal level of steadiness.  Occupation 
and reconstruction gives the conqueror a say in the future development of the defeated nation 
and allows the victor to mold the vanquished into a body that poses minimal threat.  Militarily, 
an occupation ensures the security of the winning state and is a necessary step to establishing 
peace.  In practice, however, an occupation requires the disruption of a foreign culture by the 
heavy hand of a military organization that rarely is equipped for gubernatorial duties.  The 
requirement to eradicate elements of the offending society believed to have caused the war 
results in deep culture clashes often to the detriment of the occupied people.  Reconstruction in 
                                                          
1Carl von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 109-110. 
 
223 
 
the American South following the Civil War serves as such an example.  The imposition of 
blacks’ rights caused such a disruption in the racial hierarchy that it provoked Southern white 
violence.2  U.S. Marine occupation in Haiti from 1915-1934 devolved into a “police state” 
punctuated by massacres of the civilian population.3  Occupation duty compels military officers 
into unfamiliar government roles that further create tension between the population and the 
military who enforces the policies.  Dissatisfied with the selection of the Haitian President and 
the earlier establishment of a U.S. High Commissioner, violent protests erupted in Haiti in 1929.4  
During American Reconstruction, General Philip Sheridan asserted his military authority by 
removing civilian government officials.  President Andrew Johnson fired him.5  Occupations 
carry weighty consequences for the longevity of the country that prevailed in war; yet, they are 
complicated undertakings that stretch the capabilities of their military executors and unavoidably 
disturb the cultural fabric of a society.  Miscalculations of the situation or a dismissal of 
gubernatorial responsibilities can place a hard earned victory in jeopardy or ensnare a country 
into an undesired prolonged commitment in an area. 
The roots of reconstruction start within the violent conflict itself.  Wartime occupation 
occurs alongside the opening percussions of combat since battle commences among the 
population.  Initial contact between foreign army and local population builds the groundwork for 
military government operations following the end of hostilities.  An army that fails to consider 
the interruption to military operations caused by local infrastructure puts its campaigns at risk.  
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Local communities pose logistical challenges: they stand in the way of linear battlefields, 
redefine routes, disrupt supply distribution, obscure targets, and hide the enemy.  Practically, 
military commanders must consider how to preserve the integrity of their mission while 
minimizing the amount of interference caused by the population. 
Focusing only on military tactics on the battlefield and how to reduce challenges to 
military maneuvers, however, ignores the inherent cultural nature of occupation and reduces the 
understanding of the local people to two-dimensions.  Occupations born out of strictly military 
considerations struggle to find commonality with the population and thus impose regulations that 
consequently fail because they lack the ability to adapt to the environment.  Ultimately, such 
militaries impede the population from regaining control over their community following the 
conflict and thus extend the commitment of the foreign government in administering the 
occupied land. 
The wartime occupation of Okinawa demonstrates the crucial role that considerations of 
race and ethnicity must have on the conduct of military government.  American military 
government planners recognized both the possible threat a population of 463,000 civilians posed 
and the complexities of the relationship between Okinawa and Japan.  Without losing sight of the 
impact that the civilians would have on military operations, planners from all services, to include 
the Marines, analyzed the ethnicity of the Okinawans and how their cultural distinctiveness 
informed their behavior.  While the Marines’ policy prohibited further assessment of the 
population upon landing on the island, preliminary analysis provided the military leadership of 
all services with a more robust understanding of the battlefield that they faced and thus better 
prepared them to preserve military lives, safeguard American secrets, and win the battle. 
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Planning for the Battle of Okinawa began in the fall of 1944 as American military 
leadership recognized the strategic importance of Okinawa in relation to mainland Japan.  
Buckner, as the Commanding General of Tenth Army, primarily concerned himself with the 
tactical and operational plans of the invasion yet empowered his subordinate staff to analyze 
carefully the impact of the sizeable population on the mission.  As Crist identified, the 
determination of Okinawan allegiance to Japan held crucial importance in the conduct of the 
battle.  Balancing operational concerns about supply, mission accomplishment, and minimizing 
casualties with the potential of the civilians to form a fighting force, Army planners opted for a 
strategy that prepared the soldiers for the most dangerous outcome: assume the Okinawans 
would honor their prefectural status with Japan and engage in combat.  In execution, the plan 
called for the removal of the civilians from the battlefield so they did not interfere with the 
mission.  Soldiers learned to approach civilians with caution as potential spies and enemies.  
Consistent with Buckner’s priority on mission success, the policy meant to preserve the safety of 
tactical military secrets and minimize the loss of American soldiers’ lives.  Training for the 
soldiers, however, also acknowledged that the true disposition of the Okinawans remained 
unknown.  Once ashore, the recognition of the conjecture involved with assigning an Okinawan 
identity allowed the soldiers to fully interpret what they encountered and modify their 
judgements.  Through increased interaction with the Okinawans, the military government units 
attached to the Army gradually viewed the civilians more positively and as less of a threat.  The 
soldiers began to give the civilians more independence within the military government camps 
and provide them with extra facilities beyond their basic needs.  They identified the civilians as 
Okinawans, separate from the Japanese and independent in their motivations and loyalties but 
akin to the Americans in sensibilities and beliefs. 
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The analytical studies conducted during planning did not lack complications, however, 
and conclusions drawn by different services caused somewhat uneven results on the battlefield.  
The Marines reached the same answer about Okinawan loyalty as the Army and also devised a 
policy that rested on the supposition that the Okinawans would rally to the Japanese side. Unlike 
the Army, however, the Marines’ strict adherence to the assignment of a Japanese identity to the 
Okinawans prohibited their men on the ground from continually reassessing the behavior of the 
people they encountered.  As a result, the Marines held on to the idea of the Okinawan enemy 
longer than practical which resulted in harsher, sometimes brutal treatment.  Joint operations in 
the Pacific carried many complications despite the conscious efforts of Buckner to seamlessly 
amalgamate XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps under his Tenth Army and monitor 
interservice discontent.  Unfortunately, the population at times became game pieces in the 
contest of wills between the services. 
Following combat operations, the mission of military government on Okinawa changed 
from wartime occupation to the occupation of a defeated country.  As Army forces were diverted 
to perform occupation duties in Japan and Korea, the Navy assumed responsibility for military 
government on Okinawa.  In the chaotic aftermath of the battle, the Navy handled the 
displacement of civilians by dictating military government activities on an ad hoc basis through 
directives issued simultaneously throughout operations.  The Navy failed to analyze the changed 
environment as the island transition to peace and continued battlefield practices, such as 
guarding civilians during movement, which lacked appropriateness under the current situation. 
Naval military government settled into a malaise that accomplished little more than temporary 
fixes to the most conspicuous problems. 
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Inspired new Naval leadership placed emphasis on rectifying the troubles that afflicted 
military government.  Spruance recognized the importance of Okinawan participation in the 
emerging government structure and wrote a directive that, along with plans from junior officers, 
placed administrative control of local government with the Okinawans.  Meant to address the 
practical problem of troop attrition due to expired military service commitments, the plan also 
created a place for the people to shape their own community.  Spruance and the ingenuity of key 
officers working directly in military government recognized that only through meticulous 
analysis of the history and customs of the Okinawans could the Navy construct a viable and 
durable government organization.  Just as the Army experienced during the war, sailors found 
their views of the Okinawans evolving from increased interaction with them; they now viewed 
Okinawans as competent and civilized: a group that formed a distinct, separate, unique ethnic 
community that was neither American nor Japanese in its likeness. 
In post war operations, correctly comprehending the intent of the population and the 
nature of their loyalty allowed the occupying forces to grant the civilians increased liberties and 
ownership over the re-establishment of their government.  Under the progressive thinking and 
superior direction of Spruance and young, imaginative leaders such as Caldwell, occupation 
during the transition to peace focused on the utility of the population in achieving U.S. military 
goals.  Even with the strategic role of Okinawa following the war as an American base and a 
geographic presence in the Pacific, Okinawan involvement in the shaping of their society 
ensured the long term viability of their community programs and allowed the U.S. military to 
reduce its manpower overseas to minimal levels. 
Acknowledgment of race and ethnicity does not always ignite emotionally charged 
racism.  In contrast to Dower’s argument that negative racial sentiments towards the Japanese 
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deeply motivated the actions of the American forces at war in the Pacific Theater, contemplating 
ethnic differences did not always result in racist assumptions.6  Detailed study about the Ryukyus 
produced a deeper appreciation for the Okinawans in 1944-1946 and a better understanding of 
their unique place within the Japanese Empire.  This knowledge then allowed the military 
planners to grapple with the complex question about the disposition of the population.  Well 
aware of the importance of positive control of Okinawa in the overall strategic campaign for the 
invasion of Japan, planners handled the problem of the civilian population with seriousness.  The 
conclusion they reached – to prepare for Okinawan loyalty to the Emperor and therefore, a 
legitimate fight – lay on a foundation of solid and reliable information despite it only carrying 
the weight of a best guess.  The Okinawans, however, experienced conflicted sentiments about 
the nation of Japan and could only speculate on how they would react under the strain of violent 
conflict.  Military planners recognized the dichotomy between governing nation and peoples 
subjugated to second class and knew no simple or guaranteed answer about Okinawan 
temperament existed.  Cultural studies of an area of occupation expand the image of the occupied 
population into three-dimensions and prompt policy makers to ask questions about the impact of 
their decisions.  Military governments that provide a small amount of cultural continuity in their 
policies also increase the likelihood of acceptance by the occupied population. 
Cultural analysis acknowledges the ability of a population to think and contribute to the 
outcome of their own situation.  Thoughtful analysis of the complexities of race and ethnicity 
reveals its malleability and, thus, exposes the ability of the people to adapt and modify their 
identity to gain advantage.  As evidenced by the U.S. Army and Navy in Okinawa, military and 
government officials need to both understand the historic foundation of ethnic traditions and 
                                                          
6John Dower, War Without Mercy, Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 3-14. 
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loyalties yet also fully comprehend the contested nature of ethnicity and identity.  Successful 
military government is flexible in its cultural analysis to properly account for the adaptive nature 
of the occupied people as they struggle under the stress of the newly imposed government. 
Nations and belligerents will continue to fight wars and face occupation responsibilities 
in communities whose cultures, traditions, and beliefs differ or conflict with theirs.  Race and 
ethnicity cannot be ignored in occupations because the very nature of an occupation is the 
imposition of one set of cultural beliefs upon another in order to accomplish a military objective 
of stability.  In 2013, as the United States transitioned from Brigade Combat Team operations to 
advisor roles in Afghanistan, the need for positive and effective interaction with the local 
population became paramount.  In combating a terrorist enemy that embeds itself among the 
people, soldiers in Afghanistan, much like the American forces on Okinawa, must differentiate 
between the enemy and the citizens.  Thorough, open-minded evaluation of race and ethnicity 
executed as an active and evolving analysis provides the military with the ability to fully engage 
in their environment and flex their policy to suit the ever-changing circumstances.  
Acknowledgement of ethnic differences, done in a manner that seeks common understanding, 
will not harbor racism but, rather grow progressive policy that still supports military goals.  An 
examination of the wartime occupation of Okinawa provides an example for effective military 
government programs now and in the future. 
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